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In this study, I investigated the precursors and the outcomes of team resilience. In 
contrast to many resilience studies, which focus on low-probability, high-impact 
challenges, I investigated resilience in the face of high-frequency, low-impact 
challenges that teams can face in their operational environments. I conducted an 
extensive literature analysis of the field of resilience and on the basis of this 
constructed a model of team resilience by integrating insights from high reliability 
organizing, positive organizational scholarship, sensemaking and disaster resilience 
studies. I then tested and improved this model through an exploratory study of team 
behaviour in two “Escape Game” settings in which teams of 5 people worked through a 
series of puzzles under time-constrained and somewhat stressful conditions. Following 
the exploratory study, I developed the resilience model into an operationalizable 
format and tested it using seven runs of a simulation study involving 547 individuals in 
68 teams. In the simulation, teams had to work both quickly and accurately whilst 
adapting to the changing conditions of a turbulent, competitive environment. 
Quantitative and qualitative data were collected on various team attributes, team 
resilience and team performance. I have used quantitative data as the main source of 
analysis and qualitative data as a supporting tool. Self-completion questionnaires, 
objective performance indicators, direct observation and post-simulation team and 
individual reflections were among the data collection tools that were used to obtain 
data. 
Team resilience shows highly significant associations with a range of objective 
measures of team performance. In turn, resilience is supported by several team 
attributes, including collective mental models, effective channels of communication and 
systems of information gathering and team cohesion. When teams faced challenges 
outside of their existing action repertoires their ability to improvise also contributed to 
resilience. Finally, when teams overcame (novel) challenges, this fed back into their 
accumulated knowledge through collective learning, enriching action repertoires. 
Together, these features bestow teams with resilience, which, in turn, enables them to 
overcome disturbances that might otherwise impede operational performance.  
In its final form, my resilience model serves as an explanation of the mechanisms of 
resilience and identifies its antecedents and outcomes. It can inform teams operating in 
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uncertain, ambiguous and volatile work conditions about the capacities and capabilities 






Table of Contents  
Declaration .......................................................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................................ v 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................ vii 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background and the significance of the research ........................................................... 1 
1.2 Overview of the current research ......................................................................................... 8 
1.3 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................. 11 
2 Literature Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 13 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 13 
2.2 A brief history of the resilience term ................................................................................ 13 
2.3 “Resilience” in organizational research ........................................................................... 17 
2.3.1 Organizational resilience in high-risk industries ............................................... 19 
2.3.2 Organizational resilience and major crises .......................................................... 22 
2.4 Literature gaps ........................................................................................................................... 28 
2.5 Research Questions .................................................................................................................. 33 
2.5.1 Precursors of ‘team resilience’ ................................................................................... 35 
2.5.2 Team resilience and Team performance ............................................................... 40 
2.6 Research Model .......................................................................................................................... 44 
2.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 47 
3 Exploratory Study – Escape Games ............................................................................................. 49 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 49 
3.2 Methods ......................................................................................................................................... 51 
3.2.1 Nature of Escape Games (Escape Room) ............................................................... 51 
3.2.2 Research design ............................................................................................................... 52 
3.2.3 Data collection .................................................................................................................. 53 
3.2.4 Sampling .............................................................................................................................. 53 
x 
 
3.3 Implementation ......................................................................................................................... 54 
3.4 Detailed accounts of exercises ............................................................................................ 55 
3.4.1 Exercise 1 ........................................................................................................................... 55 
3.4.2 Exercise 2 ........................................................................................................................... 57 
3.5 Analysis ......................................................................................................................................... 59 
3.5.1 Comparability of the two exercises: ........................................................................ 60 
3.5.2 Validation of resilience precursors identified in the conceptual model .. 61 
3.5.3 Other precursors observed to facilitate resilience ............................................ 69 
3.5.4 Resilience and team performance ............................................................................ 74 
3.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 75 
4 Main Study: Methodology ............................................................................................................... 79 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 79 
4.2 Research Design ........................................................................................................................ 80 
4.2.1 Methodological choices ................................................................................................ 80 
4.2.2 Participants........................................................................................................................ 83 
4.3 An overview of the Simulation ............................................................................................ 84 
4.3.1 Simulation Process ......................................................................................................... 84 
4.3.2 The rationale behind choosing “greetings cards market” simulation to 
investigate resilience ........................................................................................................................ 90 
4.4 Data Collection Methods ........................................................................................................ 91 
4.4.1 Questionnaires ................................................................................................................. 92 
4.4.2 Objective performance data ..................................................................................... 100 
4.4.3 Other data collection tools ........................................................................................ 103 
4.5 Data Analysis ............................................................................................................................ 105 
4.5.1 Quantitative data analysis ......................................................................................... 105 
4.5.2 Utilization of the qualitative data ........................................................................... 112 
4.6 Testable research model and the hypotheses............................................................. 114 
4.7 Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................... 116 
xi 
 
5 Results 1: Quantitative Findings ................................................................................................ 117 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 117 
5.2 Data preparation for the analysis .................................................................................... 118 
5.2.1 Interrater agreement (IRA) ...................................................................................... 119 
5.2.2 Reliability analysis (Internal consistency) ......................................................... 122 
5.2.3 Factor analysis (discriminant validity) ............................................................... 125 
5.3 Manipulation Checks ............................................................................................................ 128 
5.3.1 The effects of the challenging conditions ........................................................... 128 
5.3.2 The unexpectedness of the trading period ........................................................ 130 
5.4 Nature of the data and the identification of control variables ............................ 131 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics ................................................................................................... 131 
5.4.2 Selection of control variables .................................................................................. 135 
5.5 Steps of the hypothesis testing ......................................................................................... 138 
5.5.1 Correlations .................................................................................................................... 138 
5.5.2 Regressions ..................................................................................................................... 144 
5.5.3 Path Analysis .................................................................................................................. 152 
5.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 158 
6 Results 2: Qualitative Findings ................................................................................................... 159 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 159 
6.2 Further validation of the quantitative findings ......................................................... 159 
6.2.1 Team resilience and collective dynamics ........................................................... 159 
6.2.2 Team resilience and team performance ............................................................. 165 
6.3 Further exploration of the research model ................................................................. 167 
6.3.1 Knowledge accumulation (preparation, modelling, testing and trials) . 167 
6.3.2 Effective information processing ........................................................................... 179 
6.4 Discovery of new relationships ........................................................................................ 182 
6.4.1 Managing Diversity ...................................................................................................... 182 
6.4.2 Trust in other team members ................................................................................. 184 
xii 
 
6.4.3 Supportive team members / team atmosphere ............................................... 186 
6.5 Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................... 187 
7 Discussion ............................................................................................................................................ 189 
7.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 189 
7.2 Model of Team Resilience.................................................................................................... 189 
7.3 Research questions re-visited ........................................................................................... 192 
7.3.1 What are the precursors of team resilience? ..................................................... 192 
7.3.2 Is team resilience related to team performance and if so, how? ............... 195 
7.4 Implications .............................................................................................................................. 197 
7.4.1 Academic implications ................................................................................................ 197 
7.4.2 Practical implications .................................................................................................. 201 
7.5 Limitations and recommendations ................................................................................. 207 
7.5.1 Limitations ....................................................................................................................... 207 
7.5.2 Recommendations for future studies into resilience ..................................... 210 
8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 215 
9 References ........................................................................................................................................... 219 
10 Appendices ..................................................................................................................................... 249 
10.1 Various definitions of ‘resilience’ ..................................................................................... 251 
10.2 Exploratory study data collection guidelines.............................................................. 262 
10.3 Examples of documents provided with the Starter/Pre-Order Pack ................ 263 
10.3.1 General Product Specifications ............................................................................... 263 
10.3.2 Final Accounts Form .................................................................................................... 264 
10.3.3 Emergency Loan Application Form ....................................................................... 265 
10.3.4 Procurement Form ....................................................................................................... 266 
10.4 Example of a Sales Order and Delivery Notice (SODN) ........................................... 267 
10.5 The latest version of pre- and post-trading questionnaires ................................. 268 
10.5.1 Pre-trading questionnaire ......................................................................................... 268 
10.5.2 Post-trading questionnaire ....................................................................................... 270 
xiii 
 
10.6 Contents of the self-completion measures .................................................................. 274 
10.7 Performance data used in the calculation of performance indicators ............. 276 
10.8 An example template for Strategic Plans ..................................................................... 278 
10.9 Strategic review meeting guidelines for the researchers ...................................... 279 
 
Figure 1. McDaniels et al.’s (2008, p. 312) conceptualization of resilience ......................... 15 
Figure 2. "Swiss Cheese Model" by Reason (2000, p. 769) ......................................................... 20 
Figure 3. Measure of seismic resilience (Bruneau et al., 2003, p. 737, 2005, p. 19; 
Tierney and Bruneau, 2007, p. 15)........................................................................................................ 25 
Figure 4. Resilience explained through organization challenge-response process .......... 45 
Figure 5. Conceptual model ...................................................................................................................... 46 
Figure 6. Improved research model ..................................................................................................... 76 
Figure 7. Opt-Out Item............................................................................................................................. 100 
Figure 8. Operationalized research model ...................................................................................... 116 
Figure 9. Formulas for rwg and rwg(J) ................................................................................................... 121 
Figure 10. Scatterplot of predicted values of dependent variable against the 
standardized residuals ............................................................................................................................ 146 
Figure 11. Scatterplot of predicted values of dependent variable against the 
standardized residuals ............................................................................................................................ 148 
Figure 12. Scatterplot of predicted values of dependent variable against the 
standardized residuals ............................................................................................................................ 151 
Figure 13. Path diagram for the overall model (covariances were not shown for 
simplicity), Model-1 n=47 ...................................................................................................................... 153 
Figure 14. Path diagram for the overall model (covariances were not shown for 
simplicity) – Model-2, n=47 .................................................................................................................. 153 
Figure 15. Path diagram for the overall model (covariances were not shown for 
simplicity) – Simplified Model, n=68................................................................................................. 155 
Figure 16. Model of Collective Resilience ........................................................................................ 190 
 
Table 1. Various characterizations of resilience in different fields. ........................................ 16 
Table 2. Comparison of two exploratory exercises ........................................................................ 60 
Table 3. Details of the seven runs of the simulation ...................................................................... 85 
Table 4. Scales and open-ended items ................................................................................................. 93 
xiv 
 
Table 5. mean rwg(J) values for the constructs ................................................................................. 122 
Table 6. Summary of reliability analysis, n=541 ........................................................................... 123 
Table 7. Adequacy tests for factor analysis for pre-trading items ......................................... 125 
Table 8. Rotated factor loadings for pre-trading items (factor loading below 0.30 was 
not included in the table) ........................................................................................................................ 125 
Table 9. Adequacy tests for factor analysis for post-trading items ....................................... 126 
Table 10. Rotated factor loadings for post-trading items (factor loading below 0.30 was 
not included in the table) ........................................................................................................................ 126 
Table 11. Rejection and non-fulfilment levels ................................................................................ 129 
Table 12. Emotional status of the participants after the trading period, n=541 ............. 130 
Table 13. Forecasts vs. Actual results ................................................................................................ 131 
Table 14. Demographic features of the sample ............................................................................. 132 
Table 15. Descriptive statistics associated with performance indicators .......................... 134 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics associated with the constructs ............................................. 135 
Table 17. Aggregation of the demographic variables to the team level .............................. 136 
Table 18. Analysis results for the relationships between dependent variables and the 
candidates of demographic control variables ................................................................................ 137 
Table 19. Performance dimensions and corresponding variables ........................................ 139 
Table 20. Correlations between various performance measures .......................................... 139 
Table 21. Correlations between team resilience and various performance measures . 140 
Table 22. Correlations between team resilience and the precursor constructs .............. 142 
Table 23. Correlations between performance and precursor variables ............................. 143 
Table 24. Regression analysis: Team resilience as the dependent variable, n=47 ......... 145 
Table 25. Regression analysis: Team resilience as the dependent variable, n=68 ......... 147 
Table 26. Regression analysis: Profit/Loss as the dependent variable, n=68 .................. 150 
Table 27. Path analysis results for the main research models, n=47 ................................... 154 
Table 28. Path analysis results for the simplified models, n=68 ............................................ 156 
Table 29. Various definitions of resilience ...................................................................................... 261 





1.1 Background and the significance of the research 
 
“In an increasingly volatile and uncertain world, one of the greatest assets an 
organisation can have is the agility to survive unexpected crisis and to find opportunity 
to thrive in the face of potentially terminal events.” 
(Stephenson et al., 2010, p. 2) 
 
Many commentators argue that for many organizations the world is getting more 
challenging and disruptive. Increased volumes of economic shocks, natural disasters, 
terrorist attacks, political instabilities and other threats are cited as reasons for this 
(van der Vegt et al., 2015; Annarelli and Nonino, 2016; Linnenluecke, 2017). To 
respond to these challenges, organizations need to learn to survive and even thrive in 
the face of these threats and to adapt themselves to changing conditions in their 
environments. As Gibson and Tarrant put it (2010, p. 6): 
 “Over the last decade, volatility in our natural, economic and 
social systems appears to be increasing at rates faster than many 
organisations can cope. Whilst such fast moving events 
overwhelm many organisations a proportion demonstrate an 
ability to either manage or bounce back from the adverse effects 
of system volatility.” 
This increased frequency of industrial and natural adversities faced by organizations 
has stimulated organizational researchers to work on finding ways to make employees, 
teams and organizations more resilient to these challenging conditions (Shrivastava et 
al., 1988). The reason is that these challenging conditions, depending on their volume 
and severity, may cause a loss in customers and revenues (as in the 2008 financial 
crisis), damage to reputation (as in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill), a decrease in 
employee morale (as in GM’s layoffs between 2008–2010), the termination of 
functionality (as in Hurricane Katrina) and, worst of all, injuries and fatalities (as in the 
9/11 terrorist attacks). Arguably, the urgency of understanding processes of resilience 
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is increasing, for two reasons. Firstly, adverse conditions around organizations (such as 
natural disasters, economic crises or depletion of resources) are increasing in volume, 
severity and unpredictability according to many scholars (Richtnér and Löfsten, 2014; 
Scholten, Scott and Fynes, 2014; for e.g. Coward, 2015). Secondly, organizations are 
becoming more vulnerable to adverse conditions because of increased automation and 
interdependencies (Dalziell and McManus, 2004; Gölgeci and Ponomarov, 2014). 
Increased collaboration between organizations, which can increase productivity and 
efficiency, also increases interdependency. Thus, an incident which directly interrupts 
one organization’s operations may also indirectly interrupt the operations of the many 
other organizations that are connected to the organization directly afflicted. This, in 
turn, increases the amount of the average cost of downtime per hour from disruptions 
as demonstrated by the Aberdeen Group (2012). 
Despite the increasing prevalence of challenges, organizations may be reluctant to 
allocate resources to the  anticipation, mitigation and elimination of challenges (Ray, 
Baker and Plowman, 2011). One reason is the greater salience of conventional 
efficiency and performance pressures (such as growing revenues, outsourcing or 
decreasing costs) whose outcomes are more tangible and immediate. However, in 
addition to draining the organizational budgets, these practices may lower 
organizations’ flexibility and increase their interdependence, which, in turn, increases 
their vulnerability and risk of facing adversities (Mcaslan, 2010, p. 1). For example, 
Fiksel et al. (2015, p. 80) draw attention to the fact that 2011 tsunami in Japan caused 
great challenges for organizations like General Motors who practice just-in-time and 
lean production methods, where “managers work closely with a small number of 
suppliers to keep inventories low”. These companies had no slack resources (or 
contingency suppliers) to supply certain components; and hence, they had to pause 
their operations.  
Adding onto this discussion, Choo (2008, p. 34) states that practitioners are in favour of 
spending “minimum mental and physical effort” and providing maximum “cost 
efficiency” in operations. Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2010, p. 500) argue that these 
practices may be counterproductive in volatile operational conditions. Moreover, 
Fujimoto and Park (2014) suggest that organizations can both provide for effective 
crisis response and competitiveness at the same time, if they prioritize resilience along 
with efficiency and invest in the development of various mental and physical 
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capabilities. According to Fujimoto and Park (2014), utilizing these capabilities 
provides recovery from the crisis without increasing the unit costs. 
Nonetheless, contrary to conventional organizational concerns, concerns for 
operational and organizational risks are neglected by practitioners because the 
outcomes of these concerns may be intangible and very hard to observe or demonstrate 
(Lee, Vargo and Seville, 2013, p. 30). Activities such as formulating contingency plans or 
running scenario analyses do not necessarily yield measurable and observable benefits, 
unless the organization is actually put to the test. Regarding this, Stephenson (2010a, p. 
2) points out how hard it is to convince executives to invest in practices without 
demonstrating tangible and measurable outcomes; and Klein et al. (2003, p. 42) suggest 
that without measurability, resilience cannot serve as a “practical policy or 
management tool”. Thus, robust measures are needed to be able to demonstrate the 
outcomes of allocating resources towards building resilience, if decision-makers are to 
be persuaded to invest more heavily in such activities.  
Not only may the volume of challenges be increasing, so may be their unpredictability –
caused by constant changes in technology, nature, society and economy (Sahebjamnia, 
Torabi and Mansouri, 2015; Seville, Van Opstal and Vargo, 2015). Thus, even 
implementing ‘planned responses’ to anticipated crises, which are expected to facilitate 
recovery, is found insufficient (Corey and Deitch, 2011, p. 171); and the necessity of 
successful ‘ad hoc responses’ to novel situations becomes prominent (Boin and 
McConnell, 2007). Therefore, even investing in planned responses is not sufficient; 
therefore, research should guide practitioners with regard to what capacities and 
capabilities to invest in to be able to formulate ad hoc responses, as well as planned 
ones.  
Recently, investigation of these ‘ad hoc responses’ has been the main focus of 
organizational survival researchers and this marked the popularization of the 
organizational resilience concept in the field. As Coward (2015, p. 58) pointed out:  
“[R]esilience marks a turn from the predictable geopolitical threat 
of mutually assured destruction to an era of complexity and 
unpredictability in which subjects must be equipped with the skills 
to live with uncertainty and respond to crisis.”  
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Moreover, the widely held assumption that ‘all crises and disruptions are merely or 
mainly bad for organizations’ is also challenged by positive organizational scholarship 
proponents (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). This is supported by many other scholars who 
challenged the widely held view that people and organizations cannot respond well to 
large-scale, novel, crisis situations (for e.g. Horne and Orr, 1997; Mallak, 1998a). 
Positive framings of organizational crises have shaped the way organizational scholars 
perceive crisis management (van der Vegt et al., 2015, p. 972). Investigations to help 
organizations manage crises have slowly been replaced by investigations of how 
organizations can be resilient. Traditional crisis management perspectives mainly 
perceive crises as negative situations to be avoided and value the structural elements of 
organizations that allow them to prevent or absorb these situations (Alesch, Holly, 
Mittler and Nagy, 2001). As opposed to this, resilience emphasizes how adverse 
situations can present learning opportunities for organizations, drawing attention to 
the cognitive, emotional and relational dynamics in organizations which can help to 
overcome adversity. 
Two significant streams of work have addressed challenges with a positive framing, 
acknowledging the benefits and opportunities that might emerge from them. On the 
one hand, researchers have examined organizations in high-risk industries and have 
sought to understand the factors behind their survival in these zero-tolerance 
conditions, where the penalty for even the smallest errors is extremely high. These 
organizations are called high-reliability organizations (HROs) because, they constantly 
need to provide for “reliable performance” while operating “hazardous systems” 
(LaPorte and Consolini, 1991). Since the outcomes of the errors made in these systems 
are severe, perhaps even terminal, these organizations need to demonstrate resilience 
to survive in these conditions. Therefore HRO researchers focused their studies on 
understanding how organizations operating in these conditions are able to continue to 
functional and on the factors that facilitate this ability (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 
2008). Examples of this work are the studies investigating the reliable performances of 
nuclear power plants (e.g. Carvalho et al., 2008; Gomes et al., 2014), military 
organizations (Roberts, Stout and Halpern, 1994), aircraft carriers (Weick and Roberts, 
1993) and other organizations operating in high-risk industries. 
On the other hand, other researchers have investigated organizations in ‘normal’ risk 
conditions that experience unexpected crises in the form of natural disasters, industrial 
shocks, political, technological or economic breakdowns, etc. They have sought to 
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understand the difference between organizations that can survive crises and those that 
cannot; and they have tried to determine the factors behind crisis survival. In these 
studies, researchers have paid particular attention to understanding the capacity for 
ad-hoc response formulation, because solely relying on planned responses is ineffective 
when dealing with unexpected events (Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003b). The most 
abundant work in this stream is post-hoc examination of organizations facing such 
unexpected crises. Among this work are notable examples such as investigations into 
organizations that survived the 9/11 attacks (e.g. Freeman, Hirschhorn and Triad, 
2003a; Gittell et al., 2006); climate change and major natural disasters (Dahlhamer and 
Tierney, 1998; e.g. Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 1998; Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2013; 
Williams and Shepherd, 2016); and technological and industrial shocks (Meyer, 1982; 
Meyer, Brooks and Goes, 1990; e.g. Akgün and Keskin, 2014) along with investigations 
into supply chain resilience to unexpected disruptions (Sheffi and Rice Jr., 2005; 
Kamalahmadi and Parast, 2016). 
The existing work on resilience is abundant in proposing various antecedents for 
resilient responses to challenges (Meyer, 1982; notable examples are: Weick, 1993; 
Horne and Orr, 1997; Mallak, 1998a; Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 
2005; Stephenson, 2010b). However, there are prominent gaps in the field: first, there 
is a lack of a generally accepted model built based on these antecedents, and second, 
there is little explicit investigation and discussion of the outcomes of resilient (or non-
resilient) responses. Therefore, the important questions of ‘what precursors lead 
organizations to achieve resilient responses to challenges?’ and ‘what are the outcomes 
of resilience that allow us to recognize its existence?’ remain unanswered. As stated by 
Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2012, p. 938): “While illustrating important points, it is 
likely that existing theoretical and case insights have not yet uncovered the full range of 
factors leading to resilience”.  
Even more crucial than these two issues, much previous work in the field has 
investigated resilience in extreme settings, where the outcomes of adversity threaten 
the survival of organizations and individuals. As mentioned above, a great deal of work 
either investigates organizations in high-risk sectors (e.g. nuclear power plants, fire 
rescue departments) or organizations that have been through extreme adversity (e.g. 
floods, hurricanes, terrorist attacks). In the development of the resilience field, the 
resilience perspective is almost exclusively seen in terms of better response to such 
extremities. An undesirable consequence of this inclination is that it restricts 
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conceptualization of, as well as research into, resilience to major and one-off 
disruptions. Thus, resilience research becomes relevant only to “organizations in which 
reliability is a more pressing issue than efficiency” (Weick, 1987, p. 112). However, a 
capacity to demonstrate resilience is also important for organizations dealing with less 
consequential yet more frequent challenges of the operational volatilities and 
unexpectedness such as an unexpected big order from a customer, the introduction of 
an advanced product or service by a competitor or a conflict between the units of an 
organization. 
Conclusively, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical work with regard to resilience 
in less extreme conditions such as sectoral turbulences, daily work stressors or 
unexpected operational pressures and events. This is important because these non-
extreme adversities are far more frequent and are experienced by larger numbers of 
organizations; and hence, frameworks that explain resilience to these challenges would 
be beneficial to a much wider organizational population, compared to the frameworks 
for extreme adversities. The current study targets this gap; it aims to identify the 
precursors of resilience and also to understand how resilience is, in turn, beneficial for 
the organizations in non-extreme but still volatile, stressful and turbulent conditions. 
However, in order to achieve these aims, a number of other gaps and limitations of the 
organizational resilience field should also be addressed.  
On the one hand, there are fundamental gaps at the theoretical level. Starting from the 
emergence of the general resilience literature, the term ‘resilience’ has been defined 
and conceptualized in very diverse ways by many scholars from different disciplines 
(Lewis, Donaldson-Feilder and Pangallo, 2011). Thus, there is a growing ‘need for a 
common terminology’ regarding the term for a convenient and more productive flow of 
conversation in the field (Dalziell  and McManus, 2004, p. 18). Additionally, scholars 
also point out the limitations of existing conceptualizations; in the sense that they could 
not be transmitted to ‘an operational, measurable concept of resilience’ (Carpenter, 
Walker, Anderies and Abel, 2001, p. 767). Therefore, existing definitions are considered 
inconsistent and inadequate by many scholars (Burnard and Bhamra, 2011; Cumming 
et al., 2005; Duchek, 2014). Targeting this gap, the current study aims to establish an 
operationalizable conceptualization of resilience.  
On the other hand, there are also prominent limitations at the empirical level of the 
resilience literature. First of all, it is generally impractical to observe organizations 
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when they are in the grip of a crisis. Opportunities to conduct real-time data collection 
are very limited, as the chances of capturing data while an organisation is responding 
to a challenge are low and the presence of observers might not be welcomed. 
Therefore, most resilience research is post-hoc case study investigation of 
organizations and the data are based on the testimonials of people experienced the 
event (Lewis, Donaldson-Feilder and Pangallo, 2011, p. 6), which may create a problem 
of self-report bias. Secondly, resilience is experienced by various kinds of organizations 
in different settings; and hence, it is very difficult to obtain generalizable results. 
Thirdly, most of empirical work in the field has collected data at a single point of time. 
This method choice is problematic because it cannot reveal the processes and 
mechanisms of resilience. Moreover, it risks treating resilience as a linear process and 
falls short in demonstrating the effects of learning from crises.   
These limitations suggest that the problems associated with empirical investigations of 
resilience are largely responsible from the gaps in the resilience literature. As Cumming 
et al. (2005, p. 976) stated it is very difficult to operationalize resilience because of its 
“abstract” and “multidimensional” nature. Moreover, as Bhamra et al. (2011) and 
Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2010) argued retrospective analysis of resilience is much 
convenient, and hence, most of the time, case studies are preferred as the empirical 
investigation method. Lastly, as Lewis et al. (2011) pointed out empirical investigations 
of resilience rely on self-reports and restricted samples and are limited in 
generalizability. Thus, methodological diversity may be an important step in 
overcoming the problems and limitations in the field. Novel methodologies are 
required both for all-round investigations of single research subjects and for 
comparisons of several similar units with regards to their responses to adversity. In 
their work where they encourage organizational studies researchers to investigate 
resilience, van der Vegt et al. (van der Vegt et al., 2015, pp. 976–7) put this as follows: 
To study the factors that determine resilience, it may be necessary 
to measure the relevant characteristics and capabilities of 
individuals and (parts of) the systems, such as those discussed 
above, and relate those to individual or system vulnerability and 
recovery indicators. This requires the tracking of the functioning 
of individuals and systems over a longer period of time during 
which one or more disturbances take place. For groups or larger 
systems, this could be realized in an experimental setting where 
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individuals work together on a complex task, and, after some time, 
one or more interruptions are introduced. Although it is 
impossible to introduce “real” disasters or crises, one could easily 
introduce disturbances that can be expected to result from such 
adverse events (e.g., failure of communication systems, high time 
pressure, and loss of team members). Individual characteristics of 
participants can be measured before the experiment, and 
relationship characteristics, emerging network structures, and 
participant behaviours can be measured during the experiment. 
Such experimental designs not only allow researchers to collect 
data from a large number of systems working on similar tasks 
with objective performance criteria, but also to manipulate a 
variety of potentially important determinants of resilience, such 
as the composition of (parts of) the system, the relationships 
between individuals and groups, and governance structures used 
to manage the system.  
 
1.2 Overview of the current research  
As Rudolph and Repenning (2002, p. 27) point out, organizations that suffer complex 
adversities, which include frequent novel disruptions, ‘must cultivate a complex set of 
skills, capabilities that have received little attention in the existing literature’. In line 
with this view and considering the increasing necessity of organizations to formulate 
resilient responses to challenges, in the current study, I aim to identify a broad set of 
collective dynamics that contributes to achieving resilience to challenging conditions. 
However, in contrast to the majority of the previous studies of the resilience field, I aim 
to identify the collective dynamics that contribute to the resilience of organizations 
facing non-extreme challenges of everyday operational conditions as well as 
organizations facing extreme adversities. Accomplishing this aim is essentially 
beneficial for organizations to effectively deal with the challenges of the operational 
environment and maintain desired performance levels. This, in turn, may positively 
affect the stakeholders of organizations such as owners who earn profits, employees 
who earn their living by working there, consumers who need the products of these 
organizations, or suppliers who sell to those organizations. Increased resilience is 
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particularly important for the members of organizations (i.e. owners and workers) as 
they may be directly exposed (physically and/or economically) to the impact of 
challenging conditions in certain cases (e.g. Weick, 1993; Freeman, Hirschhorn and 
Triad, 2003a; Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003b; Castillo, 2004).  
In designing research to accomplish this aim, I exploit a novel methodology that seeks 
to address the concerns and suggestions mentioned above, raised by Cumming et al. 
(2005, p. 976), Bhamra et al. (2011), Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2010), and van der 
Vegt et al. (2015, pp. 976–7). Previous empirical research considering organizational 
resilience is mainly restricted to post-hoc analysis of single events and single 
organizations. This method does not allow researchers to observe and understand the 
unexpressed mechanisms of how certain factors may contribute to resilience and how, 
in turn, resilience may contribute to positive organizational outcomes. It also does not 
provide comparability, which facilitates generalizability. Addressing these, I designed 
the current study to allow for real-time data collection, comparability, and the 
utilization of objective measures of performance where possible. In addition to testing 
the relationships between resilience and its antecedents as well as its outcomes, the 
study explores the mechanisms that lead to the manifestation of these relationships. In 
other words, this study aims to demonstrate how certain collective dynamics 
contribute to resilience and how resilience contributes to the maintenance of desired 
performance levels.  
To best address the issues in the field, I designed a research model that exploited a 
methodology that is unconventional to the field. It comprises of three steps. The first 
step was to conduct a thorough literature analysis and to establish a conceptual 
framework based on this analysis. This framework incorporates the various theories 
and perspectives of organizational resilience (such as high-reliability organizing, 
positive organizational scholarship, sensemaking, crisis management and business 
continuity planning) in order to propose a broad set of factors that contribute to 
resilience. It proposes an integrated framework to address questions of “what are the 
precursors that facilitate resilience?” and “what is the outcome of being resilient?” The 
literature analysis reveals that different sets of skills are proposed by many studies to 
serve that purpose (for e.g. Meyer, 1982; Weick, 1993; Coutu, 2002; Kendra and 
Wachtendorf, 2003b; Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008) 
and this framework provides an integrated picture resulting from this analysis. The 
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summary of the literature analysis and the resulting tentative research framework is 
given in chapter 2.    
Following this, the second step was to refine this framework using an exploratory study 
before more rigorous testing. In this exploratory study, I compared the propositions 
and findings from the literature with the results of my observations of the responses of 
the teams to the challenges they face. This was fruitful in two ways. First, it 
demonstrated the mechanisms of how the collective dynamics proposed in my research 
model (and in previous studies) contributed to the manifestation of resilience. In the 
light of my observations, I reassessed the relationships I proposed in the tentative 
framework. Second, it served as a practice for the main study by demonstrating the 
possible problems and challenges that might be faced. Hence, it also allowed for the 
reassessment and the improvement of the main study research design. The details of 
this exploratory study are provided in chapter 3.  
The third and final step was rigorous testing and validation of the tentative framework 
with an empirical study that was conducted with a larger population of teams. This 
study is part of a bigger research project conducted by five academicians including 
myself. In a carefully planned simulated setting, teams were subjected to challenging 
conditions and data collected regarding the manifestation of resilience and its 
outcomes. The details of the research design and the data is explained in chapter 4. The 
research framework was tested with the data collected and using quantitative as well 
as qualitative analysis. The quantitative findings associated with these analyses are 
illustrated in chapter 5 along with their interpretation. The quantitative analysis is also 
further supported with rich, descriptive qualitative data from critical incidents that 
occurred during the simulation. The anecdotes extracted from these incidents are used 
to articulate and exemplify the data obtained from the quantitative analysis. In addition 
to this, qualitative findings were also utilized in exploring relationships between the 
components of the tentative framework as well as other newly discovered 
relationships. The discussion with regard to this further exploration is provided in 
chapter 6. Finally, in chapter 7, I discuss the wider theoretical and empirical 




1.3 Concluding remarks 
Resilience research is growing in significance since there is a worldwide increase in the 
quantity and severity of the challenges facing organizations. Attention towards 
organizational resilience is growing along with the concerns of scholars towards 
changing organizational conditions and their impact on organizations. In this study, I 
intend to respond to these concerns, particularly by exploring the applicability of the 
results of resilience research by organizations facing ‘everyday’ challenges and by 
advancing understanding of the mechanisms by which resilient responses to these 
challenges are formulated. I hope that the results of this study will assist practitioners 
to construct strategic plans for resilience to challenging conditions and to invest in the 
development of relevant capacities and capabilities. The goal is to help organizations to 







2 Literature Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
The concept of resilience lies at the heart of this study. As I mentioned in the 
Introduction chapter, the purpose of my study is to establish a model to explain 
resilience by identifying its precursors and its relationship with performance. With this 
model, I aim to explain the antecedents of resilience to adversity and unexpected 
events. In this chapter, I provide background to the resilience concept before describing 
the empirical work carried out to date. This background includes the initial adoption of 
the term resilience in academia, its use by organizational theorists, models and 
frameworks that explain the concept, its dimensions, its possible precursors and its 
relationship to performance.  
In the first section, the very first studies that the concept of resilience encountered are 
disclosed and the connotations of the concept examined. In the second section, 
discussion is narrowed down to the organizational context and the concept’s usage in 
organization studies is described. This section include the initial theories of resilience 
developed in this field as well as more recently published work. Moreover, various 
models and frameworks proposed to explain organizational resilience are introduced 
in order to show the various interpretations of the resilience concept by organizational 
researchers.  
After providing a broad context with regard to what has been done in the field, I discuss 
the gaps in the resilience literature, both at theoretical and empirical levels. Then, I lay 
out my research questions, which aim to address the literature gaps. Here, I also 
elaborate on how I utilized the previous literature to frame and develop my research 
questions, particularly to establish my research model. Finally, I disclose the research 
model that I developed for this study and explain it in detail.  
 
2.2 A brief history of the resilience term 
Resilience is defined in the dictionary as “the ability of people or things to feel better 
quickly after something unpleasant, such as shock, injury, etc.” or “the ability of a 
substance to return to its original shape after it has been bent, stretched or pressed” 
(Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, 2014). As an academic term, it was initially used in the 
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nineteenth century in the field of material science. It was regarded, first, as an attribute 
to describe certain elements, and then, as a measure to compare different kinds of 
elements (McAslan, 2010, p. 2). Thus, its academic conceptualization reaches back to 
more than 100 years. However, until Holling’s work in 1973 it had not been transferred 
to any field outside of material science.  
As a pioneer in applying the conceptualization of the term resilience into another field, 
Holling (1973) used the concept to convey the idea that possessing the characteristic of 
stability is not enough for ecological systems to survive in volatile environments. To be 
able to survive in environments with frequent disturbances the characteristic of 
resilience, which provides for rapid adaptation to changes, should be displayed by 
ecological systems. This application by Holling has been embraced by other scholars 
from his field as well as scholars from other fields such as psychology, economy, social 
systems, and management (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2001; Rose, 2004; Linnenluecke and 
Griffiths, 2010; Burnard and Bhamra, 2011).  
Referring to Holling’s work, scholars gradually increased their interest in and studies of 
resilience (Linnenluecke, Griffiths and Winn, 2012, p. 22). For instance, Folke and his 
colleagues (Folke, 2006; Folke and Rockström, 2009; Folke et al., 2010; Carpenter et al., 
2012), who, like Holling, are also from field of ecology, examined the development of 
the concept of resilience in ecosystems and recommended the concept’s application in 
social-systems research. Folke drew attention to the connotations of the resilience 
concept in addition to absorbing and adapting to change, such as developing, learning, 
re-organizing and transforming (Folke, 2006, pp. 253, 259) and suggested that 
researchers may benefit from such a perspective on resilience in order to understand 
social systems experiencing changes and challenges.  
In line with Folke’s (2006) suggestion, McDaniels et al. (2008) and Nelson et al. (2007) 
used the concept of resilience to understand how complex systems respond to change 
and adversity. Nelson et al. (2007, p. 400) proposed a three-step system adaptation to 
change, where the first step is the demonstration of the capacity to absorb the change, 
the second step is transforming the system and the third step is adaptation. On the 
other hand, McDaniels et al. (2008, p. 311) conceptualized resilience in two dimensions, 
namely robustness and rapidity, and identified these two dimensions as indicators of 
a system’s resilience to an external shock (or challenge). They illustrated this 





Figure 1. McDaniels et al.’s (2008, p. 312) conceptualization of resilience 
 
As seen in the graph, robustness indicates level to which the system functioning is 
affected by the challenge, i.e. absorption capacity, and rapidity indicates how fast the 
system returns to the pre-challenge functioning levels, i.e. the adaptation capacity. 
Absorption capacity may increase the robustness of the system by the system’s 
anticipation of a challenge and adaptation capacity may increase the rapidity of the 
system through the effectiveness of the system’s responses after a challenge is 
manifested. From this perspective, both prior anticipation and later responses are 
considered to be manifestations of resilience. Conversely, for some other researchers, 
resilience emerges only after a challenge has manifested. For instance, Wildavsky 
(1988, p. 147) defined resilience as “the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers 
after they become manifest”. Similarly, Weick et al. (2008, p. 46) stated that two 
connotations of resilience are “bouncing back from errors” and “coping with surprises 
in the moment”. This different view focuses on the unexpectedness or the surprise of 
challenges and suggests that the increasingly unexpected nature of challenges is one of 
the stimulants of the emergence of resilience.  
Finally and somewhat distinct from the literature mentioned above, the concept of 
resilience has also been adopted by the psychology/psychiatry field in order to explain 
certain individuals’ tolerance to stressful life events (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003, p. 99). 
Similar to the other conceptualizations of resilience, psychology researchers also 
identify resilient individuals as being flexible and adaptable in responding to the 
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negative events in their lives (Wagnild and Young, 1993, p. 166). In addition to this, 
resourcefulness and advanced problem-solving skills are included among the 
resilience characteristics that help individuals recover from adversity (Block and Block, 
1980, p. 48; Block and Kremen, 1996, p. 359).  
 
Field Characterization Dimensions Source 
Material 
Science 





Engineering Approach to provide for 








Ecology Ability of absorbing 
disturbance and 




Social Systems Ability of social systems 








Ability of complex 
systems to absorb 
challenges and quickly 
provide for normal 






Ability to cope with the 
challenges and bounce 






Psychology Individuals’ ability to 
bounce back from 






Table 1. Various characterizations of resilience in different fields. 
 
Table 1 summarizes various characterizations associated with resilience, developed by 
researchers in different fields. It demonstrates that the concept has been adopted and 
adapted by various fields to explain the ability of entities -which may be materials, 
systems, individuals, etc. depending on the field - to withstand challenges and to 
continue normal functioning (or to bounce back to normal levels of functioning quickly) 
in the aftermath of these challenges. In order to be able to do this, entities demonstrate 
certain characteristics such as flexibility, adaptability, robustness, resourcefulness, etc. 
The propositions for such characteristics change slightly from one field to another, 
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possibly because of the differences among the natures of the entities or due to the 
nature of the different challenges that these entities face.   
 
2.3 “Resilience” in organizational research  
In the face of increased volatility and adversity of organizational environments (Gibson 
and Tarrant, 2010, p. 6), initially, the crisis management literature dominated 
investigations of organizations facing adverse conditions (Dynes and Aguirre, 1979; for 
e.g. Mitroff, Shrivastava and Udwadia, 1987; Quarantelli, 1988). This stream of research 
emphasized the significance of planning (Boin and McConnell, 2007) and precise 
execution of these plans in adverse conditions. According to the studies in this stream, 
entities (individual, teams and organizations) would be restricted in using their 
capabilities while responding to adverse conditions (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 
1981), because adverse conditions impede communication, information sharing and 
control mechanisms (Quarantelli, 1988). As a result of these impediments, frontline 
people were expected to be cognitively overwhelmed and be ineffective in addressing 
the problems (Weick, 1993). This is why crisis management studies suggested that 
following a coordinated plan and a strict authority was crucial in responding adversity. 
These assumptions of crisis management literature were challenged by an additional 
stream of research that incorporates the elements of the general resilience literature 
and positive organization scholarship (POS). On the one hand, the general resilience 
literature (elaborated in section 2.2) drew attention to the possibility of facing 
unexpected challenges, particularly in today’s increasingly VUCA (volatile, uncertain, 
complex and ambiguous) world (Stiehm, 2002, p. 6) and to the possible ineffectiveness 
of planned responses to overcome these kinds of adversity. On the other hand, POS, 
which is defined by Cameron and Caza (2004, p. 731) as: “a new movement in 
organizational science that focuses on the dynamics leading to exceptional individual 
and organizational performance such as developing human strength, producing 
resilience and restoration, and fostering vitality”, proposed that entities can effectively 
utilize their action repertoire despite the restrictions caused by the challenges. They 
also perceive resilience as a capacity that can be developed over time (Luthans and 
Youssef, 2007, p. 332). 
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Combining these two perspectives, Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003, p. 95) defined resilience 
as “the maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging conditions” and 
proposed, as opposed to the prevalent crisis management literature, that entities may 
effectively respond to adverse situations, and that resilience is as much to do with the 
ability to respond as it is to do with the ability to anticipate. They specifically proposed 
that under enabling conditions (such as effective communication systems or collective 
efficacy) entities may overcome the restrictions caused by the adversity, which may 
enhance action repertoire of the response and, in turn, enable entity to overcome the 
challenge (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003, p. 107).  
Following Sutcliffe and Vogus’ (2003) explicit application of the resilience concept to an 
organization context, resilience began to attract researchers in the organization studies 
field. Because of the continuous increase in volatility, ambiguity and unexpectedness 
around the organizations, organizational researchers’ interests are driven towards 
investigating the theories and practices that can help organizations overcome these 
challenges. As a result of this tendency, the body of literature focusing particularly on 
“organizational resilience” began to develop starting in the 1980s (for e.g. Staw, 
Sandelands and Dutton, 1981; Meyer, 1982; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Weick, 
1987). A great deal of work in this field is focused on theory development (Bhamra, 
Dani and Burnard, 2011) as there is still a lack of generally accepted framework to 
explain resilience (Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 24). However, the number and the variety of 
the empirical studies are increasing, particularly in the recent years (Linnenluecke, 
2017, p. 13).  
Organizational researchers have mainly focused on two types of ‘challenge experience’. 
Some of them, particularly during the early development of the field, investigated 
organizations in high-risk industries, the crises they experienced (for e.g. Bhopal gas 
leak, Exxon Valdez oil spill, Chernobyl nuclear accident or NASA Challenger explosion) 
and how they managed (or failed to manage) to overcome them (e.g. LaPorte and 
Consolini, 1991; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Roberts, Stout and Halpern, 1994). The 
adversities in these high-risk organizations are generally caused by the escalation of 
small-scale problems and their dissemination through whole organization because of 
the interdependencies between system units. This stream of work is concerned with 
the “organizations in which reliability is a more pressing issue than efficiency” (Weick, 
1987, p. 112). These organizations are called High Reliability Organizations (HROs) and 
the work done in this stream focused on building theories to understand how errors 
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and anomalies can be identified and contained. This stream of work is elaborated in 
section 2.3.1. 
Other researchers, particularly during the later development of the field, drew 
attention to the fact that in today’s ever more volatile environmental, political and 
economic conditions, all organizations may face major disasters irrespective of the 
riskiness of the industry in which they operate (van der Vegt et al., 2015, p. 971). These 
researchers have observed the challenges posed on organizations by climate 
extremities (Winn et al., 2011), natural disasters (Bhamra, Dani and Burnard, 2011), 
global economic volatilities (Gölgeci and Ponomarov, 2014), terrorist attacks such as 
9/11 (Gittell et al., 2006) and many other threats in and around organizations; and they 
wanted to find ways to mitigate and overcome the impact of these disruptive 
challenges. They stressed the “unexpected” nature of these adverse conditions (van der 
Vegt et al., 2015, p. 972); as organizations that do not operate in high-risk industries 
rarely consider the possibility of facing major disruptions. The studies in this stream 
are discussed in section 2.3.2.  
2.3.1 Organizational resilience in high-risk industries 
Some organizations face challenges that threaten the very survival of the organizations 
and their members. High-Reliability Organizations (HRO) literature conducted 
investigations to understand how organizations in these high-risk settings are resilient 
to these challenges. The term HRO is used to describe organizations that operate 
complex, high-risk technologies where the scope for error is high and where the 
consequences of errors are huge - economically, socially and even politically (Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008, p. 32). These organizations are characterized by tight-
coupling, which means that the subunits of the organization are tightly interconnected 
in various known and unknown ways, and hence problems in different subunits may 
interact with each other in unexpected ways (Rijpma, 1997, p. 15), leading to 
organizational-level crisis. Reason (2000, p. 769) explains this in his famous “Swiss 
Cheese Model” by illustrating how holes in organizational defenses, created by the 
problems in different subunits, may align together and pave way for organizational 




Figure 2. "Swiss Cheese Model" by Reason (2000, p. 769) 
 
In Normal Accident Theory (NAT), Perrow (1984) argued that for organizations in 
high-risk industries, who have complex systems and tightly-coupled subunits, accidents 
(organizational level disruptions) are inevitable in their ordinary course of operations. 
In contradiction to NAT, the HRO theorists assumed that although zero-error operation 
is nearly impossible (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991, p. 42), these organizations may be 
designed to constantly seek for providing reliable performance (Weick, Sutcliffe and 
Obstfeld, 2000, p. 38). In other words, HRO scholars suggest that avoiding terminal 
crisis is possible by early detection of weak signals and small mistakes (Weick, Sutcliffe 
and Obstfeld, 2008). 
Scholars interested in this stream of research examined organizations in various high-
risk industries in order to understand how resilience to the risks in these industries are 
manifested. Among these organizations, we may count nuclear power plants (Gomes et 
al., 2014), military organizations (Roberts, Stout and Halpern, 1994), aircraft carriers 
(Weick and Roberts, 1993), firefighters (Barton et al., 2015), air traffic control systems 
(Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008), electrical power grids (Christianson et al., 2011) 
and several others. Studies on these types of organizations demonstrated that 
successful organizations in high-risk industries follow certain principles and by that 
they prevent risks from turning into disasters.  
In the early studies of organizational reliability, reliability is defined as “…capacities to 
produce collective products of a given quality repeatedly” by Hannan and Freeman 
(1984, p. 153) which is achieved by “processes of institutionalization and by creating 
highly standardized routines” (1984, p. 154). As opposed to that, Weick et al. (2008, p. 
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35) argue that what needs to be stabilized to achieve high reliability are not the 
routines or procedures but the cognitive processes such as “understanding, evidence 
collection, detection, evaluation, and revising”. According to Weick et al. (2008, p. 37), 
stabilization of these cognitive processes establishes (collective) mindfulness, which 
enables HROs to detect and manage unexpected events that cause errors.  
To facilitate this, Weick et al. (2008, p. 37) propose five principles to provide for 
collective mindfulness, which, according to their theorization, lead to reliable 
performance while operating in high-risk environments. According to their study, 
reliable organizations, first, avoid hiding mistakes, openly report and discuss them, and 
provide opportunities for everyone to learn from them (2008, p. 39). These 
organizations develop cultures that avoid blaming individuals for mistakes and create 
platforms to discuss their outcomes and solutions.  Second, in these organization, 
individuals refrain from simplifying the processes and creating cognitive shortcuts to 
accomplish tasks (2008, p. 41). Whereas such simplifications provide efficiency by 
saving time and energy, they could lead to overlooking problems and warnings in high-
risk environments. Third, in these organizations, every individual is aware about the 
details of the whole operation and also ready to be fill in for another if needed (2008, p. 
43). This can also be interpreted as the members’ ability to see the big picture and to 
consult to this big picture when trying to understand the problems and searching for 
solutions. Fourth, in these organizations, expertise is valued over hierarchy when 
applying solutions to overcome the adversity (2008, p. 48). These organizations flexibly 
switch between centralized and decentralized organization structures and, when 
necessary, decision-making is left with the frontline experts rather than other 
individuals higher in the hierarchy.  
Finally, according to Weick et al. (2008, p. 45), HROs constantly expect to face with an 
unanticipated adversity and be ready to deal with it. They identify this as “commitment 
to resilience” and suggest that the act of anticipation is never sufficient for 
organizations in high-risk industries, where the outcomes of adversity may be terminal, 
and that these organizations cognitively and physically prepared to overcome 
unexpected challenges. While conceptualizing this principle, Weick et al. (2008, p. 46) 
hold on to Wildavsky’s (1988, p. 147) resilience definition of “capacity to cope with 
unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back”. 
According to Weick et al. (2008, pp. 46–7) HROs may only provide for this capacity by 
being prepared for inevitable surprises, paying attention to error prevention and 
22 
 
containment, giving formal support for improvisation and, lastly, formulating ad hoc 
response with the utilization of past experiences. 
Using Weick et al.’s (2008) insights for high-reliability organizations and their 
conceptualization of collective mindfulness, several studies investigated the sources of 
resilience in different organizational settings. For instance, Bigley and Roberts (2001) 
wanted to generalize the application of high-reliability organizing to all organizations 
with “complex and volatile task environments”, particularly to the ones with inflexible 
structures such as police and fire departments. They examined the mechanisms of 
“Incident Command System (ICS)”, which is a temporary organization system for 
emergencies, and how it is used to provide flexibility and reliability in this type of high-
risk settings. Their study demonstrates the commonalities between the mechanisms of 
ICS and collective mindfulness such as deferring to expertise, being ready to fill in for 
another or establishing effective communication to have the cognitive map of the big 
picture of the operations. Moreover, Christianson et al. (2011) demonstrated how ICS 
provided reliability in electrical power grids and wildland firefighters, and suggested 
the application of ICS to intensive care units in health care, an high-risk setting in terms 
of mortality.  
2.3.2 Organizational resilience and major crises 
With an increase in the volatility and uncertainty of organizational environments, 
organizations operating in normal risk conditions also started to face unexpected 
adversity that is hazardous to operations as well as survival. This drove resilience 
researchers towards examining the organizations which experienced unexpected major 
disruptions. Particularly, the organizations which were the victims of the world-wide 
known adverse incidents became the most common research subjects for these 
researchers. In the aftermath of 2001, these researchers focused on the crises 
consequential to 9/11 attack (for e.g. Freeman, Hirschhorn and Triad, 2003b; Kendra 
and Wachtendorf, 2003b; Gittell et al., 2006). Moreover, particularly after 2005, 
investigations began to target organizations affected by climate extremities and natural 
disasters  (Dahlhamer and Tierney, 1998; Tierney and Bruneau, 2007; for e.g. 
Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2010; Winn et al., 2011). Then, in the more recent years, 
this research spread to other types of major adversities such as economic crises, 
technological leaps or political instabilities and to various types organizations such as 
small businesses, large organizations or supply chains (Fujimoto and Park, 2014; 
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Lampel, Bhalla and Jha, 2014; Pal, Torstensson and Mattila, 2014; Doern, Williams and 
Vorley, 2016; for e.g. Williams and Shepherd, 2016). 
Although resilience researchers examined the effects of various adversities on 
organizations, there were a handful of significant incidents which particularly boosted 
attention to the field; the 9/11 attack was one of those significant incidents. This 
incident proved that even the best-informed entities may face unexpected adversities 
and even the lowest risk organizations may face threats to their survival. Thus, it was 
an abundant source of insight for resilience researchers who want to understand what 
factors are important to effectively overcome the unexpected crises. For example 
Freeman, Hirschhorn and Triad (Freeman, Hirschhorn and Triad, 2003b) examined the 
antecedents of the remarkable recovery of an investment bank after the 9/11 attacks. 
Sandler O’Neill, which was a successful investment bank before the attacks, lost 66 of 
its employees along with its office and records during the attacks. Unbelievably, they 
were back in business after just two months and were more profitable than ever in nine 
months (Freeman, Hirschhorn and Triad, 2003b). The fieldwork, which aimed at 
revealing the sources of this rapid recovery, discovered that the motivation of the 
employees, the sympathy from other organizations and the ability of company to seize the 
opportunities provided for their survival. In another example, Gittel et al. (2006) used 
publicly available data regarding the stock prices, the layoff announcements and the 
financial and the relational reserves of the airline companies after the attack to search 
for the antecedents of resilience. They concluded that the relational reserves of these 
companies, when accompanied with the financial reserves, provided for the “layoff 
avoidance” which in turn provided for their resilience (Gittell et al., 2006, p. 325). In 
this research, several airline companies investigated over a period of time in order to 
establish causal relationships. 
Another attention point for resilience researchers has been the natural extremities and 
their increased adverse effects on the organizations. For instance, Linnenluecke’s and 
her colleagues’ works (Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2010, 2011; Linnenluecke, Griffiths 
and Winn, 2012) paid attention to organizational resilience in the context of disruptive 
environmental disasters, aiming to establish a conceptual framework and suggest 
possible methodologies considering extreme weather events and vigorous climate 
changes. Moreover, some other studies also focused on the effects of natural disasters 
on organizations and recovery of organizations in the aftermath of such disasters (e.g. 
Sanchez, Korbin and Viscarra, 1995; Alesch et al., 2001; Longstaff, 2005; Runyan, 2006). 
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Pointing out the significance of natural disasters context in organizational literature, 
Runyan (2006, p. 13) states that: “Some crises are avoidable or may be mitigated, but 
natural disasters are certainly ones that affect many organizations, and are difficult to 
predict or prevent.”.  
Another example of research into natural disasters and their impact on organizations is 
the work of Bruneau and his colleagues on seismic resilience (Bruneau et al., 2003, 
2005; Tierney and Bruneau, 2007), which was carried out with the help of 
Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER). Spanning 
more than ten years, this stream of work first aimed at identifying the antecedents of 
community resilience against major earthquake events (Dahlhamer and Tierney, 1998; 
Bruneau et al., 2003). Later on, direction of the investigation turn to other natural 
disasters such as hurricanes (Tierney, 2003; Tierney and Bruneau, 2007). As a result of 
these investigations they established a framework for community resilience which 
they defined as “the ability of social units, e.g., organizations and communities, to 
mitigate hazards, contain the effects of hazard-related disasters when they occur, and 
carry out recovery activities in ways that minimize social disruption and mitigate the 
effects of future hazards.” (Bruneau et al., 2005, p. 18). Consequent studies emerging 
from this stream addressed the resilience concept in the context of systems and 
organizations (McDaniels et al., 2008) and applied the established framework by 
advancing it further for organizational survivals (Bhamra, Dani and Burnard, 2011; 
Burnard and Bhamra, 2011). In scope of this framework which addresses the concept 
in a structural manner resilience characterized under four dimensions, namely 
robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and, rapidity (Bruneau et al., 2005, p. 19).   
In this model, robustness is adopted from the conceptualization of resilience in the field 
of engineering (Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson, 2006) and complex systems (Bruneau 
et al., 2005; McDaniels et al., 2008) and indicates an entity’s ability to minimize the 
negative effects of a disruptive event. Moreover, rapidity is also adopted from complex 
systems (Bruneau et al., 2005; McDaniels et al., 2008) and indicates an entity’s ability to 
quickly overcome the challenge and bounce back to prior operational levels. 
Furthermore, resourcefulness is about the utilizing the entity capacities and employing 
the resources to the respond to adversity, which is also mentioned by Wildawsky 
(1988) as an indicator of resilience. Bruneau et al. (2005) established also added 
redundancy among these dimensions. Redundancy is possessing the additional 
structures that can replace elements that ceased functioning as a result of disruptions. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the conceptual framework associated with this model, which is 
adopted from McDaniels et al. (2008) and updated to explain the new framework. 
 
Figure 3. Measure of seismic resilience (Bruneau et al., 2003, p. 737, 2005, p. 19; Tierney and Bruneau, 2007, 
p. 15) 
Subsequent to the investigations of organizational resilience following the 9/11 attack 
and natural disasters, other work has investigated resilience to major adverse incidents 
and tried to establish a template to explain resilience in these unexpected extreme 
adverse conditions. A notable one, Lengnick-Hall and Beck (2005) work, proposed 
resilience capacity as the facilitator of effective response against disruptive surprises. 
Their framework has three components, namely cognitive, behavioural and contextual 
resilience, all of which have different subcomponents.  
Firstly, cognitive resilience is related to understanding the scope of the crisis situation 
and developing the plan for an effective response against it (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 
2005, p. 750). Constructive sensemaking and a strong ideological identity are the 
subcomponents of this dimension defined by the authors. According to them 
organizations will correctly analyse crises by constructive sensemaking, which means 
providing descriptions for the novel aspects of the challenges and establishing a 
collective, mutual understanding of the challenges with the help of these descriptions. 
Furthermore, with the help of a strong ideological identity, which means having an 
organizational level purpose that unifies members, organizations will be motivated 
towards collective actions and be able to see the opportunities associated with survival 
(Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005, pp. 750–1). As also mentioned by other resilience 
scholars (Horne and Orr, 1997; for e.g. Pulley, 1997; Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010), a 
shared purpose among the organizational members stimulates them to act collectively 
to overcome the crises that threatens their organization.  
26 
 
Secondly, behavioural resilience refers to the action capabilities of members that will 
constitute the response to the crisis (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005, p. 751). 
Subcomponents of behavioural resilience are functional habits, which are responses 
learned as a result of prior experience and knowledge, and complex and varied action 
inventory, which is developed by combining functional habits with improvised 
solutions. Utilizing appropriate habits is mentioned as  a necessary condition by 
existing resilience literature (Horne and Orr, 1997; Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). 
Resilience researchers also valued diversity and making novel combinations out of 
existing action repertoires (Weick, 1988, 1993; Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003a; 
Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; Boin and McConnell, 2007; Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2012). This 
ability is conceptualized as improvisation (Weick, 1993) or bricolage (Lengnick-Hall, 
Beck and Lengnick-Hall, 2011); and described as an ability that is revealed while 
responding to the challenges (Maynard and Kennedy, 2016, p. 14). Nonetheless, 
researchers argue that this ability may be developed, first, by encouraging members to 
formulate novel solutions when existing solutions does not work (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007); and, second, by expanding the action repertoire, which constitutes the tool to 
improvise (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). 
Thirdly, contextual resilience, which is comprised of deep social capital and broad 
resources network, maintains the necessary conditions for the utilization of other 
components (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005, p. 752). This component refers to the 
relationships with other entities which may provide help in the form of “tangible and 
intangible resources” while responding to an adversity. This is also conceptualized 
under different names by other resilience scholars (for e.g. partnering (Pulley, 1997), 
relationships (Freeman, Hirschhorn and Triad, 2003a; Cumming et al., 2005) and social 
capital (Danes et al., 2009; Olcott and Oliver, 2014)). 
In addition to organizations that experienced significant crises and natural disasters, 
resilience researchers also investigated supply chains as complex and interdependent 
entities (Kamalahmadi and Parast, 2016, p. 116), for which risks and uncertainties are 
greater as well as the negative outcomes of disruptions (Sheffi and Rice Jr., 2005, p. 41). 
Although most supply chains are not comprised of high-risk organizations, the fact that 
a disruption on the operations of an organization’s supplier directly affects the 
organization itself, or vice versa, puts supply chains under vulnerable entities category 
(Sheffi, 2001, p. 1). For instance, the fire in 1997, in an Aisin Seiki plant, one of Toyota’s 
suppliers, disrupted production at Toyota, its major customer (Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 
27 
 
1998, p. 50). The vulnerability map for supply chains presented by Sheffi (2007, p. 25) 
powerfully demonstrates how there are numerous financial, natural, operational  and 
strategic challenges that supply chains (and, as a matter of fact, any organization) face 
every day.  
Addressing this issue, Christopher and Peck (2004, p. 7) suggested four principles to 
“create the resilient supply chain”. First, supply chains needed to be engineered to 
balance efficiency and redundancy, in order to provide for operational flexibility when 
faced with an unexpected disturbance (Christopher and Peck, 2004, p. 7). Traditionally, 
supply chains have been designed to prioritize efficiency in the form of “cost 
optimization” and “customer satisfaction” (Kamalahmadi and Parast, 2016, p. 122), and 
a shift from this mindset, in the form of simultaneously prioritizing resilience, is 
suggested for supply chains to be more resilient to the disturbances (Winston, 2014). 
Additionally, structural reengineering is also suggested, such as in the form of reducing 
complexity or increasing dispersion (Blackhurst, Dunn and Craighead, 2011). Second, it 
is recommended that supply chains establish collaboration and networks among each 
other to “mitigate risks” and “reduce uncertainties” (Christopher and Peck, 2004, p. 9). 
According to Kamalahmadi and Parast (2016, p. 124) for effective collaborations among 
the supply chains trust needs to be built and information sharing should be encouraged 
among the participants. Studies by Seville et al. (2015), Olcott and Oliver (2014) and 
Nishiguchi and Beaudet (1998) demonstrated how organizations were able overcome 
the negative effects of disturbances with the help of strong networks, in the form of 
loyal customers supporting the organization during and after the disruption; thoughtful 
competitors helping to overcome the challenge and continuation of operations by 
providing staff and space; and devoted employees motivated to bring the organization 
back into action quickly. Third, supply chains needed to be agile in the form of 
“respond[ing] rapidly to the unpredictable [events]” (Christopher and Peck, 2004, p. 
10). To provide for agility, supply chains needed to be visible in the form of “timely 
messages about events, along with the planned and actual dates/times of these events” 
available to all the subunits of the supply chain (Francis, 2008, p. 182); and rapid in 
responding to the required adjustments (Prater, Biehl and Smith, 2001). Finally, supply 
chain risk management should be established as a culture in supply chains for 
continuous resilience in the long-run (Christopher and Peck, 2004, p. 11). This culture 
should be adopted and disseminated by the leaders of the supply chain and should 
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encourage innovation for a supply chain’s adaptation to the changes in its environment 
(Kamalahmadi and Parast, 2016, p. 126). 
All the studies mentioned in this section aimed at identifying the factors that contribute 
to the resilience of organization to major crises that threaten their survival and that 
caused by the volatile and unexpected nature of the organizational environments. In 
general, these studies conducted post-hoc investigations of major crises experienced by 
organizations, and they examined the capabilities and capacities that helped 
organizations overcome these crises. A handful of them (Mallak, 1998a; Christopher 
and Peck, 2004; for e.g. Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005) also tried to establish 
comprehensive frameworks to explain resilience to crises, however, none of these 
frameworks are generally accepted or widely applied (Linnenluecke, 2017).  
 
2.4 Literature gaps 
This literature has prominent theoretical and methodological gaps that prevent the 
generalizability of the application of theories in much wider organization populations. 
In this section, these gaps will be discussed.  
As I mentioned in the introduction chapter, the most prominent gap in the 
organizational resilience literature is identified as the lack of a generally accepted 
comprehensive conceptual framework that explains the manifestation of resilience, its 
precursors and its outcomes (Annarelli and Nonino, 2016, p. 8; Kamalahmadi and 
Parast, 2016, p. 126; Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 16). Particularly, as demonstrated by the 
literature review in section 2.3, resilience is almost exclusively investigated in extreme 
organizational settings (two notable exceptions are studies by Vogus and Welbourne 
(2003) and by Ray, Baker and Plowman (2011), where they applied the insight from 
HROs to non-extreme challenging settings; software firms and business schools, 
respectively). In most studies, organizations are either operating in high-risk industries 
where errors are very likely and very costly, or faced a major unexpected disturbance, 
which could have terminal consequences for them. Therefore, the applicability of 
resilience research only demonstrated for extreme settings (Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 11); 
and in most cases only for the specific types of extreme settings. This gap is in relation 
with two important set of problems in the organizational resilience field: the problems 
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associated with the conceptualization of resilience and the limitations of the 
methodologies preferred to investigate resilience. 
Many resilience researchers drew attention to the inconsistencies in the 
conceptualizations of organizational resilience  (Comfort, Boin and Demchak, 2010; 
Burnard and Bhamra, 2011; Lewis, Donaldson-Feilder and Pangallo, 2011). Because of 
the variations among the conceptualizations and characterizations of resilience, 
scholars started to refer to it as an extremely complex concept (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 
2003; Bhamra, Dani and Burnard, 2011). Particularly, Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) asked 
important questions, revealing the problems associated with the definition of the term 
resilience in general and in organizational context. They questioned whether resilience 
is a static characteristic or a dynamic process (2003, pp. 95–6); whether it refers to 
continue functioning during crisis or being able to recover quickly after it (2003, p. 96); 
and whether it may be improved by organizational learning as a result of prior 
experiences or not (2003, p. 97). With all these questions in hand they concluded that a 
successful theorization of resilience could not be carried out yet (2003, p. 99). Table 29 
provided in Appendix 10.1 gives the result of a literature review I carried out for the 
conceptualization of resilience, presenting various definitions and characterizations as 
comprehensive as possible. This table demonstrates the diversity among the various 
conceptualizations of organizational resilience. 
Moreover, an important element of the conceptualization of resilience is the nature of 
the challenge experienced by the entity under investigation. While defining resilience, 
especially in the initial definitions of resilience, scholars generally preferred the words 
like “danger”, “disruption” and “disturbance” (for e.g. Holling, 1973; Wildavsky, 1988; 
Carpenter et al., 2001; Sheffi, 2005) to refer to challenge. These definitions restricted 
the utilization of the resilience concept to extreme settings, as according to these 
definitions to be able to use the term resilience about overcoming a challenge that 
challenge had to engender terminal consequences. On the other hand, there are other 
definitions of resilience, which are relatively newer ones, where challenges are referred 
as “challenge”, “surprise”, “adversity”, “unexpected event” or even “stressor” (Sutcliffe 
and Vogus, 2003, p. 95; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009, p. 131; Carmeli, Friedman and 
Tishler, 2012, p. 15; Bowers et al., 2017, p. 2), which suggest that the concept of 
resilience may be considered in the context of non-extreme adversities, and so 
resilience research may be generalizable to much wider populations.  
30 
 
In this regard, Williams et al. (2017, p. 742) discussed the “severity of adversity” 
required to call an effective elimination of such adversity as resilience. They concluded 
that resilience is not just “a capacity to deal with rare, devastating events”, and “[t]he 
idea that resilience is more ordinary and required more broadly shows up in the 
organizational literature”. Moreover, Comfort et al. (2010, p. 8) also mentioned the 
ambiguity with regards to the “severity of the disturbance” while defining resilience. 
They stated that the range could be from “devastating events” to “anything non-normal 
to operations” and argued that both ends are problematic: whereas the former restrict 
the positioning of the concept, the latter undermines its significance. Consequently, 
they used the term “disturbances… that fall outside the range of normal and expected 
disturbances” to define challenge. The analysis of both studies demonstrates that the 
challenges that require organizations to be resilient could be faced with a broader 
range of organizations in various settings than the previous studies concentrated on. 
Considering this, the dearth of research on resilience in this “more ordinary” settings 
arises as a significant gap in the literature. 
The second set of problems associated with this gap arises from the scarcity of the 
methodological diversity and the limitations of the preferred methodologies in the 
field.  The organizational resilience field is strongly dominated by post-hoc 
investigation of single organizations that have experienced a major disruption and this 
work is generally in the form of case studies (Bhamra, Dani and Burnard, 2011, p. 
5385; Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 15). I have identified four reasons for this pattern. Firstly, 
as there is no unanimously accepted conceptual framework for organizational resilience 
(Lewis, Donaldson-Feilder and Pangallo, 2011), organizational resilience researchers 
are directed towards qualitative studies, which provides rich data and subsequent 
elaborate analysis (Richtnér and Löfsten, 2014). Case studies are considered one of the 
best methodological strategies to address these researchers’ desire to answer the 
“what” and “how” questions (for instance, Christianson et al., 2009; Jaaron and 
Backhouse, 2014). As a notable example, Kendra and Watchendorf (2003a, 2003b) 
conducted an inductive research project that comprised 750 hours of exploratory 
fieldwork on the September 9/11 event “to identify successes and challenges 
experienced by those responding to the disaster” (Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003b, p. 
38). In their study, they pointed that (2003b, p. 41): “While defining resilience is clearly 
challenging, identifying the features of organisations and other social units that make 
them resilient is even more difficult.” 
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Secondly, to investigate resilience in wider and more quantitative settings, a thorough 
operationalization of resilience is essential; and as Cumming et al. (2005, p. 976) stated: 
“The abstract, multidimensional nature of the concept of resilience makes it difficult to 
operationalize”. This problem makes it extremely difficult for organizational resilience 
researchers to design research based on quantitative methods (Carpenter et al., 2001; 
Richtnér and Löfsten, 2014). In order to overcome this problem, certain researchers 
have tried to operationalize the earlier conceptualizations of organizational resilience. 
For instance, Somers (2009) conducted an empirical research on 96 municipal public 
works departments to measure their resilience potential. The questionnaire used in the 
research was developed by utilizing Mallak’s (1998a) six dimensions of organizational 
resilience. In another example, Akgün and Keskin (2014) used Lengnick-Hall and Beck’s 
(2005) organizational resilience conceptualization to develop a questionnaire that 
measures organizations’ resilience capacity. On the other hand, other researchers in the 
field have tried to operationalize resilience by defining the concept with measurable 
terms. For example, Cumming et al. (2005, p. 976) defined resilience as: “the ability of 
the system to maintain its identity in the face of internal change and external shocks 
and disturbances” and then operationalized identity (as the preservation of “key 
components and relationships”) to propose a measure to investigate resilience in larger 
research settings. Although these study-specific operationalisations facilitated the 
investigation of resilience by making it measurable, they caused conceptual 
inconsistency by operationalizing resilience in diverse ways. 
Thirdly, organizations, disruptions and environmental settings are so diverse that it is 
extremely hard, if not impossible, to design investigations with a high number of 
comparable cases. Lewis, Donaldson-Feilder and Pangallo (2011) demonstrated how 
diverse organizations going through disruptions may be by identifying several 
differences regarding size, sector, industry and culture. Moreover, Comfort et al. (2001) 
acknowledged that disruptions range in severity immensely and because of that it is 
very hard to compare one another. Lastly, even for similar organizations that are going 
through similar disruptions different environmental settings may change many things. 
For example, Winn et al. (2011) suggested how organizations in politically unstable 
settings may be more resilient against unexpected political crises compared to 
organizations operating in politically stable settings. From another perspective, Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2007) highlighted how in some environmental settings even the smallest 
errors are unacceptable whereas in others errors are more easily tolerated. This 
32 
 
problem of extensive diversification restrains organizational resilience researchers 
from designing research with a large number of cases. As a result, empirical studies in 
the field have focused mainly on either single organizations or single disruptions. 
Finally, it may be enormously costly in both time and money to conduct empirical 
research on a large number of cases in the organizational resilience field since the unit 
of analysis is generally either an organization or a disruption. If the unit of analysis is 
organization, then the researcher should examine organizations operating under 
similar environmental settings and going through the same or similar disruptions in 
order to systematically compare resilience capacities. Similarly, if the unit of analysis is 
the disruption, then the researcher should examine disruptions that are comparable in 
severity in order to compare the relative resilience shown by the affected 
organizations. Carlson et al. (2012) explains how as the size of unit of analysis 
increases time and budget limitations prevent adequate collection of information. In 
that regard, resilience researchers inclined towards case studies of single organizations 
because of identifying large organizations as the unit of analysis.  
Elaborate post-hoc case-study investigations of resilience are helpful to understand and 
explain how resilience was possible; however, only to a degree and only in specific 
settings. There are three important limitations with this approach. First, this work 
mainly focused on investigating resilience of a single (generally large) organization that 
went through a high-impact crisis; and this type of settings are very unique and 
extreme. Hence, it is not straightforward to apply the findings of these studies to 
different settings as the work has been very diverse, unattached and non-generalizable 
(Lewis, Donaldson-Feilder and Pangallo, 2011, p. 6). Linnenluecke (2017, p. 15) 
summarizes this limitation very clearly: 
“These studies usually diagnose what happened (or ‘how resilient’ 
the organization was) in a certain situation, and seek to derive 
insights into how future resilience may be improved, based on a 
generalization from these insights… they do not draw out the 
context-dependence of their insights, and little is known about the 
transferability of insights across different contexts.”  
Second, in most of these studies, the data is collected at a single point of time, and after 
the event already taken place. This is problematic in two ways. On the one hand, since 
data is not collected for the entire duration of challenge-response process, the 
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mechanisms of resilience might not be revealed. In this case, it is impossible to 
demonstrate adequate causal connections regarding the nature of the response and the 
process of the recovery. As a notable exception to this, Alesch et al. (2001) analysed 50 
firms affected by Northridge earthquake in 1994 over a period of 30 months starting 
right after the earthquake occurred. This allowed them to assert causal relationships 
between certain dynamics (such as awareness, confidence and emotional strength) and 
a resilient response.  
On the other hand, even collecting data about a single challenge throughout a time 
period may be inadequate. Investigations in this manner treat organizational resilience 
as a linear process (Folke and Rockström, 2009, p. 1), which, in fact, may better be 
treated as a cycle (Carpenter et al., 2001, p. 766; Scholten, Scott and Fynes, 2014, p. 
216). No organization gets over a single challenge and becomes free from adversity 
thereafter. All organizations are in cycles of disruptive and non-disruptive periods. 
Thus, an organization which is fairly resilient in one disruptive period may fail to 
respond effectively in another. What is more, going through one challenge may increase 
the resilience of the responses against future challenges through a learning effect 
(Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008). 
Thirdly, the testimonials of individuals who have experienced and dealt with the 
challenge constituted a significant part of the data in resilience studies; and this creates 
the possibility of self-report bias. Although self-report bias is a general problem in the 
organization studies literature (Youssef and Luthans, 2007, p. 793), it may also cause 
problems that are specific to resilience studies. Fundamentally, people may recall their 
responses against crises very differently than their actual responses, since in most 
disruptive situations they are emotionally and psychologically overwhelmed or 
compromised (Weick, 1976, p. 15; Alesch et al., 2001, p. 42).  
 
2.5 Research Questions 
In line with the initial literature analysis conducted in the organizational resilience 
field, two questions were identified to guide my study: 
Q1: What attributes make organizations more resilient to the 
challenges they face?  
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Q2: What are the antecedents / precursors of resilience? 
Although these questions have been asked previously in the growing organizational 
resilience literature, an answer that satisfies the worldwide community has yet to be 
provided (Linnenluecke, Griffiths and Winn, 2012, p. 938). Moreover, much of the work 
in the resilience field has searched for answers to these questions in particular settings, 
hence the answers they found have only been relevant to a limited population of 
organizations. Thus, these are still the most fundamental research questions in the 
field, particularly for organizations that seek to be resilient to the challenges of daily 
operational conditions.   
Further literature investigation also demonstrated the importance of how being 
resilient benefits organizations. In the context of high-risk organizations and 
organizations in the midst of a major disruption being resilient is very much related to 
survival (continuity) and maintaining of primary functions as stated by the previous 
research (Stephenson et al., 2010, p. 3; Lampel, Bhalla and Jha, 2014, p. 71; Williams 
and Shepherd, 2016, p. 2069). However, in the context of overcoming the challenges of 
daily operational conditions the researchers should consider other outcomes as these 
less severe challenges will not be affecting the survival of an organizations or its basic 
functions. Thus, a third question is added among the main research questions: 
Q3: What are the outcomes of resilience? 
While designing my research, I wanted to bring this question into a more specific and 
measurable form. I specifically wanted address this question in the context of 
organizational settings where organizations are not dealing with survival-related 
problems. In general, resilience is defined as the ability to absorb adversities and 
continue to function normally in the face of adversities. For organizations, ‘to function 
normally’ could mean ‘to be able to achieve its aims’ and ‘to be able to continue 
operations’. If continuity is not a problem, then the main concern for an organization is 
‘performance’ (this reasoning is articulated in section 2.5.2). Expressed in measurable 
terms, it means ‘the ability to provide for normal performance levels’. Hence the 
research question becomes: 
Q4: How resilience is related to operational performance? 
Furthermore, if the circumstances were ideal, I would prefer to conduct my research on 
a large sample of organizations that are going through comparable challenges during 
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their operations; and I would prefer to collect qualitative and quantitative data that 
would allow me to compare the responses of organizations to these challenges. This 
would provide a rich, elaborate explanation of the mechanisms of resilience while at 
the same time strengthening the generalizability of the results. However, just as all the 
other resilience researchers, I did not have the necessary time and budget to collect 
data on a large number of large organizations. This problem forced organizational 
resilience researchers to conduct their investigations in the form of single-case studies, 
and as a result of this, resilience research became disintegrated and non-generalizable 
(Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 15). Several studies in the field reported a need for a caution for 
the generalizability of their findings (Bigley and Roberts, 2001; for e.g. Wilhelmsen, 
2011) and most of them suggested replication in diverse settings (for e.g. West, Patera 
and Carsten, 2009; Stephens et al., 2013). The lack of comparability lies at the heart of 
this problem (Alesch et al., 2001; Furniss et al., 2011). To address this issue, I sought to 
conduct a study with a relative larger sample; however, to be able to conduct the 
research within the time and budget I have, I preferred to work with small-size 
research units. Hence, I identified the unit of analysis as team. With this choice, I 
refined my research questions as: 
Q5: What are the precursors of team resilience? 
Q6: How is team resilience related to team performance? 
Conclusively, in this study, I aim to find answers to the questions above and intend 
these answers to be applicable by a wide population of organizations. While addressing 
these questions, I utilized deductive reasoning: based on the literature analysis I 
conducted, I have built a model that addresses my research questions and then, I have 
tested and improved this model with empirical investigations throughout my research. 
The following sections elaborates on the literature analysis I utilized to build my 
research model. In section 2.5.1, I provide the literature background with regards to the 
precursors of team resilience; and in section 2.5.2, I provide the literature background 
with regards to the relationship between team resilience and team performance. 
2.5.1 Precursors of ‘team resilience’ 
Teams are defined as the units that comprise two or more individuals to accomplish a 
common purpose (Baker and Salas, 1997; Cohen and Bailey, 1997); hence establishing 
teams “allows for the completion of tasks that require more than one individual” (Bell, 
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2007, p. 595) through collective dynamics. Since teams are capable of “complex and 
difficult tasks” (Salas, Cooke and Rosen, 2008, p. 540), scholarly work on understanding 
teams and teamwork is extensive and spans more than half a century (Mcgrath, 1991). 
Detailed reviews of this work may be found within areas such as team classification 
(Devine, 2002), team composition and diversity (Lau and Murnighan, 1998) team 
effectiveness (Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006; Salas et al., 2007), team training (Salas and 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006), team dynamics (Ilgen et al., 2005), 
team processes (Marks, Mathieu and Zaccaro, 2001), and team performance (Guzzo and 
Dickson, 1996; Devine and Philips, 2001; Kerr and Tindale, 2004). Although this work 
provides useful insights into teams working in normal conditions, more focused 
research is required to understand teams working in challenging conditions (Vessey 
and Landon, 2017), the area with which my study is concerned. Hence, while 
investigating the literature on team dynamics in relation to resilience, I focused 
specifically on work on organizational and team resilience.   
Within the context of my study, team resilience is defined as the ability of a team to 
overcome the challenges and disruptions it faces and to continue its normal 
functionality despite these challenges and disruptions (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; 
Alliger et al., 2015). These abilities require teams both to be comprised of individuals 
with distinct capabilities (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003, p. 102) and to act as single capable 
organisms that can demonstrate collective skills (Vidal and Roberts, 2014, p. 19). As I 
mentioned before, the resilience literature is rich in case studies of organizations (and 
teams) that have been through major disruptions (Weick, 1993; Nishiguchi and 
Beaudet, 1998; Freeman, Hirschhorn and Triad, 2003a) and in all these studies, 
researchers elaborate on these capabilities and skills that were effective in the recovery 
(or, if there was no recovery, they propose capabilities and skills that would be 
effective). There are similar propositions and findings with regards to these capabilities 
and skills in the organizational resilience and team resilience literatures. This may 
propose that a comprehensive framework that explains resilience of teams may also be 
used to explain resilience of larger organizations.  
To begin with, researchers drew attention to the importance of collective knowledge 
of operations, roles and positions (collective mental models) within an entity that is 
responding to adversity. Considering the roles of members in an entity, many 
researchers highlight the significance of specialization for efficiently maintaining the 
operations and for effectively responding to the challenges by allocating tasks to the 
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experts (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2012; Richtnér and Löfsten, 2014). Nonetheless, 
researchers also stress the problems specialization may cause with regards to limiting 
flexibility (Bigley and Roberts, 2001, p. 1281) and reducing slack resources (Winn et al., 
2011, p. 169). Therefore, team resilience researchers (as well as the researchers of 
resilience at the other levels of organization) propose that specialization should be 
supported by mechanisms that will provide for flexibility. Weick (1993, p. 640) 
proposed that to provide for flexibility each member should possess the knowledge of 
every member’s roles, tasks and positions. Thus, all members will be able to fill in for 
another if it becomes necessary. Weick (1993, p. 640) conceptualized this capacity as 
virtual role systems and noted that in addition to fulfilling the requirements of their 
specific roles in the team, members should be aware of the requirements of other roles 
in the team as well as the interrelation of all the roles within the team. This awareness 
becomes an important asset when a role could no longer be fulfilled by the member 
assigned to it: knowing the requirements of the role, another member may easily 
replace that member.  
Other concepts were also introduced to refer to this capacity such as collective mind 
(Weick and Roberts, 1993), shared mental models (Maynard and Kennedy, 2016) or 
transactive memory systems (Bowers et al., 2017). This enhanced knowledge on top of 
the specific expertise that specialization require is extremely significant when the team 
faced with adversities. Particularly, adversities may restrain certain members from 
fulfilling the requirement of their roles or these members might have to cease fulfilling 
their roles to address the adversity. When that happens, other individuals in teams 
with shared mental models (or transactive memory systems or virtual role models) 
may confidently volunteer to fulfil these unfulfilled roles. In addition, when addressing 
challenges, the collective mind capacity provides the collective and mutual 
understanding of the problem (Weick and Roberts, 1993) as well as the effective 
coordination of the collective efforts to overcome it (Maynard and Kennedy, 2016, p. 
17). Previous literature also demonstrated the importance of maintaining and 
constantly updating collective mental models in detecting and understanding the 
challenges (Roberts, Flin and Cleland, 2015, p. 96). 
Moreover, as a way for the shared mental models/roles system to function, there 
should be an effective communication system established among the members of the 
entity. This was proposed by Weick and Roberts (1993) in their “heedful interrelating” 
concept, where they suggest that in order for a team to establish collective mental 
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models, it needs to have effective communications systems among the members, where 
members interact by "noticing, taking care, attending, applying one's mind, 
concentrating, putting one's heart into something, thinking what one is doing, alertness, 
interest, intentness, studying, and trying" (Ryle, 1949, p. 136 in Weick and Roberts, 
1993). Weick (1993, p. 642) suggests that this idea of the positive effect of well-
established team communication systems on resilience is reinforced by “respectful 
interaction”. Using this concept, Weick suggested that team members’ minds can only 
be aligned (which he conceptualized as virtual role models) by effectively exchanging 
the various interpretations of the situation and establishing a comprehensive single 
interpretation based on these exchanges. This provides for the collective action as a 
single unit while responding to challenge. Other conceptual work on the precursors of 
resilience has also proposed positive relationships between effective communication 
channels and resilience (Horne and Orr, 1997, p. 33; for e.g. Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003, 
p. 102)  Testing these propositions, various studies have supported  this relationship: 
as examples, one can point out Maynard and Kennedy’s (2016) investigation on NASA 
teams, and Morgan et al.’s (2013) study on sports teams. Both of these studies 
confirmed that effective communication among team members allowed them to 
execute collective action in response to the adversity they faced. 
Most studies conceptualizing or validating the relationship between resilience and 
effective communication have argued that while intra-team information exchange, 
conceptualized as effective communication, is crucial in aligning collective mental 
models and collective action, the accurate interpretation and processing of 
information gathered from the external environment is crucial to formulate the 
right solutions and actions to address the challenges (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003, p. 108). 
Acknowledging this, in the context of resilience to the adversity, scholars proposed 
establishing situational awareness by enabling the flow of information (Sutcliffe and 
Vogus, 2003, p. 108), by being attentive to external information with regards to the 
early and weak signals of problems (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008, p. 43); by 
checking information from multiple sources to ensure accuracy (Mallak, 1998a, p. 151; 
Fruhen et al., 2014, p. 32), and by collectively assembling and interpreting the 
information to establish a big picture of the situation (McManus et al., 2007, p. 20; 
Fioratou et al., 2010, p. 88; Alliger et al., 2015, p. 180). Validating this, Edson’ (2012) 
study on a large project team, Meyer’s (1982) study on strikes in hospitals and Vidal 
and Robert’s (2014) study on firefighting teams demonstrate the importance of 
39 
 
continuously scanning the environment and being attentive to the weak signals in 
formulating effective responses by detecting challenges and threats before they 
escalate.  
Regarding this, Weick et al. (2008, p. 44) draws attention to the possible negative 
consequences of gathering too much unnecessary information while trying to maintain 
the “broad operational awareness”. The process of continuous information gathering 
may be costly in terms of overwhelming the members and overloading the information 
channels, a problem which may be coupled by the experience of an adversity 
(Quarantelli, 1988, p. 375). To overcome this problem, resilient entities pay particular 
attention not to overwhelm members while processing necessary information, and 
process information selectively not to overload channels. For example, in their 
empirical study of nuclear power plant operators Furniss et al. (2011, p. 8) observed 
that a team member put a paper clip on the page where problem solving procedures 
were detailed about the problem experienced in order for information channels not to 
be overloaded with the remaining information in the problem solving guide. 
Conclusively, while comprehensive information gathering is proposed as an important 
source of resilience, it is also suggested to paying attention not to overload the 
information channels with unnecessary information.  
Prior knowledge and experience is another capacity frequently proposed as the 
precursor of resilience. It is conceptualized as accumulated knowledge by Sutcliffe and 
Vogus (2003, p. 101) in the form of “acquiring new skills, mastering new situations and 
improving competence” and found necessary “for new knowledge to be assimilated and 
used”. Moreover, Horne and Orr (1997, p. 32) called in competence and portrayed it as 
having the necessary skills and applying them effectively. Lastly, McManus et al. (2007, 
p. 34) included it as information and knowledge in their framework to denote the 
effective application of specialized knowledge while responding to the challenges. In 
their book, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007, p. 99) suggested that resilient organizations are 
“actively concerned with developing people’s skills and knowledge” and they have the 
“ability to use their knowledge in novel ways”, which helps formulating effective 
responses to unexpected challenges. The empirical work by Morgan et al. (2015), 
Amaral et al. (2015) and Maynard and Kennedy (2016) also demonstrated that 
establishing a learning culture within the team (or organization) leads to accumulating 
knowledge from past experiences; and effectively utilizing this knowledge facilitates 
resilience when responding to future challenges. 
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Finally, whilst praising the utilization of accumulated knowledge to address challenges, 
researchers also paid attention to the ability to formulate novel solutions, 
particularly in the case of novel challenges. Weick (1993, p. 638) conceptualized this 
ability as improvisation, and argued that organizations should encourage developing 
this ability, as it is extremely useful when existing solutions do not work. Improvisation 
is also observed to be practiced by HROs by “recombining actions already in their 
repertoire into novel combinations” (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008, p. 47); and 
proposed by HRO researchers as one of the antecedents of resilience by enabling the 
organization to formulate the response to effectively address the challenge. Moreover, 
Kendra and Wachtendorf’s  (2003b, p. 45) investigation of the response of New York 
City's Emergency Operations Centre to the 9/11 attack demonstrated how improvised 
actions were necessary when there were unexpected challenges to respond to and 
planned actions did not work.   
Another dynamic that is considered significant in relation to both team effectiveness 
(Kozlowski et al., 1996; Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006) and to team and organizational 
resilience (Stephenson, 2010b; Carpenter et al., 2012) is the role of leadership. 
Leadership is among the factors that contribute to “team functioning and performance” 
(Vessey and Landon, 2017, p. 531); and hence, both theoretical and practical 
investment in understanding the effects of leadership on teams have been advocated 
(Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006, p. 111). However, the leadership literature is vast; to do 
justice to it would have left me short of resources to explore my main concern, namely, 
collective contributory factors to team resilience. I therefore did not include 
‘leadership’ among the contributing factors of team resilience in my conceptual model. 
 
2.5.2 Team resilience and Team performance 
The relationship between resilience and performance is acknowledged by many 
resilience researchers in the conceptualization of resilience in the form of maintaining 
normal performance levels in the face of challenges. Reason (2000, p. 770) framed this 
as: “withstand[ing]… operational dangers and still achiev[ing]… objectives”; Sheffi 
(2005, p. 13) explicitly stated that resilience is the “ability to… return to… normal 
performance level”; Horne (1997, p. 27) said that it is: “the ability… to withstand… 
without resulting in regressive/non-productive behavio[u]r”; and Pulley (1997, p. 2) 
took it the other way around and argued that: “A lack of resilience… results [in] lower 
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productivity and declining performance”. Although not as explicitly as these, various 
other conceptualizations also imply that resilience leads to better performance. 
Freeman et al. (2003a, p. B6) asserts that: “resilience means the ability to spring back to 
original” and this “original” may also cover the higher prior performance levels. 
Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003, p. 97) propose that: “Resilience refers to the maintenance of 
positive adjustment under challenging conditions”, and Mallak (1998a, p. 149) similarly 
refer it as: “the ability… to design and implement positive adaptive behaviours”, in both 
of which these positive “adjustments” or “adaptive behaviours” could also mean 
increased performance levels. Coutu (2002, p. 52) described it as: “the skill and the 
capacity to be robust under conditions of enormous stress and change” and Cumming 
et al. (2005, p. 976) said that it is: “the ability… to maintain… identity”; and in these two 
conceptualizations one of the various elements of being robust and maintaining 
identity could be preserving high (or regular) performance levels. Lastly, even the 
features in Wildavsky’s (1988, p. 147) fundamental definition could be matched with 
performance: an act of coping meant by the phrase “the capacity to cope” may be 
preserving performance levels or an act of “bouncing back” may be turning back to 
higher prior performance levels as in Freeman et al.’s (2003a) conceptualization.   
Moreover, while elaborating on these conceptualizations, the researchers mention 
certain capacities that leads to resilient responses to challenges (or adversity or 
disruptions), and in turn, these resilient responses lead to preserved (or even higher) 
performance levels. For instance, Lengnick-Hall et al. (2011, p. 252) proposes that 
certain characteristics such as problem-solving routines, self-efficacy and a positive 
attitude towards learning leads to the improvement of the resilience capacity and this 
resilience capacity provides for the survival of entities in challenging conditions 
through maintained performance levels. Similar to this conceptualization, Gittell et al. 
(2006) investigated the airlines affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and concluded 
that abundance of relational reserves and adequate equipment of financial reserves are 
the sources of resilient responses and resilient responses are sources of recovery from 
the crisis, which they measured in the form of performance recovery.  
In another example, Gomes et al. (2014) investigated the sources of team resilience and 
the outcome of team resilience is conceptualized as performance. As a result of their 
case study, they found effective communication as well as team diversity as the sources 
of resilience, and they concluded that understanding and achieving resilience, 
particularly in the context of complex systems with challenging dynamics, is the way to 
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improving performance. Jaaron and Backhouse (2014) also conceptualized resilience as 
a mediator mechanism between certain individual and organizational level inputs and 
team (and, ultimately, organizational) performance. While developing this 
conceptualization, they mentioned that the previous literature defines resilience as a 
capacity that allows the preservation of “satisfactory” performance levels (2014, p. 
2029). Lastly, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) wrote a book about how the concept they 
created and defined, [collective] mindfulness, leads, in various examples, the 
organizations in extreme and highly dynamic environments to be more resilient to 
challenges and this allows these organization to provide for desired production and 
performance levels.  
Interestingly, in spite of this inherent inclusion of performance in the conceptualization 
of resilience, the relationship between resilience and performance has rarely been 
modelled and empirically investigated by resilience researchers (Lewis, Donaldson-
Feilder and Pangallo, 2011, p. 7). Maynard and Kennedy (2016, p. 22) also draws 
attention to the scarcity of explicit empirical investigations of the relationship between 
resilience and performance, specifically at the team level, and points out the necessity of 
such empirical work given the assumed importance of resilience for performance. 
Moving from this, they propose a research model (2016, p. 63), where various 
organizational, individual and team level inputs leads to the emergence of resilience in 
the face of challenges and the demonstration of resilience leads to better performance 
along with certain other team level outcomes.  
In the team resilience literature (in addition to the work by Maynard and Kennedy 
(2016)), and to some extent in the individual resilience literature, the conceptual 
elaborations and empirical investigation of resilience in relation to performance are 
relatively more abundant compared to the organizational resilience literature. The 
reason for this may be about the relative ease of data collection on performance at the 
individual and team level compared to at the organizational level. A second possible 
reason may be the inclination of organization resilience studies to extreme settings 
where survival is more crucial than performance or, in Weick’s (1987, p. 112) words: 
“reliability is a more pressing issue than efficiency”. No matter what the reason is, in 
the individual resilience and team resilience literatures, the conceptualization of 
resilience is more explicitly associated with performance and, although still scarce, 
more empirical investigations were carried out. For example, in their conceptual work, 
Alliger et al. (2015, p. 177) pointed out how, for teams, one of the most significant 
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negative effects of facing challenges is decreased performance along with decreased 
team cohesion and member well-being. They added that certain number of challenges 
may be overcome by many teams, however, in the face of enduring challenges, “only 
resilient teams can sustain performance and morale”. Moreover, Amaral et al. (2015, p. 
1184) also associated resilience with “overall performance” in their team resilience 
definition, particularly regarding performance as one of the outcomes of resilience. 
They suggested developing models that explain the relationship between resilience and 
performance as an important direction for future team resilience research. Finally, 
Bowers et al. (2017) proposed a team resilience framework, drawing on the work of 
Maynard and Kennedy (2016), in which they defined team resilience as an emergent 
state, which means it may only be observed when the teams are faced with challenges. 
In this framework, they treated team resilience as a mediator between individual, team 
and organizational level inputs and outcomes. The inputs, which serve as the 
precursors of the emergent team resilience, may be characteristics or processes. On the 
other hand, outcomes are positive adjustments in the face of challenges, one of which is 
“maintenance of performance”. 
Empirically, Furniss et al.’s (2011) work is among the first to investigate the 
relationship between team resilience and performance. In their work, they established 
a framework to explain resilience and tested it with a case study where they conducted 
an experiment on 14 nuclear operator crews. Their study concluded that situational 
awareness and slack resources in the form of broad action repertoire lead to resilient 
responses to the challenges faced, and these resilient responses allowed crews to 
manage the variabilities in the performance, and avoid performance decreases that 
could be caused by challenges. In another study, Meneghel et al. (2014) employed 
quantitative methods to investigate positive emotions, team resilience and team 
performance. 216 teams from 40 companies were rated their level of positive emotions 
(such as enthusiasm, optimism, satisfaction, etc.) and team resilience and the 
supervisors of the teams rated their performance. The results showed that team 
resilience mediates the relationship between positive emotions and team performance. 
This study is also significant in terms of acknowledging the existence and importance of 
resilience in less-extreme challenging settings as opposed to extreme environments, 
which most of the resilience research turned their face towards. Another quantitative 
study, at the organizational level, is conducted by Akgun and Keskin (2014), where they 
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investigated 112 firms from various industries with different market turbulence levels. 
Their study also validated a positive relationship between resilience and performance. 
Finally, the empirical work by Youssef and Luthans (2007) is one of the rare empirical 
studies that investigated the relationship between resilience and performance. 
Contrary to the expectations and other studies, in this study, resilience was not found 
to significantly affect performance. The researchers explain the non-significance by the 
inadequacy of their sample size. However, there are two more important comments 
had to be made about this unexpected finding. Firstly, this research is on the individual 
level, and hence same results cannot be directly assumed at the different levels of 
organization. Secondly, and more importantly, the performance data is measured based 
on self-report tools. Regarding the investigation of the relationship between resilience 
and performance, an important problem is the frequent preference of measures of a 
self-report nature to obtain performance data. Vera et al. (2017, p. 135), as well as 
Youssef and Luthans (2007), highlighted this limitation of their study and suggested 
that if objective performance measures were used in the investigation, the results 
would be more reliable. 
 
2.6 Research Model 
In this study, my main purpose is to develop a generic (that is “transferable to different 
or future contexts” (Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 24)) yet comprehensive (that “uncover[s] a 
[broad] range of factors leading to resilience” (Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 24)) framework 
to explain resilience. With this framework, I basically aim to answer this question asked 
by Linnenluecke (2017, p. 16): “are there resources, capabilities and organizational 
structures that promote resilience in a wide variety of different contexts”. With this 
purpose, my first objective has been to establish a resilience framework based on a 
comprehensive literature analysis summarized in this chapter, then, to bring this 
framework to an operationalizable format with the help of an exploratory study, and 
finally, to test this framework with my main study. Following these steps, I first 
established a process-focused framework to understand what I shall call the 
“challenge-response” process, which corresponds to an entities actions during the 




Figure 4. Resilience explained through organization challenge-response process 
According to this framework (illustrated by Figure 4), when an organization is faced 
with a challenge with novel elements, it first has to come up with solution alternatives. 
The formulation of accurate solution alternatives requires a good understanding of the 
context (reflected by situational awareness), which is only possible with the effective 
processing of necessary information, which is facilitated with effective communication. 
While the solution alternatives are formulated, the knowledge from past experiences 
may be utilized, however, this knowledge should be supplemented with a novel 
combination of actions using improvisation to also address the novel elements of the 
challenge. The decision regarding which solution to implement also requires a sound 
understanding of the challenge and the circumstances around it. In order to implement 
the solution, the organization has to act in a cohesive and coordinated manner with 
collective mental models. Elimination of challenge (demonstrable by maintained 
performance levels) leaves the organization with the newly acquired knowledge which 
may improve the ‘elimination’ process when face with the future challenges. 
Further to this, I have established the framework that illustrates the precursors that 
lead to the manifestation of resilience. In this framework, I considered resilience as an 
emergent capacity, which is only demonstrable when certain predetermining factors 
are in place (Maynard and Kennedy, 2016, p. 8). This explains why the resilience 
capacity is only demonstrated when faced with challenges and why it is extremely hard 
to observe and measure it. Thus, I also wanted to investigate its observable and 
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operationalizable outcomes and identified performance to serve this purpose (section 
2.5.2). Figure 5 illustrates this framework, where resilience is portrayed as an emergent 
capacity and performance is included as its observable and operationalizable outcome.  
 
 
Figure 5. Conceptual model 
 
According to this framework, resilience is conceptualized as a capacity to provide for 
satisfactory performance outcomes while operating under challenging, stressful and/or 
disruptive environmental conditions. In other words, for an entity to be successfully 
operate in the face of challenging conditions, it needs to demonstrate resilience 
capacity that emerges as a result of a combination of certain precursor capacities and 
capabilities. As mentioned before, prior literature on resilience proposes various 
precursors and throughout the empirical part of this study, the effects of these 
precursors on resilience were investigated to test and improve the model. Nonetheless, 
based on the literature analysis I conducted with regards to the antecedents of 
resilience (which is elaborated in section 2.5.1), in the tentative framework these 
precursors are identified as; 
• collective mental models (‘virtual role systems’ in Weick, 1993; ‘collective mind’ 
in Weick and Roberts, 1993; ‘coordination’ in Horne and Orr, 1997; ‘role 
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dependence’ Mallak, 1998a; ‘shared mental models’ in Maynard and Kennedy, 
2016; ‘transactive memory systems’ in Bowers et al., 2017),  
• effective communication systems (‘respectful interaction’ in Weick, 1993; 
‘communication’ in Horne and Orr, 1997; ‘effective communication’ in Sutcliffe 
and Vogus, 2003; McManus et al., 2007; Furniss et al., 2011; Stephens et al., 
2013; Maynard and Kennedy, 2016; Bowers et al., 2017),  
• effective information gathering (‘attention to environment’ in Meyer, 1982; 
‘critical understanding’ in Horne and Orr, 1997; ‘constructive sensemaking’ in 
Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; ‘situational awareness’ in McManus et al., 2007; 
‘attention to weak signals’ in Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008; Furniss et al., 
2011; Alliger et al., 2015),  
• accumulated knowledge (‘competence’ in Horne and Orr, 1997; ‘accumulated 
knowledge’ and ‘learning culture’ in Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; ‘information and 
knowledge’ in McManus et al., 2007; ‘using existing knowledge’ in Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007; ‘past experience and training’ in Furniss et al., 2011; Morgan, 
Fletcher and Sarkar, 2013; Amaral, Fernandes and Varajão, 2015; ‘learning 
culture’ in Maynard and Kennedy, 2016),  
• and improvisation (Weick, 1993; Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003b; Sutcliffe and 
Vogus, 2003; Boin and McConnell, 2007; West, Patera and Carsten, 2009).  
Combining these insights, with this framework, I propose that with these capabilities, 
entities (in this study, teams) will be able to demonstrate resilience to the challenges, 
which, in turn, will prevent the deterioration of performance in challenging conditions. 
I included these capabilities in this conceptual model as general contributing factors to 
team resilience. I did not assume that their contribution to resilience was equal and/or 
direct. Rather I aimed to investigate the nature and level of these contributions 
throughout my research. This framework was further improved with the exploratory 
study and was tested and finalized in the main study.   
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was twofold: to set a conceptual background for the 
following empirical work and to develop a testable model for the study. To achieve the 
former, first, I conducted a review of previous studies about resilience. I provided a 
brief history with regards to how resilience was started to be used in the academia, 
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accounting for its journey from material science to all the way to the organization 
studies. I also provided various characterizations in different fields in that regards 
(section 2.2). With regards to its conceptualization in the organization studies, initially, 
I discussed the work that constituted its roots, namely, crisis management, positive 
organizational scholarship and the general resilience literatures. Following this, I 
accounted for the resilience research in two groups of settings, namely high-risk 
industries and organizations experiencing major crises, on which almost all resilience 
research has concentrated.  
Once I summarized the background of the resilience literature, I laid out the limitations 
and gaps waiting to be addressed in the resilience field. I identified the immediate gap 
as the lack of a comprehensive framework to explain resilience, particularly for a wider 
population of organizations facing less extreme operational challenges compared to the 
organizations in the extreme settings, concentrated by the previous studies. In this 
regard, since for organizations in less-extreme settings performance is a compelling 
issue (as reliability or survival is not an issue), I also identified the nature of the 
relationship between resilience and performance as another important gap to be 
addressed. I indicated the issues I addressed in this research with regards to these gaps 
in the following section. Within this scope, I mentioned the studies that investigated the 
mechanisms that explain resilience and its relationship with performance. 
In the continuation of this section, I provided the research model which aimed to guide 
my investigation to answer the research questions I identified. This model was 
established based on the propositions and findings of the studies that investigated the 
mechanisms of resilience, the capacities and capabilities that leads to resilience, and 
the outcomes of resilience. Using this model, I tested the relationship between various 
capacities and capabilities and resilience as well as resilience and performance as an 







3 Exploratory Study – Escape Games 
3.1 Introduction 
As described in section 2.4, there are three important limitations of methods used in 
previous empirical investigations of resilience: the non-generalizability of the findings 
to wider organizational populations, a lack of direct (or real-time) data collection with 
regard to the mechanisms of resilience, and extensive dependence on self-report 
measures. In the empirical part of my research, I intend my research design to address 
these limitations. With this intention, first, I decided to investigate resilience to high-
probability low impact disruptions (Sheffi and Rice Jr., 2005, p. 43), which are mainly 
caused by the challenges of daily operations. Such challenges are faced by many 
organizations; hence, data on resilience to these challenges may be applicable to a wide 
range of organizations. Second, I decided to conduct a study with a relatively large 
sample compared to previous resilience studies, which would enable me to employ 
quantitative methods, to compare and contrast across multiple, comparable units in a 
relatively controlled setting and thereby obtain (more) generalizable results. Thus, to 
be practical (both considering time and money), I decided to use relatively small and 
manageable organizational units and opted to use teams as my unit of analysis. This 
decision also served the purpose of collecting real-time as opposed to post-hoc 
investigation. In this regard, I reasoned that team processes would be easier to map out 
in a holistic manner than would comparable processes in large organizations; which 
would require me to be at several places at the same, even for a single organization. 
Finally, I also wanted use data independent from self-reports where possible, so in my 
research design, I wanted to employ direct observations and objective measures, 
particularly to measure performance.  
Given my intention to collect real-time data on a relatively large sample, it appeared 
impractical to design a field study. As I elaborated before, it is difficult to observe the 
challenge-response processes in multiple units in real life and this may be one of the 
reasons why post-hoc case studies are so dominant in the resilience field. However, the 
mechanisms of resilience may not be easily revealed by these post-hoc investigations, 
as actors may either forget to account for them, may hide them in order to hide their 
mistakes or may not even be aware of them (Weick, 1976, p. 15; Alesch et al., 2001, p. 
42; Lewis, Donaldson-Feilder and Pangallo, 2011, p. 6). As a solution to this, I decided 
to conduct my investigation in a more controlled setting, in which I was aware of the 
50 
 
nature and timing of the challenges faced by the teams. This allowed me to collect real-
time data. In addition, since these challenges did not have negative outcomes with very 
significant consequences (such as injury, loss-of-life, financial losses, layoffs, etc.), 
participants would not be as disturbed by data collection as they would if they were 
subject to research in a real-time setting where their actions had major consequences. 
Of course, an important downside of this decision is the difficulty in finding an artificial 
setting where participants still feel sufficiently challenged despite not facing real life 
consequences.  
My search for such an artificial setting lead me in the first instance to “escape games”, 
where teams of up to six people are locked into a room with a series of puzzles and 
problems in it. Solving these puzzles and problems leads the team to a key to open the 
locked door of the room. They have 60 minutes to reach the key. They fail the exercise if 
they do not reach the key in the given time. I considered this setting because it is a 
setting that causes nervousness, and even stress on some occasions, according to the 
testimonials of those who have played it (Nicholson, 2015, p. 12). Since people has a 
very limited idea with regard to what expects them in the room and they might be 
nervous about not being competent enough to unlock themselves in the given time, I 
anticipated that ‘escape game’ setting might be sufficiently challenging for the research 
participants. Moreover, solving the complex and connected puzzles in the room 
requires participants to gather information from the surroundings, communicate the 
obtained information, collectively make sense of the situation and improvise solutions 
using this collective sensemaking capacity. Thus, responding to the challenges in this 
setting appeared to require capabilities similar to those of team resilience.  I therefore 
decided to test the framework I established as a result of my literature investigation in 
this setting. 
I conducted investigations with two teams as an exploratory study in the escape game 
setting. As a result of these investigations, I concluded that the escape game setting was 
limited in certain ways in terms of revealing the mechanisms of resilience I was 
investigating. Thus, I did not continue my main study with the escape game setting. The 
exploratory study generated several insights and helped with the design of my main 
study in a number of ways. First, it revealed the strengths and weaknesses of artificial 
research settings with regard to resilience research. Second, it demonstrated how 
resilience research could be done in the most effective way in such settings. Third, it 
indicated the type of data collection methods that were most feasible and beneficial to 
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use while investigating resilience in artificial settings. In addition to the methodological 
insight I gained and in spite of ‘Escape Game’ setting’s limits in terms of revealing the 
mechanisms of resilience, I observed teams responding to challenges in this study. 
Hence, this exploratory study was also fruitful in terms of testing and improving the 
research model I developed, particularly in terms of bringing it into an 
operationalizable format. 
 
3.2 Methods  
3.2.1 Nature of Escape Games (Escape Room) 
Escape games are physical versions of the videogames in which characters are trapped 
in a room and players must extract information (from the surroundings) that will 
enable them to unlock the room and escape (Escape the room, 2006). Instead of the 
virtual characters in the videogame, in physical escape games, people, themselves, - as 
teams - are locked into a physical room full of information in the form of problems and 
puzzles. In these escape games, people need to free themselves from a locked room 
within a time limit, by decoding information in order to reach to the hidden room key 
and thereby escape.  
According to information provided by Escape Room Directory website (Escape Room 
Directory, 2016), there are more than 2500 Escape Game facilities worldwide that span 
1191 cities and 92 countries. Most of these facilities offer a number of rooms with 
different themes and scenarios. There are rooms that imitate prison cells, dungeons 
and space stations (Escape Room, 2013) as well as non-themed rooms with several 
puzzles embedded within them. Real life escape games were first initiated in Asia with 
earliest facilities being established around 2006 and they became popular after 2010 
all over the world (Nicholson, 2015).  
In the process of playing Escape Games, participants are first required to gather as a 
team. After the establishment of the team, a date is set with the facility and the room 
booked for the team for the duration of the exercise. On arrival at the facility, an 
experienced controller briefs the team about the exercise, particularly to prevent team 
members damaging themselves or the room (such as trying to break windows, move 




Once the team enters into the room, it is locked from the outside and the countdown 
starts. Generally, teams are given 60 minutes to find the key and escape. Throughout 
that time, a controller monitors the room via a video camera and only intervenes with 
the exercise if (a) an unexpected problem arises or (b) the team is unable to solve clues 
and asks for help. Nicholson’s (2015) survey suggests that only around 41% of the 
teams are able to successfully unlock themselves from the room within the time 
available. This suggests that solving the problems and the puzzles embedded in the 
rooms require collective problem-solving skills in the form of searching for clues, 
accurately combining different clues and making interpretations from these 
combinations, formulating solutions with these interpretations and applying the 
solutions to overcome the problems. I presumed that all these activities require a team 
to construct collective mental models, establish efficient communication and 
information gathering systems and formulate improvised solutions; and, by that, 
demonstrating resilient responses to the unexpected challenges. This may be why 
escape games are popular as a corporate activity (Caramela, 2018), as with these 
exercises they test and improve their collective skills and capabilities (French and 
Marmor Shaw, 2015), hopefully improving productivity and performance at workplace. 
3.2.2 Research design 
For the exploratory study, I carried out two single-team exercises with one team 
entered into the exercise at each run. By using the escape game setting in these 
exercises, I aimed to observe collective behaviour while teams solved problems on the 
way to reach their goal of escaping within one hour. As observed by several resilience 
scholars, resilience is about efficiently responding to challenges while operating to 
complete a mission (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; McManus et al., 2007; Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008). Adopting this view, many scholars have argued that 
dealing with unexpected challenges that “fall outside the set of disturbances the system 
is designed to handle” (Comfort, Boin and Demchak, 2010, p. 8) requires resilience 
(Williams et al., 2017, p. 742). Thus, considering the fact that I will be observing teams 
that are facing unexpected challenges, I hoped that the exploratory study would reveal 
the mechanisms of resilience.  
In the two exercises I conducted, the first one resulted in success and the team 
unlocked the door in 48 minutes. The second team, on the other hand, was unable to 
find the key within 60 minutes which meant that they ‘failed’ the exercise. Descriptions 
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of these two exercises are provided in section 3.4. The contrast between the results of 
two runs yielded useful insight into the actions that facilitate resilient responses to 
challenges faced during operations.   
3.2.3 Data collection 
Data collection involved pre- and post-exercise discussion sessions and video 
recordings of the exercises. I met with the teams one hour prior to the exercise and 
held pre-exercise discussions in order to understand the stress levels and expectations 
of team members along with the team dynamics prior to the exercise. Then the exercise 
was carried out and recorded (with both visual and audio recordings). After the 
exercise, I held post-exercise discussion sessions to explore participants’ views of the 
exercise and of the behaviour of their team. 
During the pre- and post-exercise discussions, I employed a semi-structured interview 
method. With the help of predetermined questions (Appendix 10.2), I aimed to 
understand participants both individually and as a team. I asked questions to 
understand how participants feel regarding the exercise and their team. I also asked 
questions to understand what collective capacities they envision to develop and use 
throughout the exercise. I did not intervene with the flow and the direction of the 
discussions, but facilitated the progression by introducing new questions when 
necessary. I audio-recorded the discussion sessions and took notes during the 
discussions. I used these recordings and notes to supplement the qualitative analysis of 
the video recordings of the exercises.  
3.2.4 Sampling  
The sampling method I employed for this exploratory study was ‘convenience 
sampling’, namely selecting the participants of the study according to how easy it is to 
access them (Salkind, 2010) rather than considering how representative they are of the 
population investigated (Vogt, 2011c). This is a non-random sampling method and, 
hence, has advantages and disadvantages. In order to quickly test the escape game 
setting as a possible research setting and to gather information about the methods and 
measures to be used in the main study, I used convenience sampling because it was 
easy and economical to acquire participants by this method. It is not straightforward to 
suggest generalizability for this method of sampling (Salkind, 2010), however my 
purpose with the exploratory study was to facilitate the main study (by an initial 
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testing of the research model and planned research methods) rather than generating 
generalizable findings.  
 
3.3 Implementation 
My first step was to form the teams. I directly approached to the PhD students at 
University of Edinburgh Business School asking for their participation in the exercise 
and first five volunteers made up the first team to run the exercise. On the arranged 
date, I first conducted the pre-exercise discussion. During the pre-exercise discussion, 
participants revealed their thoughts and expectations about the exercise they will enter 
in an hour. They also revealed how excited and/or stressful they were both verbally 
and with their body language. I only intervened with the discussion (a) when I wanted 
to ask follow-up questions about the subject being discussed and (b) when participants 
had nothing else to say on that subject and another one could be introduced. Once in 
the exercise, a controller and I monitored the exercise from outside the exercise room 
for the complete duration. As an experienced runner of the exercise, the controller 
explained the implications of actions taken by the team as the exercise proceeded. I 
took note of all this information. The team successfully completed the exercise in 48 
minutes. After the exercise, participants discussed their experience and contrasted 
these with their expectations before the exercise. They, then, discussed the actions 
taken by the team and how these were useful (or not) in solving the problems and 
puzzles. Participants explained, from their own perspective, the reasons behind their 
ability to effectively address to the challenges as well as the reasons behind the level of 
their performance. 
The volunteers for the second run were drawn from a business school in Turkey and 
five volunteers formed up the second team. The second exercise was carried out in 
Turkey using a different Escape Game scenario to the UK exercise. Although the 
scenarios were different, the difficulty of the problems and puzzles were similar and 
both teams were given the same time limit (60 minutes) to complete the exercise. In 
the pre-exercise discussion session of the second team, I introduced the same questions 
as the pre-exercise discussion of the first run. Participants talked about their 
expectations, their excitement and their stress. After the discussion, participants 
entered in the exercise. The exercise lasted for 60 minutes, all of which was recorded 
and monitored by the controller and myself. Again, the controller shared her opinion of 
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the implications of the actions taken by the team. This team was unsuccessful in that 
after 60 minutes they had not located the key to unlock the door. Thus, the post-
exercise discussion was mainly about the reasons they thought caused their failure; and 
about actions they could take instead to change the result. I wrote a detailed 
description of both discussions afterwards. 
  
3.4 Detailed accounts of exercises 
3.4.1 Exercise 1 
I carried out the first Escape Game exercise at a facility in Edinburgh, United Kingdom 
on March 7, 2015. The exercise lasted from 11:29am to 12:17pm, 48 minutes in total. 
The team had to solve eight sets of puzzles (in the form of locked cupboards, briefcases, 
boxes, coded writings, etc.). They reached the key and completed the exercise 
successfully.  
As soon as the team stepped into the exercise room, the members scattered around and 
started to carefully examine the room in order to find clues that would lead them to the 
key. They gathered everything they had considered as clues on a table that was sitting 
in the middle of the room. From the moment the exercise started, the team members 
communicated their individual findings to the others so that everybody had a cognitive 
map of the team’s progress constantly. This communication was sustained until the end 
of the exercise, especially in the form of reporting individual findings verbally out loud 
so that other team members could hear them. Quotes such as “I… got two [postcards] 
over there”, “[there is] not anything behind the TV or on these shelves” or “Is there 
something in the lampshade?” were constantly uttered by the team members, 
providing continuity of communication.  
The initial passwords they aimed to find were numerical ones to open a number of 
locked cupboards with padlocks on them. Thus, they initially targeted different hour 
indications of the various clocks in the room (such as 6:05, 7:05, 4:30, etc.). They used a 
white board to record what they had found in order not to forget it and to be able to 
detect the connections between different clues more effectively. Once they recorded the 
clues on the board, they discussed possible interpretations in order to reach to the 
correct one. The team generally worked in subgroups of 2-3 people, which allowed 
them to deal with multiple clues at the same time and hence work more quickly and 
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effectively. They only got together as a team when there were bigger and more complex 
problems to deal with that required brainstorming, new idea generation and option 
evaluation.  
In terms of tangible outcomes, the team made a slow start. They overcome the first 
puzzle (a numerical password for one of the padlocks) only after 13:56 minutes passed. 
Since they spent more time on this than an average team spends, the controller 
provided an extra clue via a TV screen. The second puzzle also involved a numerical 
password to open another locked cupboard. Unsuccessful attempts cost them a lot of 
time and because of this, the controller provided two additional clues. The problem 
initially was poor interpretation of the clues, and then, the inability of a team member 
to physically unlock the padlock with the correct password combination. This failure 
led them to look for other possible password combinations and lengthened the time to 
solve the problem. With reinforced confidence in their initial finding provided by the 
additional clues from the controller, they tried the open the locker once more and 
succeeded after 21:55 minutes into the exercise. 
With additional findings from the unlocked cupboards, the team faced a complex 
decoding activity in the third puzzle. They did not need to formulate novel solutions or 
discuss alternatives for this puzzle. All the team needed to do was to decode encrypted 
writing using decoding clues. In more detail, there were certain Greek letters that were 
the codes for different numbers and certain algebraic expressions were given for the 
team to work out the numbers that the Greek letters were codes for. The purpose of the 
puzzle was to unlock a box with a three-digit password (a simple example: 3Δ=9, 
Γ+Δ=4, password: ΔΓΓ). They were extremely quick and efficient in decoding this, 
solving the puzzle in 2:21 minutes.  
The box revealed a Cryptex (a portable vault with a coded padlock, used to hide secret 
messages) with a five-letter code to be solved. At this point, the team could not 
associate any clue on hand with the solution of this puzzle and started to brainstorm 
ways to solve the puzzle. The problem was their inability to discover a briefcase 
between a table and a sofa. This locked briefcase had to be opened, because the clues 
inside it were needed to solve the Cryptex. Being unaware of that fact, they discussed 
how to solve Cryptex for quite some time. It took another clue from the controller for 
them to locate the briefcase, but once noticed, they were very quick to associate the 
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relevant clue (a picture with briefcase and three shapes, side counts of which were the 
three numerical password codes of the briefcase–e.g. ∆⧠◊=344-) and open it.  
After the discovery of the briefcase and the clues inside, it became easier for the team 
to associate the clues with the remaining puzzles. They needed to decipher another 
complex clue to discover a code for another box and in a coordinated fashion, they 
quickly discovered the code. The box revealed other items and clues that lead the team 
to the discovery of the five-letter code of the Cryptex. The Cryptex revealed a key to 
open a glass box that contained a safe with a door key in it and an ashtray sitting on the 
safe. According to the instructions, opening the safe required a four-digit code. This was 
the last puzzle and the only clue was the ashtray. They immediately tried the isolate the 
objects that they did not use throughout the exercise and that lead them to a shelf 
containing books and CDs. They looked for a book or a CD, which had a name associated 
with an ashtray, such as ‘ash’, ‘cigarette’, ‘fire’, etc. Finally, they discovered an Album by 
the group ‘Ash’ named: 1977. Entering the code on the safe opened it. This revealed the 
key and ended the exercise, after 47:49 minutes. 
3.4.2 Exercise 2 
The second exercise took place at another Escape Game facility located in Samsun, 
Turkey on July 4, 2015. It started at 13:55 and lasted until 14:55 with the team failing 
to reach the key and complete the exercise. This group was also had to solve eight sets 
of puzzles; however, they could only solve six of these. Just as the first group, the 
second group started by scattering around and searching the room and agreed to place 
all the clues on the table. They also counted the locks so that they would know 
approximately how many puzzles they needed to solve. However, the team did not 
adhere to these ideas as the exercise progressed, and members acted in ways that were 
independent and disconnected. This issue grew as the exercise progressed. There were 
very few verbalizations of individual discoveries. In addition to this, members appeared 
not to listen to or to try to make sense of what other members said. Therefore, most of 
the time, individuals only had the partial information that they themselves had 
obtained from the clues, and even then, they generally misinterpreted this information. 
This caused them to waste their time by searching the same places and trying the same 
solutions repeatedly, either individually or in sub-groups. For instance, after they had 
unlocked an old piece of luggage, there were four distinct instances (each by a different 
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group member) where this luggage was searched again for clues because no-one had 
called out what they had found (or had not found) inside.  
Because of these impediments, the team took 25 minutes to solve the first puzzle of the 
exercise and then only with a couple additional hints from the controller. In this first 
puzzle, they needed to collect four transparent decoding sheets and decode a password 
with them to open a box. Searching the entire room, they gathered only three of the 
sheets, but without knowing they were missing one, they could not decode the 
password. The controller told them about the missing sheet, which they then found. 
However, they still could not interpret how to use cards correctly without further help 
from the controller. Late success with the opening of the lock motivated the team to 
work together and in a more focused manner, so, in 5 minutes, they solved the second 
puzzle. For the second puzzle, the team quickly gathered the numbers by identifying 
the numerically coded differences between two seemingly identical pictures. The clue 
gathered from the drawer led the team to crack the code on a retro telephone, and this 
code opened the locked cupboard. The cupboard revealed an old piece of luggage and 
several clothes.  
In the luggage, there were books. One of these books was the key to solve the fourth 
puzzle and the team had to identify this from an earlier mention of its author on a card 
along with some numbers. The fourth puzzle required decoding a password by 
applying the numbers in the card in page-line-letter format and find the written version 
of the numerical password by using the letters obtained by this coding (e.g. letters of 
“onehundredandtwo” would be identified to get the code “102”). The team was very 
slow in interpreting how to apply the clue to discover the code, and could only manage 
it with a couple hints from the controller. This fourth puzzle, which was used to open 
another drawer, took more than 15 minutes of their time. 
From the drawer, they gathered a memo saying: “the time is running out, tidy up the 
stuff”. One member was quick in realizing that the first part of the memo referred to the 
numerical expression of the time in a digital clock in the room (i.e. 4:31 431). 
However, the team could not find any lock in the room to use that code, and they could 
not interpret the second half of the memo. Only after a hint by the controller, they 
realized that there was a hidden door behind clothes hung in the cupboard. The door 
was opening to another room, which was filled with three more puzzles. The group 
could step into the room with less than 10 minutes left in the exercise and could only 
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solve one of the puzzles. Using a key, they gathered by solving the previous puzzles, 
they opened the bookcase in this second room. A clue inside revealed the prefixes “sor-
” and “dis-”, which they discovered to correspond to the 7th and 21st books in an 
encyclopaedia set (as these prefixes were writing on the cover of these books to show 
which words described in these books). Using the code “712” they opened the 
briefcase. By the time they reached to this point, the team still had two puzzles left to be 
solved. Being left with this much work and very limited time, they lost motivation. The 
group started to demonstrate signs of desperation and frustration, especially after they 
realized they had only five minutes left and a puzzle that they were nowhere near to 




For the analysis of my exploratory study, I used the video recordings of the exercises, 
the notes I took while watching the exercise with the controller, the audio recordings of 
the pre- and post-exercise discussion sessions, and, finally, the notes I took during 
these sessions. Examining all these sources, I first created a timeline for each team, with 
regard to what they achieved during the exercise. Then, I contrasted these timelines, 
and marked the differences between the teams in terms of these achievements. 
Following this, in the data, I searched for the reasons of these differences. Using the 
insight from the literature and combining these with the information from the data, I 
aimed to understand the factors that contributed to overcoming the problems and 
puzzles of the exercise and the factors that caused delays and inefficiencies in team 
processes.  
The purpose of the exploratory study was to reveal mechanisms of team resilience and 
to test the explanatory power of my conceptual model, in order determine the 
approach and measures to be used in the main study. Two exercises were carried out in 
this exploratory study; one resulted in success and the other in failure. The first team 
appeared to display certain capacities and capabilities, which enabled them to better 
respond to the challenges and this, in turn, led them to solving puzzles quickly. Lacking 
those capacities and capabilities, at least to a sufficient level, the second team found it 
harder to hold themselves together as a unified force in the face of the challenges. 
Therefore, not being able to act collectively in an effective way, the second team was 
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unable to respond to the problems and puzzles effectively, was slow to solve the 
puzzles and, eventually, failed to complete the exercise within the allowed time. Thus, I 
discuss the finding in terms of collective dynamics that are revealed to contribute to 
resilient responses to the challenges faced by the teams. However, before discussing 
these dynamics I illustrated the comparability of two exercises implemented.   
3.5.1 Comparability of the two exercises:  
The completion times of two exercises may not be exactly comparable since the tasks 
and the scenario in each one was different. However, the exercises had a certain level of 
similarity, as shown in Table 2: 
 
Attribute Exercise – 1 Exercise – 2 
Amount of time given 60 minutes 60 minutes 
Number of puzzle series 
to be solved 
8 8 
Nature of the puzzles Codes and passwords Codes and passwords 




Help  Given in a standard 
manner to all teams in 
written form (via a TV 
screen) 
Given considering unique 
circumstances, verbally by 
the controller (via 
speaker) 
Number of clues 
provided by the 
controller 
5 6 
Number of rooms  1 2 
Table 2. Comparison of two exploratory exercises 
 
Table 2 demonstrates that two exercises are comparable in terms of the time it took 
teams to finish the exercise. Considering this, in general, first group was quicker in 
solving through the puzzle sets. In total, first group finished the exercise in 48 minutes 
whereas the second group had not completed the exercise after 60 minutes. 
Considering the completion time of individual puzzle stages, both groups were slow in 
solving the first puzzle and this may be expected due to initial adjustment to the 
exercise; the first group solved the first puzzle in 14 minutes whereas the second group 
only solved it after 25 minutes and then only with significant help from the controller. 
Both groups became more effective as the exercise progressed but this was not enough 
for the second group to complete the exercise. 
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3.5.2 Validation of resilience precursors identified in the conceptual model 
3.5.2.1 Establishment of an effective communication system 
Providing the effective communication within a team is one of the most important 
elements of the ability to quickly respond to challenges (Weick, 1993, p. 642). 
Resilience scholars have proposed various activities that facilitate the establishment of 
an effective communication system such as interacting (Weick, 1993), interrelating 
(Weick and Roberts, 1993), sharing (Maynard and Kennedy, 2016), providing feedback 
(Horne and Orr, 1997), transmitting (ideas, thoughts, knowledge) (Bowers et al., 2017), 
expressing (Stephens et al., 2013), etc. All these activities allow actors to combine the 
pieces of the comprehensive knowledge required to formulate resilient responses to 
challenges. Team members may individually have different pieces of information 
necessary to respond to a challenge (in the form of puzzles in escape games), but 
without the ability combine these pieces, it may be impossible to provide an effective 
response.  
In the first team, each individual informed the others of the progress they were making, 
so that everybody had a complete ‘cognitive map’ of what was going on. They also 
always checked in with each other about their progress even though sometimes they 
were working on different things simultaneously. Whilst doing this managed to avoid 
interrupting the flow of each other’s work during these interrelations. In contrast, 
individuals in the second team generally did not seem to consider it necessary to 
inform others of their progress, which led to delays in solving puzzles. For e.g. while 
searching for clues the same places were investigated by several group members at 
different times because nobody informed the others that s/he had already investigated 
that place. A dialogue between two members strikingly illustrates this communication 
issue, along with a suggestion of lack of trust: 
Member A: “I found it, I found the answer it is 6990.” 
Member B: (laughs loudly) “we’ve seen it, we’ve tried it, it does not 
work” 
Member A: (surprised and not convinced) “You did?” 
Member B: (not very happy that Member A is not convinced) “if 
you want, try it again!” 
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Maybe more importantly, for the second team, the lack of proper communication 
manifested itself as not paying attention to the ideas of other team members. Thus, 
their ability as a team to combine the ideas of different members was notably impeded 
and this prevented them from reaching solutions easily. For example, individuals 
constantly offered ideas regarding solutions to the puzzles but others generally did not 
pay attention to these ideas; some ideas were lightly mocked by other members. In 
contrast, every idea was valued, discussed and tried in the first exercise without 
judgement or discrimination.  
Additionally, team member interactions were very frequent and thorough in the first 
team, which helped the team to be coherent and provided a comprehensive cognitive 
map of the situation. Particularly, they discussed possibilities of what a clue might 
mean and also what it did not mean. These discussions helped them figure out possible 
solutions and also helped limit thinking in an ‘overcomplicated’ manner. For instance, 
one clue was a postcard with Greek letters on it, which corresponded to certain 
numbers. However, before understanding that they need to decode numbers that 
correspond to these Greek letters, one participant thought that the Greek meaning of 
these letters might be important or not and asked another member of the team (who 
happened to be Greek) whether the letters are meaningful together. At that moment, 
another participant pointed out that the meaning of the Greek letters could not be 
important, as most teams playing the Escape Games would not have any Greek 
participants. This was a good example of how the team eliminated a possibility and 
avoided losing time whilst interpreting the clues.  
Another example of this occurred when the first team was generating possible 
solutions to the Cryptex which they found after solving the third puzzle. The Cryptex 
had a five-letter code that they had to identify. Without realizing that they were missing 
the briefcase which included clues to solve the Cryptex, they tried to generate several 
alternative ways to solve it. At one point, one member suggested using a binary 
numerical system to decode the Cryptex but others immediately (but kindly) pointed 
out that it would be extremely hard to deal with a binary system, so that this could not 
be the right way to solve the puzzle.  
In contrast, while trying to figure out some page-line-letter coding, the second team 
also considered various complicated coding schemes, but they did not think about 
whether solving them was feasible within the given time. They spent a lot of time in 
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trying to decode clues using these complicated coding schemes. Only after suggestions 
from the controller did they realize that they were using inappropriate coding schemes. 
3.5.2.2 Establishment of the collective mental models  
In order for an entity to effectively act as a single unit while responding to the 
challenges, the entity has to possess the collective knowledge of each member’s current 
operations and situation (Bowers et al., 2017, p. 10). Some sharing of this collective 
knowledge across members of the team entity is also needed if members are to be able 
to fill in for each other when necessary (Weick, 1993, p. 640). As I mentioned in section 
2.5.2, this shared collective knowledge has been conceptualized in different ways by 
various scholars (e.g. collective mind, shared mental models, etc.), and proposed as one 
of the enablers of resilience by enhancing coordinated collective responses.   
Through their systematic approach and organized actions, the first team appear to have 
established a good sense of collective mental models, partly due to the effectiveness of 
the communication system that they employed. Using this system, they frequently 
evaluated the whole situation so that they had the ‘big picture’ in their minds. This is 
how, for example, they were able to come up with the last four-digit code to be solved. 
When they were brainstorming about how to discover the last code, one member 
asked: “What else is left that we haven’t used?” referring to the objects in the room and 
others replied: “the book shelf”. Their search of the shelf led them to a CD whose title 
(1977) provided the code. As well as being aware of their overall progress and making 
sense of all the clues they acquired, in each individual task, they were quick and 
efficient as a group to comprehend the situation and respond to it. This, for instance, 
allowed them to quickly go through the Greek letter encryption. 
The second team was much less successful in establishing such a sense of collective 
mental models. They became extremely caught up in details, and focused on the 
immediate solution of individual puzzles without thinking about how these might fit 
together. They were obsessed with getting out of the room without thinking about how 
each stage might lead on to another. Thus, they never paused to evaluate the situation, 
where they were, how much they had already been through, how many of the clues 
they had already used, how many boxes and closets/cupboards they had opened in 
order to assess how many tasks might remain. This was particularly manifested by 
attempting to apply every clue they found to every puzzle without trying to form 
associations between individual clues and the narrative of the puzzle. For example, in 
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the page-line-letter puzzle, the clue explicitly stated that a specific author was applied 
the coding in his books. However, they still tried to apply the decoding to books that did 
not belong to that author. 
As mentioned in section 2.5.1, the ability of a group to develop, maintain and access 
collective knowledge has been conceptualized as transactive memory systems by 
Wegner (1987), and Lewis (2003, p. 590) suggested that this latent concept is 
manifested in three operationalizable attributes: specialization, credibility, and 
coordination. According to Lewis (2003, p. 589) specialization is differentiated 
knowledge of members; credibility is members’ trust in the other members’ knowledge 
and expertise in these different areas; and coordination is the collective utilization of 
this diverse expertise and knowledge. Using this conceptualization, I analysed the two 
teams in terms of their transactive memory systems.  
Specialization: 
Specialization is significant for operations that require multiple areas of expertise and 
multitasking. Although teams do not need to demonstrate deep expertise in specific 
areas in the escape game environment, multitasking and parallel working is a must for 
the teams for the many parts of the exercise if they are to complete it on time. 
Considering this, the first team was efficient in breaking into subgroups to specialize 
and even allowing individuals to specialize when required. For instance, at the 
beginning of the exercise they decided that each member first needed to work by 
themselves to collect as many clues as possible. Moreover, later in the exercise, they 
frequently divided themselves into subgroups of two or three to work on different 
tasks simultaneously. Thereby, they were able to solve different puzzles simultaneously 
and obtain several clues that contributes to the solution of the subsequent puzzle.  
The second team, on the other hand, was not so specialized. In general, members were 
either wandering about on their own without engaging in a useful action or everyone 
was working as a whole group on the same puzzle which did not usually require so 
many people. On almost no occasions did I observe this team to be working on more 
than one task at a time in subgroups. The only exception to this was when solving a 
puzzle did not require the attention of the whole group. At these times, the individuals 
whose efforts were not needed tended to wander around, apparently with their minds 




When working on a task as a team, it is important to trust the expertise and judgements 
of the other members, especially if different individuals or subgroups are working on 
the different parts of the task. When members trust the expertise of other members, 
they do not require cross-checking the work completed by them and the information 
they communicate. This, in turn, speeds up the challenge-response process.  Such trust 
was observable in the first team as they confidently worked on different puzzles as 
subgroups. The suggestions coming from different members and subgroups appeared 
to be regarded as credible and were implemented when appropriate. The quotes from 
the post-exercise discussion reproduced below demonstrate the existence of such 
‘trust’ and its importance: 
“... when discussing possibilities, nobody ever said something like 
‘ow, whatever’ and instead everybody was like ‘Ok, yeah, let’s try 
that’…” 
“…it was like a sequence… at the beginning the groups split up… 
then gather when we finish that… so the other group was already 
finished with the writing… so we could directly go there… so it was 
flowing… not interrupted” 
“the best thing was we tried to solve the problem, we did not 
compete with each other” 
“…it was always like ‘let’s think about this’, ‘we can do this’, ‘what 
do you think’, it was always like this, the team, which to be 
completely honest surprised me about myself, cause I usually like 
to control… I… felt like it did have to do with ‘trust’, in the sense 
that I trusted each and every one… to figure it out…” 
This trust was also appeared to be strongly reinforced by the effective communication 
system as everything that was thought or discovered by individuals was constantly 
communicated to the group.  
Although the second team also had a positive environment and generally good member 
relations, there appeared to be a lack of confidence in the suggestions of others. One 
member in particular, frequently discouraged other members by quickly rejecting the 
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feasibility of their suggestions. Team members appeared, in general, unreceptive to the 
suggestions from others and everybody tried to implement their own ideas. They did 
not argue or fight and tried to keep a positive mood until the end of the exercises, but 
there was a clear lack of trust in the ideas and skills of fellow team members.  
 
Coordination: 
If there are several simultaneous tasks to be carried out and subgroups carry out these 
tasks, then the subgroups and their actions must be coordinated. Effective and efficient 
communication between subgroups, in particular, and between all members, in general, 
is necessary for the team to function in a coordinated manner. Moreover, a cognitive 
map of all members’ operational positions and overall situation have to be established 
in each member’s mind in order to provide for an overall coordination. Thus, the first 
team easily coordinated its actions and that speeded up the process of solving the 
puzzles, working through the stages of the exercise and reaching the key. The second 
team, on the other hand, lacked effective communication and failed to establish a 
shared cognitive map of the situation. Thus, they were unsuccessful in coordinating 
their actions. They showed impatience in their attempts to solve the puzzles, failing to 
ensure that they had gathered all the clues. They also jumped from one problem-
solving attempt to another without recognizing that it was impossible to solve one 
puzzle without solving the previous one first. In the absence of a repertoire of 
systematic, coordinated responses, most of their actions were simply a waste of time.  
3.5.2.3 Effective information gathering (situational awareness) 
Resilience scholars have demonstrated the importance of being attentive to signals 
coming from the external environment of a team or organization. This is crucial, first, in 
detecting adversity and anomalies before they escalate (Meyer, 1982), and second, in 
collecting adequate information to formulate appropriate responses (Sutcliffe and 
Vogus, 2003, p. 108). In this regard, the first team systematically searched for clues 
(first, at the very beginning of the exercise and, then, occasionally when they were out 
of ideas while solving a puzzle). They were also successful in spotting small details and 
forming associations between clues. They figured out the orientation of a Tablet PC 
from its position on the TV screen; they decoded the briefcase password from a picture 
of shapes very easily, worked out that a “black and white puzzle” meant grey and, they 
found out what the clue “ash” meant by remembering that books were the only thing in 
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the room that they had not used. They also frequently checked the TV monitor so that 
they were informed of any help immediately it was shown. However, they did overlook 
details a few times. For example, although they extensively searched the room at the 
beginning they missed a briefcase under a table. 
The second team was not systematic regarding the detection of details or gathering of 
clues. They appeared rather detached from each other and acted individually while 
searching for clues and solutions. Since they did not try to construct a shared meaning 
for the clues, they lost track of the connections among them as time passed. Their 
increasing impatience to solve the first puzzle also made them mindless in the search 
for additional clues. For instance, the last clue of the first puzzle was in a drawer which 
was examined by all the group members individually at different times but despite this, 
none of them located it. Having said that, the second team did sometimes identify 
certain small details and associations. For example, they immediately associated the 
name of the author on the clue card with a book that he had written, despite acquiring 
the two pieces of information at very different times during the exercise. Through this, 
they were able to combine these two clues to reach a solution. They were also very 
quick to associate the “time is passing” clue with the clocks in the room and thereby 
obtain the code for a padlock from those clocks.   
While drawing attention to the importance of situational awareness, resilience scholars 
have also warned against  overload of information channels (Weick, Sutcliffe and 
Obstfeld, 2008, p. 44). Regarding this, members of the second team frequently disrupted 
the action sequences of sub groups working on other issues. The conversations below, 
while two sub groups were working on different clues illustrate how team members 
did not consider the action sequences of others: 
Member A (from the 1st subunit, looking at a half-completed map 
of the room and shouting): “Looking at this, the key must be 
somewhere around here” (pointing towards the place where 2nd 
subgroup was and trying to gather their attention) 
Member B: (from the 2nd subunit, working on a different clue but 




Member A: (realizing only then she disturbed them): “anyways, 
you continue with your own work, let me not confuse you with 
this” (which she had already done by then) 
3.5.2.4 Accumulated knowledge 
The knowledge accumulated prior to the emergence of a challenge, which may be in the 
form of past experiences, simulations and training, has been  proposed to facilitate 
resilience by the enlargement of skill sets (Horne and Orr, 1997, p. 32) and action 
repertoires (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003, p. 101). Even when confronted with novel 
challenges, entities with broader action repertories and skill sets are more likely be 
able to call up and combine actions that enable an effective response. In the context of 
Escape Games, the teams are not expected to be knowledgeable about the scenario that 
they face, so that the challenges are unexpected and solutions are formulated in the 
moment. Thus, while identifying my participants for this exploratory study, I paid 
attention to selecting individuals that had never been through an Escape Game before. I 
understood from people who had been through an escape game that those with 
experience would be familiar with the way exercise progresses, and would know where 
to look and what to do compared to others without this experience. Thus, I selected 
participants who had no such prior experience or training. 
Nonetheless, I observed that both teams appeared to learn as the exercise progressed 
and hence both became quicker at finding and accurately interpreting clues. The first 
team in particular showed a positive learning curve, integrating each new piece of 
information to their knowledge base. For instance, when they received the first clue 
from the controller via the TV screen, it took them several minutes to notice the clue. 
However, after this they learned to keep an eye on the screen to make sure they 
obtained any extra clues the moment they appeared on the screen. The effect of 
learning could be expected to be even more significant if these teams conducted a 
second escape game exercise with a different scenario. 
3.5.2.5 Improvisation 
Finally, improvisation, the ability to formulate novel solutions ‘in the moment’ of the 
situation, has also been proposed by various scholars as one of the precursors of 
resilience (for e.g. Weick, 1993; Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003b), and I therefore 
included it in my conceptual model. Selecting a setting where challenges require 
responses in a limited window of time by participants with no prior experience and 
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training, I expected to observe an association between improvisation and resilience in 
my exploratory study. However, there were few occasions where teams demonstrated 
improvisation. This may be attributable to the fact that in the escape game setting all 
the challenges (puzzles) and their solutions are predesigned and clearly marked by 
leading clues. Knowing that these clues will lead the team to the solution, the team 
members might have been reluctant to think ‘outside the box’. What is more, trying to 
improvise may even be counterproductive while responding to a challenge in such a 
strictly predesigned setting. The reason is in such a setting, problems have unique 
solutions; hence, alternative interpretations of the clues and alternative solution 
generations may be time wasting. This may a reason why exploratory study teams were 
reluctant to improvise.  
3.5.3 Other precursors observed to facilitate resilience  
3.5.3.1 Team cohesion 
In addition to the capabilities and capacities that I proposed as the precursors of 
resilience in my conceptual model, I have also observed the effect of certain other 
capabilities in my analysis of the two escape game exercises. Firstly, the cohesiveness of 
the teams in the form of their ability to work together in a harmonious fashion 
appeared to facilitate the formation of effective responses.  
In the literature, team cohesion has been defined and investigated numerous times. 
One of the earliest definitions can be found in the study by Festinger (1950, p. 274), 
namely: “the resultant of all the forces acting on the members to remain in the group”. 
This general definition was later considered on two levels: commitment to the task and 
commitment to the group itself (Gross and Martin, 1952). I adopted the definition by 
Carron (1982, p. 124), which considers both of these levels and refers to team cohesion 
as “a dynamic process which is reflected in the tendency for a group to stick together 
and remain united in the pursuit of its goals and objectives.” Previous research has 
demonstrated the importance of cohesion for productivity (Evans and Jarvis, 1980) and 
performance (Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006). Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006, p. 89) concluded 
that cohesion is more significant for teams when “team workflow demands increase 
interdependence and require greater coordination of information and effort.”, which is 
the case when teams are operating in challenging conditions.  
In my exploratory study, in both teams, the members were all studying or working in 
the same group (the first team members had been studying in the same PhD 
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programme for six months and the members of the second team had been working in 
the same business school for two years), so in both teams, team members personally 
knew each other. The first team had never worked as a team prior to the exercise; on 
the other hand, as colleagues from the same department, the second team worked as a 
group on work-related projects before. Knowing this, I expected the first team to take 
some time to establish a cohesive group atmosphere and the second team to establish 
cohesion in the first few minutes of the exercise. Surprisingly, the reality was contrary 
to my expectations.  
From the initial moments, the first team was committed to completing the exercise and 
unified as a single entity for this purpose. While brainstorming, they always framed the 
discussion as “how can each one of us contribute to achieve our ultimate purpose?” 
Two members appeared to wish to lead the group actions, however, instead of fighting 
over the leadership they mutually managed the team in two subunits with constant 
communication between them. For the majority of the exercise, the team operated in 
two subunits and the subunits merged into a single entity when brainstorming was 
needed or when the task required more capacity (e.g. the Greek letter encryption).  
In the second team, as mentioned above, the individuals tended to act alone throughout 
the exercise. This was particularly observable in terms of their inability to combine 
pieces of information together. There was a handful of instances in which members 
tried to establish cohesion and enable collective action, however, these were not very 
effective. For instance, while working on the first puzzle, they gathered all the clues, 
however, they were unable to interpret them immediately. This led some members’ 
attention to be diverted to other items in the room. Members made comments such as 
“there is something with these clues, come on, please focus on this”, “come on, let’s do 
group effort”, but these were not very effective in getting the distracted members’ 
attention back to solving the first puzzle. Moreover, no one tried to establish a holistic 
way of looking at the situation and no one shared their findings to the group in an 
organized way. Interestingly, they were aware of this problem and some members 
individually called others to establish group norms and work as a team. For instance, in 
the first half of the exercise, a member explicitly stated: “we are not working as a team”, 
and another member agreed: “yes, let’s gather together, come on!” In another instance, 
while the group was trying to solve a specific puzzle, members started to dissolve and 
act independently. To warn them, a member called others by their names and said: “I 
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think we should focus here first!” Unfortunately, almost none of these attempts 
succeeded in gathering the group together and establishing cohesive action. 
In the resilience literature, there are conceptual as well as empirical studies that 
propose a relationship between cohesiveness and resilience. For instance, Lengnick-
Hall and Beck (2005, p. 750)  and Horne and Orr (1997, p. 32) suggested that when the 
members of an entity are united under a core identity or a common purpose, they are 
motivated and directed towards achieving common goals and eliminating challenges 
that stand in the way of hem achieving these goals. Moreover, in their investigation of 
sports teams, Morgan et al. (2013, p. 556) found a relationship between team cohesion 
and team resilience. In the light of this, I decided to add team cohesion to my research 
model among the precursors of resilience. 
3.5.3.2 Team Potency (Collective efficacy)  
Another significant difference between the first team and the second team that I 
observed was in their belief in the team’s potential to complete the exercise in 60 
minutes. Along with their unification under the common purpose of completing the 
exercise, the members of the first team also had a strong belief in their success. During 
the pre-exercise discussion, they constantly regarded their team as a team of capable 
and competent individuals with strong ambition. Moreover, although they had a slow 
start, they never voiced any concern about whether this might prevent them from 
reaching the key.  
On the other hand, the second team was quite anxious before going into the exercise. 
They made jokes about how they would like to keep the video-recording secret if they 
could not complete the exercise. In the exercise, the slow solution to the first puzzle 
was linked to members’ inability to establish effective communication. This made team 
members demotivated, anxious, pessimistic and insecure from time to time. Group 
members constantly uttered phrases like “I am bored!”, “I feel we are not going to be 
able to finish this.”, “We were so slow in doing…” This insecurity was especially 
noticeable in their behaviour in the latter part of the exercise: they frequently came up 
with different ideas to solve the puzzles but they did not think them worth trying and 
even those who generated the ideas appeared reluctant to try them. This may also be a 
sign of their lack of confidence in their own ideas and capabilities.   
In the literature, the confidence in a team’s own ideas and capabilities is labelled as 
‘team potency’ and ‘team efficacy’ (Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006). Self-efficacy was 
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initially defined at the individual level by Bandura (1977, p. 193) in the form of one’s 
expectation with regard to the fact that s/he “can successfully execute the behavio[u]r 
required to produce the outcomes.” Self-efficacy is proposed to contribute to 
performance based on the logic that the strength of people’s belief in their capacity to 
achieve might stimulate them to set higher goals and to actually achieve higher levels of 
performance (Phillips, Hollenbeck and Ilgen, 1996). Self-efficacy has also been defined 
at the team level (Lindsley, Brass and Thomas, 1995, p. 648) as: “the group's (or 
organization's) collective belief that it can successfully perform a specific task.” and 
labelled as collective efficacy. Feltz and Lirgg (1998, p. 558) suggest that collective 
efficacy is different from the mere aggregation of self-efficacy of team members in the 
sense that it is a ‘shared’ attribute and hence degree of consensus should be considered 
when measuring it.  
Another construct, regarded as very similar according to many researchers in the field, 
is team or group potency, and defined as (Shea and Guzzo, 1987, p. 335): “the collective 
belief of a group that it can be effective.” Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006) asserted the 
subtle difference between team potency and collective efficacy as generality and 
specificity. According to these authors, collective efficacy is “task specific”, whereas 
team potency is about “general effectiveness”. Adopting this view, I included this 
dynamic as team potency in my conceptual model, as a general indicator of teams’ belief 
in their capabilities to overcome challenges and increase performance.  
In the general teams literature, both team potency and collective efficacy are found to 
contribute to performance (Gully et al., 2002). In the literature specific to resilience, 
regarding collective efficacy / team potency, Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003, p. 102) 
proposed that groups may be resilient to challenges in their operating  environments if 
members collectively believe in the capabilities of the group. In their quantitative 
investigation of 194 teams, Vera et al. (2017, p. 128) found strong and meaningful 
positive relationship between collective efficacy and team resilience. Considering these 
findings and my own observations from the exploratory study, I decided to add 
collective efficacy in my research model.  
3.5.3.3 Collective Mindfulness: 
Based on my analysis, I also found Weick et al.’s (2008) ‘mindfulness’ concept, which 
they define as a capability that “induce[s] a rich awareness of discriminatory detail and 
a capacity for action” (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008, p. 37), relevant to 
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establishing collective mental models and achieving resilience. By openly talking about 
solution ideas, by establishing the complete picture of the operations, by being 
attentive to the hidden details in clues and by allowing tasks to be performed by the 
members that have the relevant competence, entities can manage unknown situations, 
such as the puzzles in the escape game context. To be able to provide this capacity, 
entities need to demonstrate these characteristics. These characteristics were 
observable in the first team as they were attentive to the details, they were discussing 
and evaluating all the alternative solutions and they successfully established the 
cognitive map of the situation they were in. As a result of mindful acting, they 
demonstrated a good balance of persistence and retreat. They generally did not persist 
in continuing unsuccessful attempts, they did not insist on trying impossible ideas but 
they did give a shot to many ideas (some of which were not very likely) without 
premature judgement. They also provided a good balance between attentiveness (to 
recognize details) and comprehension (to complete the cognitive map). 
The second team was frequently observed as behaving mindlessly; for instance, while 
searching for clues they searched the very same places several times or while 
generating possible solutions to the puzzles they came up with the right ideas but they 
did not evaluate them properly. They were generally caught up too much in the details 
and were not be very successful in balancing this with the comprehension afforded by 
the big picture. A partial reason for this problem was their inability to establish 
effective communication among themselves. They tended to preserve with blind alleys 
rather than re-assessing the situation. For e.g. they insisted on using the transparent 
decoding sheets all together and getting the whole code at once in the first puzzle, 
whereas what they needed to do was to separately examine the sheets and extract 
individual numbers of the code from each sheet. In another example, they needed to 
figure out the written version of a numerical code (e.g. “thirteen” would mean that the 
code is “13”) in the page-line-letter coding, but instead they insisted on trying to find 
numbers from the book. This was impossible with the clue they had, so they tried to use 
the clue in several overcomplex ways in order to extract any number, but all their 
attempts were unsuccessful.  
Conclusively, according to my exploratory study, the factors that contribute to the 
resilience of organizations in high-risk industries to the challenges of their operational 
environment (which is discussed in detail in section 2.3.1) may also contribute to the 
resilience to challenges in non-extreme operational environments. Therefore, I decided 
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to include collective mindfulness in my research model, among the team dynamics that 
contribute to resilience. In my framework, I modelled this concept as an indicator of 
collective mental models along with transactive memory systems.  
3.5.4 Resilience and team performance 
Finally, through this exploratory study, I also wanted to investigate the relationship 
between resilience and performance. As I mentioned in section 2.5.2, for many 
resilience scholars, performance is seen as the outcome of being resilient in the face of 
challenges in the operational environment (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; e.g. Sheffi, 
2005), particularly for organizational settings where survival is not threatened. As I 
aim to establish a resilience framework for such settings, I identified the outcome of 
resilience as operational performance in my model.  
In the context of escape game settings, I operationalized this outcome as the “time 
spent to complete the exercise”. The first team completed the exercise in 48 minutes 
and the second team was unable to complete it within the 60 minutes allowed. 
Considering my analysis above, I concluded that the first team was resilient to the 
challenges of the exercise, which was reflected in the outcome. This team was able to 
quickly and efficiently address the problems they faced and come up with the solutions 
to overcome these problems. With a similar logic, the second team experienced 
problems in demonstrating the skills to respond to challenges, and in turn, was 
reflected in their performance. However, while analysing the performance in my 
exploratory study, I realized that it was synonymous with responding the challenges, as 
responding to and overcoming challenges made the teams obtain the key. Differently, in 
the context of real-life entities, performance is perhaps better defined as the ability to 
achieve organizational purposes (whether or not there are challenges); and challenges 
disrupt entities while they work on the activities necessary to achieve these purposes. 
Such a collective purpose (other than responding to the challenges) did not exist in the 
escape game settings, which in a sense represent problem-solving activities for their 
own sake, as a form of entertainment. Therefore, although confirming my conceptual 
model, I decided that escape game settings were not the ideal settings to investigate the 





I conducted this exploratory study with three aims: to investigate my conceptual 
framework, to understand the advantages and limitations associated with conducting 
resilience research in an artificial setting; and to try out the escape game setting as a 
research environment. With regards to the first aim, as a result of my analysis of this 
exploratory study, I improved my research model to the version illustrated in Figure 6. 
The analysis provided some qualitative validation of the relationship between collective 
mental models and resilience. To operationalize collective mental models, I decided to 
use the transactive memory systems framework by Lewis (2003) and the (collective) 
mindfulness framework by Weick et al. (2008). Moreover, effective communication and 
information gathering systems were also found to be related to resilience. Accumulated 
knowledge and improvisation could not be observed in this study, but I suspected that 
this was due to the limitations of the research setting and decided to continue to 
include them in the framework. Finally, two more constructs, namely team cohesion 
and collective efficacy/potency have been shown to affect team resilience and 
performance, both in the exploratory study and in previous literature.  I therefore 
decided to add them among the precursors of resilience. Moreover, my analysis in the 
exploratory study implied the relationship between resilience and performance, so this 
relationship is included in the framework. However, performance is re-defined in way 
to highlight its relations with the main purposes of the entity.  
With regards to the second purpose, this study demonstrated that using an artificial 
setting can be advantageous in terms of observing team responses to challenges. As I 
mentioned before, one of the biggest methodological challenges with resilience 
research is the need for, but the difficulty of, real time data collection. It is needed, 
because post-hoc data collection may not reveal the mechanisms that lead to resilience; 
and it is often based on testimonials and so, may be  affected by the self-report bias 
(Alesch et al., 2001, p. 42). On the other hand, real-time data collection is difficult, 
because it is not feasible and effective to collect data while people are responding to 
possibly serious and consequential challenges. In an artificial setting, participants will 
not be disturbed as much since the challenges do not have huge consequences; and an 
artificial setting may allow designs of data collection that do not disrupt participants 
while they confront challenges. Moreover, the data may be collected in real time, so it is 
less unlikely that participants create their own narratives (versions of the incident) 





Figure 6. Improved research model 
 
However, obviously there are disadvantages associated with conducting resilience 
research in an artificial setting. In an artificial setting, the challenges are (almost) non-
consequential in terms of their effects to the real life. No negative outcomes are likely to 
come out of them except perhaps a ‘feeling of failure’. This feeling, by itself, creates a 
significant amount of stress and anxiety as supported by the testimonials of the 
participants, however, this effect is not expected to be equal to the effect of a real-life 
challenge with real-life consequences. Thus, with the stress and anxiety caused by real-
life challenges, teams’ responses to the challenges might be different to that which is 
observed in an artificial setting. This disadvantage was particularly valid for the escape 
game settings. In spite of their challenging nature, escape games are designed as an 
amusement activity; and all the challenges in the setting are strictly pre-structured. In 
real life, far less can be controlled when it comes to challenges and to responses to 
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them. Hence, in my main study, I decide to use a setting where challenges occur in a 
more naturalistic/realistic manner, but where some control and direct observation was 
also possible.  
Another problem associated with escape game setting was the operationalization of the 
performance. As I mentioned in section 3.5.4, in real life, entities, such as teams and 
organizations, have purposes and they act to accomplish these purposes. The 
challenges they face disrupt their actions; and hence, the outcome of being resilient to 
challenges is reflected in performance with regards to accomplishing these purposes. In 
escape game settings, the entities (teams) do not have such collective purposes other 
than responding to the challenges – in this case, solving puzzles. Thus, the only way to 
operationalize the outcomes of resilience is to measure how quickly they complete the 
challenges. Considering this, in my main study, I decided to use a setting where entities 
would have purposes other than responding to the challenges and the levels of 
performance in achieving this purpose can be operationalizable as outcomes of 
resilience.  
In the following chapter, I explain the design and the methods of my main study. I 
demonstrate and justify my choices with regard to the setting, the participants, and the 
data collection and analysis methods, and, then, I present the operationalized version of 









4 Main Study: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
In this study, I aim to investigate resilience by introducing a method novel to the field: 
simulation. In order to do that, first, I conducted a thorough literature analysis and 
provided its details in the second chapter. As a result of this analysis, I established a 
research model and conducted an initial trial of this with an exploratory study. Details 
of this exploratory were provided in chapter three. Both literature analysis and 
exploratory study helped me in deciding the methods to be used in the main study. In 
this fourth chapter, I describe the data collection and analysis methods I used to 
conduct the main study.  I provide the details of main study research design, the 
simulation method, various data collections methods employed, and lastly, tools and 
software I used to analyse this data along with the procedures I followed.  
The main part of this research was conducted as a part of a bigger project in which a 
research team including myself and four other researchers work to identify the team 
attributes and processes that facilitate performance in fast-paced, competitive and 
disruptive market conditions. In order to investigate this, fast-paced market conditions 
were simulated, in which teams of 6-10 people needed to perform a moderately 
complex set of operations quickly and accurately in a turbulent, competitive 
environment. Various data collection methods were used to collect the data I used to 
test my research model and the hypotheses that I had formulated. My main study is 
based on data from seven separate runs of the simulation over three years, covering a 
total of 68 teams and 547 participants (from which complete questionnaire data were 
obtained from 541 participants). Using these data, I investigate the factors contributing 
to the team resilience and the relationship between team resilience and team 
performance.  
Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected; hence, I have adopted mixed 
methods approach to conduct the analysis. I have used a convergent parallel mixed 
methods model, in which both qualitative and quantitative data have been collected at 
the same time and used together to conduct the analysis and interpret the results 
(Creswell, 2014, p. 15). I have conducted quantitative analysis methods to test various 
relationships in my model, and, then, using qualitative data, I elaborated on the 
mechanisms of the relationships tested with quantitative analysis. I also used 
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qualitative data to explore the relationships that I could not test with quantitative 
analysis.  
 
4.2 Research Design 
4.2.1 Methodological choices 
As I mentioned in section 2.4, one of the most important problems of the organizational 
resilience literature is the lack of diversity in methodological choices. First, the field is 
dominated by case studies using post-hoc and self-report data (Bhamra, Dani and 
Burnard, 2011; Linnenluecke, 2017). In these studies, researchers could not collect 
data about the challenge-response processes themselves; and so, they based their 
analysis on the testimonials they gather from the people who experienced the 
challenge, in most cases, a long time ago. Unfortunately, people tend to forget or, worse, 
reconstruct the past. Therefore, this work may be limited in its ability to capture 
information about the processes that explain how certain factors are effective in the 
manifestation of resilience and how resilience in turn affects individual and collective 
outcomes. 
Second, a majority of the work investigates resilience-related issues in extreme 
settings. Hence, the literature is abundant in making propositions about the factors that 
lead to resilience when operating in high-risk conditions or when faced with natural 
disasters, high-impact human errors and political, technological or economic 
disruptions. However, these findings are not always meaningful for organizations that 
desire to improve their resilience in the face of lower-impact, but more frequent 
perturbations in their daily operations. The process of formulating responses to less 
extreme challenges may be different, as these challenges are faced more frequently, 
apply to smaller units, and are mainly focused on operational performance as opposed 
to survival. Thus, the results of these studies may not be generalizable to wider 
populations of organizations that whose resilience is tested by a stream of daily 
challenges.  
Lastly, in investigations of organizational resilience, information is generally captured 
at a single point in time, which, again, can be problematic in terms of analysing the 
challenge-response process. Since researchers do not capture data throughout the 
entirety of this process, the mechanisms of resilience and its outcomes may not be 
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effectively revealed. In addition, if information is only gathered about a single 
challenge-response process, then the effects of accumulated knowledge, past 
experience and learning cannot be analysed. Therefore, previous work is also limited in 
terms of demonstrating the mechanisms of resilience and the effects of experiencing 
prior challenges on resilience to future challenges.  
The methodological choices that I made in this study sought to address these 
limitations. The first important choice I had to make was about the unit of analysis. In 
this study, I wanted to investigate the relationship between collective dynamics and 
collective resilience. Thus, I could not identify individuals as the unit of analysis as it 
would prevent me from capturing data about collective capacities and capabilities. 
Analysis at the level of the whole organization could have provided a rich 
understanding of how capacities and actions at different levels (individual, team and 
organizational) form and intermingle in the development of resilient responses (e.g. 
Freeman, Hirschhorn and Triad, 2003b; Jaaron and Backhouse, 2014). However, it is 
highly demanding (time-wise and budget-wise) to design a study with a large sample of 
organizations and achieving comparability can be difficult. This may be one reason why 
almost all of the studies at the organizational level are in case study format, 
investigating either one or two organizations. This creates a generalizability problem 
with respect to the results obtained (Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 15). I therefore chose 
teams as the unit of analysis because “teams” appeared to allow investigation of the 
effects of collective capacities without sacrificing comparability and generalizability. 
This allowed me to design a study of resilience with a relatively large sample within a 
reasonable budget. Employing such a design, I was able to conduct quantitative analysis 
to yield generalizable results. However, I acknowledge the fact that organizations and 
teams are not synonymous; most organizations are larger collective entities that have 
more levels of nested structures and processes. Therefore, applying the results 
gathered in this study in organizations might not be straightforward. 
A second consideration was the type of research setting: whether to use a real setting 
or an artificial setting. In a real setting, challenges have real consequences for the 
entities investigated. This is advantageous because participants’ reactions to challenges 
will be more authentic compared to an artificial setting. Furthermore, it is impossible to 
perfectly mimic real conditions in an artificial setting, however hard researchers try to 
replicate real conditions. This may mean that certain conditions which might influence 
resilience cannot effectively be simulated in an artificial setting. Considering these 
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issues, I first thought about doing my research in a real setting. I searched for 
organizations in fast-paced market conditions, in which operations are frequently 
disrupted by unexpected challenges and rapid changes; hence, resilience to these 
challenges is significant in maintaining the levels of operational performance. As a 
result of this search, I met with teams in technologically or economically volatile 
market conditions (such as app developers and start-up firms). In these meetings, I 
have realised the disadvantages of doing a real-time resilience research in real settings. 
It would be impossible to schedule real-time data collection activities as I would never 
know when the participants would face challenges. Moreover, participants might be 
disturbed by my data collection activities while they were responding to the challenges 
with real consequences. Hence, to be able to properly collect real time data on 
challenge-response process, I chose an artificial setting.  
In the chosen setting teams of 6-10 participants were subjected to challenges. Data 
were collected with regard to how the teams approached the challenges, how resilient 
they were in responding and how they ultimately performed. This allowed for detailed 
recording and analysis of the behavioural and environmental dynamics that affected 
the challenge-response process and for comparison between multiple units with 
respect to the concepts investigated in this study. This methodology is crucial in terms 
of bringing novelty to the investigation of resilience. There have been agent-based 
simulations or scenario-based approaches (where scenarios such as terrorist attacks or 
natural disasters) –in both of which computers or humans work on solving specific 
disruption scenarios– but these have been applied in a limited way (Cumming et al., 
2005; Datta, 2007). For instance, while simulating a natural disaster, since an actual 
disaster cannot be replicated, participants can only be briefed with written documents 
and this does not provide a “real” challenge sense for participants. Hence, these 
methodologies do not permit observation and analysis of the cognitive and behavioural 
processes of individuals and groups that emerge in an actual challenging condition. Of 
course, it is extremely hard to design such settings where participants feel as stressed 
as they would in a real challenging environment of any kind. However, by putting 
participants into challenging operational conditions rather than giving them scenarios 
to work on, this study aimed to obtain results as close as possible to those of real, 
challenging conditions. In order to check this, participants were asked to rate 
themselves with regard to certain feelings such as tenseness. This choice strengthens 
the validity of the results of this study. 
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Lastly, I faced the choice of whether to use qualitative or quantitative methods to 
collect the data and conduct the analysis. In order to strengthen the generalizability of 
the results, I planned to work with a relatively large sample and utilize quantitative 
analysis methods. In order to be able to reveal and test the patterns in the data, I 
needed to run statistical tests. However, to be able to address the problem of the lack of 
understanding with regards to the mechanisms behind these patterns, I also needed to 
search for the explanations of these patterns. This was only possible by collecting 
qualitative data on the critical incidents and by analysing them in combination with the 
patterns discovered by statistical tests. Consequently, I have decided to exploit both 
methods. Following the methodological roadmap suggested by Turner et al. (2015, pp. 
14–17), I decided to employ convergent and holistic triangulation, where I used 
quantitative data to test the theory and qualitative data to illustrate and where possible 
explain some of the patterns seen in the quantitative data. In other words, I used 
quantitative methods to systematically test hypotheses with regards to the likely 
relationships based on the previous literature and on my observations from my 
exploratory study. I used qualitative data to enrich the interpretation of the 
quantitative data and to seek insights that could not easily be revealed by the 
quantitative data.  
4.2.2 Participants 
As mentioned earlier, this study forms part of a more substantial project into team 
resilience and performance conducted at the University of Edinburgh Business School. 
This project has an educational aspect to it; the participants of the project, and hence, of 
this study, are students who take the post-graduate level courses that utilize the 
simulation. These courses are run once a year, thus, each year a new set of participants 
are included in the data.  Each student participates in one simulation only.  
For many years, the simulation has only been run for educational purposes.  Its use as a 
setting for research into team resilience began in 2015 and has been continuing for 
three consecutive academic years so far. The courses in which the simulation was 
utilized were given at the MBA, MSc and E-MBA levels. Over the course of three years, 
547 participants from these programmes participated in the simulation. Participants 
were randomly (within their programme and within their education year) allocated to 
teams of 6 to 10 members, resulting in 68 teams.  
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One might question conducting statistical analysis with this sample since it is not 
selected using probability sampling procedures. However, as Vehovar et al. (2017) 
explained in their work, non-probability samples are ‘naturally’ randomized, and hence, 
use of statistical inferencing is deemed acceptable by many scholars. In addition, the 
sample in this research is adequately diverse in the sense that there are participants 
coming from various demographic and organizational backgrounds. There are people 
from 72 different nationalities belonging to different age groups, with different levels of 
work experiences, who either worked or were still working in different industries and 
sectors. Thus, results of the study may be generalizable to teams operating at various 
sectors and industries in various countries.  
 
4.3 An overview of the Simulation 
4.3.1 Simulation Process 
The data of this study comes from seven runs of the simulation conducted over a three-
year period. In the simulation, a “trading period” takes place, where the conditions of a 
fast-paced greetings cards market are replicated. In this “trading period” teams act as 
companies producing greetings cards and competing to be the most profitable 
company in the market by securing orders from a marketplace and actually producing 
batches of greetings cards. This requires participants to work in their teams in a tightly 
coordinated fashion while simultaneously dealing with various operational challenges 
such as environmental disturbance (noise, low lightening, shaking production tables, 
etc.), inventory problems, or rejections of delivered orders or intra-team conflicts. 
Table 3 provides the details of the seven runs of the simulation. The process of the 
simulation is detailed below. 
4.3.1.1 Preparation and Planning 
Four weeks prior to the commencement of the “trading period”, researchers brief 
controllers and participants to explain the simulation rules and procedures. A team of 
controllers ran each simulation; the controllers were staff and PhD students from the 
University of Edinburgh Business School. I acted as a controller in all seven runs of the 
simulation. Approximately one controller is required per 10-12 participants (one per 1-
1.5 teams) to run the simulation. Controllers undertake one of three roles: 
administration, responsible for overall monitoring and data processing; quality control, 
responsible for issuing orders, inspecting the accuracy of the completed and submitted 
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orders and paying the teams for successful orders; and procurement, responsible for 
supplying materials and equipment to the teams during the trading period. 
 
No. Date and Time Programme No of participants No of teams 
1 19 October 2015 
14:30-16:45 
MBA 44 6 
2 23 October 2015 
14:00-16:15 
MSc 121 15 
3 17 October 2015 
14:00-16:15 
MBA 43 6 
4 21 October 2016 
14:00-16:15 
MSc 139 16 
5 10 March 2017 
14:30-16:45 
EMBA 28 4 
6 16 October 2017 
14:00-16:15 
MBA 48 6 
7 20 October 2017 
14:00-16:15 
MSc 124 15 
   547 68 
Table 3. Details of the seven runs of the simulation 
 
After been given the brief participants are allocated into the teams. These allocations 
are random. Which students participate in a specific simulation is determined by the 
programme on which they are enrolled (MBA, MSc or EMBA).  The simulation is an 
integral part of a course on Organizational Behaviour. For MBA and EMBA 
programmes, all students take this course and therefore random team allocations are 
made within these complete groups of students. The MSc Organizational Behaviour 
course is shared by students from four different MSc programmes, namely 
Management, Human Resource Management (HRM), International Business and 
Emerging Markets (IBEM) and International Human Resource Management (IHRM). 
Thus, for the MSc programmes, random team allocations are made within the specific 
programme. In other words, MSc Management students are teamed up among 
themselves, and so on.  
Further to the allocations, teams start preparing for the trading day. They have around 
four weeks in which to do this. In this time, they get to know each other as the exercise 
is run at the start of the academic year and is the first major team exercise that the 
students undertake and establish team norms; develop strategies in line with the 
nature of the trading period as well as the particularities of their team; and decide the 
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most efficient ways to achieve their strategies. This process includes identifying team 
and member strengths and weaknesses, organizing the team around these and 
allocating specific tasks accordingly. The nature of these tasks depends on the specific 
roles adopted. For operational and managerial activities, formulating strategies, 
conducting scenario analyses, forming alternative plans and contingencies, and running 
and validating financial analyses are among the central tasks. Production workers, on 
the other hand, are responsible meeting the specific production requirements. 
Members coordinate throughout the preparation stage to ensure compatibility between 
strategy and execution. No strategy will work in the trading period if it cannot be 
executed. For instance, the most profitable orders require 12 greetings cards to be 
produced in 15 minutes. If the production unit is not fast enough to complete 12 cards 
accurately in 15 minutes, the most reasonable strategy for this team might be to avoid 
this type of order. In order to make sure the subunits of a team can work in a well-
coordinated fashion teams may conduct mock trading periods and see if the strategies 
and execution are in line. However, no matter how well they conduct these mock 
trading periods, it is difficult to imitate the exact conditions of the trading day.  
Within the week before the trading takes place, controllers allocate the material (e.g. 
paper sheets), the equipment (e.g. pen, rulers, stencils) and the cash pre-ordered by the 
teams. A starter pack including a standard set of materials and equipment was 
provided for the first four runs of the simulation. The teams receive these materials in 
team boxes. In these boxes, four additional documents are provided: a document 
detailing the general specifications with regards to the product (greetings cards), a final 
accounts form for them to calculate the value of the cash, material and equipment they 
left unused at the end; emergency loan forms if they become short of cash during the 
trading period (for which the interest rate is 25%); and procurement forms for them to 
be able to order materials and equipment during the trading period. Examples of these 
documents can be found in Appendix - 10.3.  
4.3.1.2 Trading day 
On trading day, participants and controllers take their places in the trading room. The 
Controllers’ area has three sections. First, quality control tables are located near to the 
order board. Quality controllers also issue orders to the teams and hence they have to 
be close to the order board. The order board is filled with the orders before the trading 
period. For the small-scale runs of the simulation (4-6 teams), there are around 10-12 
orders at once on the order boards, but this number increases to 20 for the large-scale 
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runs of the simulation (15+ teams). Behind the quality control tables, there are boxes 
for accepted and rejected order forms, accepted cards (as rejected cards are returned 
to the teams) and envelopes (orders are delivered in envelopes). Accepted and rejected 
order forms are used to enter data on team performance. Second, there, there is a 
procurement station, which has a stock of equipment and materials that the teams can 
purchase during the trading period. Lastly, on the back, there is a station 
administration and data processing as trading progresses. 
Right before the trading period begins, the lead controller gives an introductory speech 
outlining the schedule for the next few hours and answering any final questions. Then, 
he rings a loud bell to signal the start. The first 10-15 minutes of the trading period are 
extremely chaotic, particularly for the large-scale runs of the simulation. Team order-
takers descend upon the order board and yell the order numbers at the controllers to 
get the order they desire. Controllers need to quickly issue orders and replenish the 
order board as the initial orders are issued to the teams.  After the initial frenzy, teams 
start producing and the atmosphere calms down. After that point, the level of 
turbulence (in the form of participants running around and shouting) goes up and 
down in line with the production cycles of the teams. 
During the trading period, teams operate in production cycles. Order takers examine 
the order board and try to identify the order(s) that match the strategies of their teams. 
Order-takers may need to consult with the team’s stock controller to make sure there 
are enough materials to produce the order. Once the order is decided, order takers ask 
one of the controllers to issue that order to his/her team. The order taker, then, takes 
the Sales Order and Delivery Notice (SODN) sheet, on which the details of the order are 
written (an example is shown in Appendix - 10.4), to the team table and the production 
members of the team start producing it. The SODN indicates the specific product 
requirements: occasion (wedding, Christmas, birthday, anniversary, birthday, etc.), 
number or cards (4, 8 or 12), colour (white, blue, green, pink, yellow or salmon), size 
(A5, A6 or A7), number of lines of verse (2, 4 or 6), time allowed (15 minutes, 20 
minutes, 25 minutes, 30 minutes or open-ended), and the price (which varies between 
£150 and £1250 in accordance with the difficulty of the order). Considering these 
variations, there are potentially nearly 30,000 different types of orders that can appear 
on the order board, which creates high levels of uncertainty. Hence, teams need to do 
rigorous strategizing to be able to identify and secure their desired types of orders.  
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Teams vary in terms of how they organize production. A typical approach is for the 
necessary materials (sheets of the right colour and an envelope) to be arranged first. 
Then, since all sheets are given in A4 size, folding is done in accordance with the 
required size. Following the fold, on the front of the cards, the occasion is stencilled 
centrally (10mm stencil if an A5 or A6 card, 5mm stencil if A6 or A7). On the inside, the 
verse is handwritten within a pre-specified margin, and on the back, team ID and order 
number are written in the bottom right corner (e.g. Co-A/SO1). When the order is 
complete and the team is satisfied with the quality, cards are put into the envelope, and 
the envelope labelled with the team ID and order number. All the equipment to produce 
the cards (pen, stencils, rulers, pencils, etc.) must be bought from the controllers. This 
rule is strictly enforced.  
Completed orders are delivered to a Quality Controller. The controller first checks 
whether the deadline is met. If not, the order is qualified as a late delivery and in 
addition to no payment, the team will be fined 20% of the order price. If the deadline is 
met, then the cards are checked against the general specification (such as accurate 
margins and centralization, rhyming verses, no smudging or marks, etc.) and the 
order’s specific demands (such as number of cards, colour, occasion, etc.). If all the 
criteria are met, then the order sheet is marked as an ‘accept’, the product is taken from 
the team and the team is paid the price with (fake) cash. If not, then team is informed of 
the rejection (by a loud whistle to create an unfavourable atmosphere for that team and 
to worry the rest) and the rejected cards are returned to the team.  
An important element of the production cycle is stock control as teams need to have the 
necessary equipment and materials to produce an order. Although teams pre-order 
equipment and materials before the trading period, pre-ordered stock is generally 
inadequate for the whole duration of the trading period, and so teams buy more as 
trading progresses. For these purchases, they fill in a procurement form and take it to 
the procurement desk along with the cash required to complete the transaction and the 
materials box (simulating a transportation container). Procurement also has a lead 
time which is announced before the beginning of the trading period. This was 10 
minutes for the first five runs of the simulation and lowered to 5 minutes for the last 
two, as the absence of a starter pack was produced to create additional inventory 
control, issues). Within this lead-time, the procurement controllers take the 
procurement form and payment, fill the materials box with the ordered materials and 
equipment and then hold the box until the lead time has elapsed. In addition to buying 
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materials from the official procurement station, teams are also allowed to trade 
between each other on whatever terms they agree amongst themselves. 
Teams have to make many rapid decisions using information from various sources 
acquired by different team members. Hence collective mental models are likely to be 
important to their overall resilience and performance during the trading period. 
Moreover, decisions have to be implemented by different members working on the 
different tasks, which means cohesion and intra-team communication are also key. 
Lastly, teams face unexpected adversities throughout the trading period; hence, broad 
action repertoires and an ability to collectively improvise are required to help them 
address and overcome challenges and maintain performance levels.  
4.3.1.3 Post-Trading  
Once trading is finished, participants immediately complete the post-trading 
questionnaire and then spend about an hour reflecting collectively on what happened 
during the trading period whilst the Controllers’ calculate some basic performance 
data.  After about an hour the controllers announce the preliminary results in terms of 
cards per head, rejects and profit or loss and, in the smaller simulations there is a brief 
open discussion of the results. In all cases this is followed by an informal social event 
for participants and controllers.  
In the day following the trading period, data from the pre- and the post-trading 
questionnaires and from the performance indicators are processed into a database 
using SPSS Software. Once all the data is in, an initial analysis generates some 
descriptive statistics which are used to provide information to the participants for 
them to use for their presentations and reflective assignments.   
Teams are required to make presentations on their performance one or two weeks 
after the trading period. For these presentations, they are provided with validated, 
double-checked results (including data on profits, value of sales, reject rate and average 
value per order for all the teams participating in that simulation) and the 
aforementioned ‘initial analysis’ of the data from pre- and post-trading questionnaires. 
In addition to this information, they also draw on their collective experience of the 
simulation as the base for their presentation. In these presentations, they compare 
their prior expectations with reality; they identify the strengths and weaknesses 
associated with their performance; and they demonstrate what they have learned as a 
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result of this experience. These presentations are primarily educational, but they also 
provide useful data on the activities of each team for research purposes.  
4.3.2 The rationale behind choosing “greetings cards market” simulation to 
investigate resilience 
The simulation was initially designed as a teaching exercise, long before it is used as a 
research method for this project. The simulation requires teams to interpret their 
environments, think, decide and act quickly, at least faster than the competition, and 
adapt to the changing conditions of the market (for e.g. rapidly changing types of orders 
on the order board) and the actions of competitors (for e.g. if two competing teams are 
going after the same type of order). In order to perform satisfactorily, teams need to 
address challenges (such as rejections, inventory problems, intra-team conflicts, an 
inconvenient operation environment, etc.) while maintaining their production quality 
and speed. This requires them to be attentive to weak signals of forthcoming problems 
and to constantly update the collective conceptual map of internal and external 
operational dynamics.  
In addition to this dynamism, there are many adversities the teams have to deal with 
throughout the trading period. The challenges start with the formation of teams where 
people who don’t know each other have to work together in a coordinated fashion. The 
trading period atmosphere is extremely disturbing and noisy (especially for large-scale 
runs of the simulation) with many teams actively seeking the best performance results. 
There is constant communication between team members, between competing teams 
and between teams and controllers and this creates a lot of noise. There is also constant 
shuttling between team tables and the Controllers’ area (for the purposes of order 
getting, order submission and procurement) which is one of the biggest causes of 
disruption for those engaged in production.  
Moreover, there are also operational and performance related adversities, which are 
frequently mentioned as reasons for disruption by the participants. First of all, teams 
often experience shock when they realize the trading period is not as they have 
expected and their plans are not going to work as the way they imagined. No matter 
how intensively teams try to imitate the trading period during their preparation, they 
can never precisely anticipate the conditions that they will face. Thus, they are faced 
with orders incompatible to their strategies on the order board or lengthening queues 
in front of the controller tables, so they are forced to adapt. Secondly, they are also 
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challenged by the need to manage the production cycle and maintain stock levels for 
135 minutes. Order takers have to monitor the order board and get the optimum 
orders (most profitable ones that the team can manage to accurately produce within 
the deadline), stock controllers have to always make sure there is enough stock for 
these orders and take the procurement lead time (and possible procurement queues) 
into consideration. Production sub-units have to be motivated to produce for the whole 
duration without any collapse. Specialist functions need to be in constant 
communication and close coordination. Any error in this cycle has the potential to drag 
the team into a crisis (for e.g. orders taken without the adequate stock necessary 
materials). Thirdly, teams experience adversity most explicitly when they cannot not 
meet the deadline with the order they produced and submitted, or when the order is 
rejected by the controllers, as these events have direct negative effect on performance. 
Rejected and unfulfilled orders destroy prior performance projections, and cause loss 
of motivation within the teams. Rejections may also be a consequence of a false 
interpretation of the general product specifications which may require a team to 
reorganize its production cycle (for e.g. in the form of changing the type of target orders 
or changing the roles within the team). All these conditions require teams to 
demonstrate resilience, adapt to the newly understood conditions and continue 
operating in the face of disruption.  
 
4.4 Data Collection Methods 
As mentioned above, I utilized quantitative methods to test several relationships in my 
research model. Therefore, I used the data collected by tools that allowed systematic 
and structured data accumulation. I then processed this data into an SPSS database and 
ran the necessary statistical analyses. However, while interpreting the results of these 
analyses, I also benefited from additional rich information about specific incidences 
and processes that occurred during the simulation; particularly to explain and give 
context to some of relationships revealed. This additional rich information was 
collected by qualitative data collection tools, which collected data less systematically 
but in a more detailed and descriptive manner. I also used this data to explore the 
relationships in my model that I could not test with quantitative analysis. All the 





A questionnaire is a method of survey research, which aims to systematically collect 
data from a range of participants (Julien, 2008). The questionnaire method is amongst 
the most preferred data collection methods in social research (Oliver, 2010). It is also 
termed a “self-completion questionnaire” (Walliman, 2006), as it is completed by 
respondents themselves without the involvement of a researcher in the process. 
Walliman (2006) summarised the advantages of the method as quickness, convenience, 
structured format, private information giving, no researcher influence and large sample 
coverage, The disadvantages can be a long design and development process, limited 
answer range, poor response rates and validity of responses.  
In this research, the questionnaire method was preferred because it could 
systematically gather comprehensive information from a large sample with regard to 
processes, mechanisms and events that took place before and during the trading 
period. This strengthened the generalizability of the results. However, questionnaire 
data needed to be structured and systematic to be used in the quantitative analysis. The 
disadvantage of self-completion questionnaires is the fact that they are based on the 
subjective judgements of participants which might not always reflect the actual course 
of events.  
Thus, an alternative approach could have been systematic observations, particularly 
during the trading period, for data to be more objective. However, systematic 
observation of all the teams would require each team to be observed by at least one 
researcher for the entire duration. This would have several drawbacks: first, it would 
have been costly in terms of devoting more man-hours to data collection; second, it 
might have been distracting for the teams to be observed by a researcher all the time, 
particularly when they are dealing with challenges; and, third, it would have left no 
room for teams to manoeuvre in the already crowded and disruptive trading 
atmosphere. Hence, acknowledging its disadvantages, questionnaires were preferred as 






Scales and additional items Sim-1 Sim-2 Sim-3 Sim-4 Sim-5 Sim-6 Sim-7 
Pre-Trading Questionnaire 
Scales 
Team Potency  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Individual Resilience √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Items 
Any general comments as you approach the trading 
period of the Game?    
√ √ √ √ √ X X 
Post-Trading Questionnaire 
Scales 
Team Resilience √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Collective Mindfulness √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Transactive Memory Systems √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Improvisation X X √ √ √ √ √ 
Team cohesion X X √ √ √ √ √ 
Affective Well-being √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Items 
Did your Company experience any crises during the 
Game? 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
If so [your company experienced crisis], what was the 
nature of these? 
√ √ √ √ √ X X 
What are the main factors that you feel helped your 
team’s performance in the Game? 
√ √ √ √ √ X X 
What are the main factors that you feel hindered your 
team’s performance in the Game? 
√ √ √ √ √ X X 
Table 4. Scales and open-ended items 
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In all seven runs of the simulation, two questionnaires were delivered to the 
participants: a pre-trading and a post-trading questionnaire (the latest version of both 
may be found in Appendix - 10.5). The items in the pre-trading questionnaire are 
intended to capture data with regards to the preparation phase whereas the items in 
the post-trading questionnaire are intended to capture data with regard to the trading 
period. Although both questionnaires were largely identical across all seven runs of the 
simulation, slight changes and improvements were made in their content each year to 
eliminate problems or questions that yielded little useful data experienced and to 
probe emerging issues. Table 4 summarizes the scales and additional items used in my 
study.  
Measures 
While deciding on which measures to include in the questionnaires as the research 
team (of the project), we tried to satisfy three crucial criteria. First, we wanted the 
measures to be able to capture the mechanisms and processes of resilience identified in 
the literature analysis. We particularly wanted to be able to quantitatively test the 
relationships proposed in the conceptual model built prior to the data collection. The 
literature investigation with regards to the antecedents and outcomes of resilience, 
which I conducted in my first year and is summarized in sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, guided 
the selection of various measures. Moreover, insight gained from my exploratory study 
was helpful in measure selection. Second, we wanted to use previously tried, robust 
and valid measures, which were proven to accurately measure what they aimed to 
measure. Thus, we have used established measures where possible. Third, we wanted 
as many participants as possible to complete the questionnaires, and to do so in a way 
that did not feel unduly burdensome. We therefore tried to keep the questionnaires to a 
reasonable length. Of course, balancing these criteria forced compromises; some scales 
were included because they were robust although they did not precisely correspond to 
concepts in the conceptual framework; certain items were developed and included in 
the questionnaires because the conceptual framework required them, even though they 
had not been tried before and some scales and items were not included although they 
might have been useful, in order to keep the questionnaires at a reasonable length. In 
this section, these measures are described and the reasons behind their selection are 
explained (the items of measures may be found in Appendix - 10.6).   
Team resilience: As illustrated in Figure 5, in this study, resilience is conceptualized as 
an emergent capacity to effectively respond to challenges. It is extremely difficult to 
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measure this emergent capacity, as pointed out by several resilience researchers 
(Carpenter et al., 2001; e.g. Cumming et al., 2005). A thorough analysis of the literature, 
particularly quantitative empirical studies of team dynamics, revealed that there are 
only a handful of previously established scales to measure resilience at the collective 
level. Among these rare studies, Stephens and his colleagues’ (2013) have developed a 
3-item team resilience scale that aims to measure “a team’s capacity to bounce back 
from a setback” (Stephens et al., 2013, p. 27). They conducted an exploratory factor 
analysis which yielded a one-factor solution and in their reliability analysis, Cronbach’s 
alpha is measured to be 0.92. Among very limited options, we found this scale to be the 
most appropriate one to measure team resilience in this research. In the reliability 
analysis conducted in this study, Cronbach’s alpha is revealed to be 0.895.   
The scale developed by Stephens et al. (2013) was employed in this study, with only 
minor wording adjustments (we have replaced the phrase “top management team”, 
which was the unit of analysis on their study, with the word “team”) and using a 5-point 
Likert-type scale (ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree) rather than 7-point 
version preferred in their study. The reason for the choice of 5-point scale was to 
standardize the response scales throughout the questionnaires and to keep them 
compact and easy-to-complete. The scale was included in the post-trading 
questionnaire to reveal the experienced resilience to the actual challenges and 
adversities faced, in other words, when a team experiences the “brutal audit: at a 
moment’s notice, everything that was left unprepared becomes a complex problem, and 
every weakness comes rushing to the forefront” (Lagadec, 1993, p. 54).  
Collective mindfulness: To measure collective mental models, we used two previously 
developed scales, one of which is collective mindfulness. Previous studies proposed a 
strong relationship between resilience and collective mindfulness (Sutcliffe, Vogus and 
Dane, 2016). The concept is introduced by Weick and his colleagues (2008) to define 
high-reliability organizations’ capacity for attention and action and this capacity is 
found to be effective in responding to challenges and preserving performance levels 
(Vogus and Welbourne, 2003). I also found this capacity useful while teams were 
responding to the problems in the exploratory study. Attentiveness, discussion of 
alternative solutions and having a constantly updated conceptual map of operations, 
which are three core activities of mindful organizing, were among the sources of 
success for the first team in the exploratory study. In line with these, this capacity is 
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included among the proposed precursors of resilience in the quantitatively 
operationalizable version of my research model.  
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007, p. 103) proposed a 9-item scale to measure this capacity. 
This scale is used in this research to measure collective mindfulness. No adaptation is 
made to the scale; only a 5-point Likert-type scale (ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree) is used instead of the 3-point scoring proposed by them (again, with the 
purpose of standardizing the response scales throughout the questionnaire). This 
measurement was measured in post-trading questionnaire. 
Team transactive memory systems: The second scale used to measure collective mental 
models was transactive memory systems. Several organizational and team resilience 
researchers have pointed out the importance of shared knowledge of the roles, 
expertise and current operations to effectively responding to challenges. Weick (1993) 
conceptualizes this shared knowledge in terms of virtual role models; Maynard and 
Kennedy (2016) adopt shared mental models as a concept to refer to it; and Bowers et 
al. (2017) use Austin’s (2003) transactive memory systems concept. Moreover, in the 
exploratory study, the first team activated this capacity by an effective background 
communication system among the individuals and subunits dealing with different 
aspects of the problem; this enabled them to easily combine the missing pieces of 
information and solve the problems effectively. Hence, this capacity is included in the 
conceptual framework as transactive memory systems, which Austin (2003) 
conceptualizes as an effective mechanism of knowledge sharing and processing within 
teams.  
The scale used to measure this capacity is developed by Lewis (2003), who defines it as 
“the cooperative division of labour for learning, remembering, and communicating 
relevant team knowledge” based on the earlier work of Wegner (1987) on transactive 
memory and group mind. The scale consists of three subscales each of which is 
measured by five items, using 5-point Likert-type response format with points ranging 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Subscales are titled as specialization, 
credibility and cooperation. Specialization measures the degree to which each team 
members’ knowledge varies from the others in the team; credibility measure the 
degree to which each member trusts the knowledge level of other members; and lastly, 
cooperation measures the degree to which the varied knowledge from all team 
members is combined and used effectively (Lewis, 2003, p. 589). The scale was 
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developed by Lewis (2003) in three stages: preliminary development, assessment and 
cross-validity; and carried out over three studies. In all three studies, the Cronbach’s 
alpha values for all the subscales were over 0.75 both at the individual and the team 
level.  
Collective Improvisation: The ability to improvise was first suggested by Weick (1988, 
1993) as a source of effective challenge-response. Following his work, Sutcliffe and 
Vogus (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2012) acknowledged its 
importance for adapting to unexpected changes; and Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003b) 
found this ability effective in the demonstration of resilience to 9/11 attacks. Therefore, 
I included the collective capacity for improvisation in the conceptual framework. In the 
first two runs of the simulation, it was measured with a single-item developed within 
the study (“We were able to improvise effectively as the Game progressed”). However, 
the analyses with single-items were limited in terms of robustness.  
Thus, starting with the 3rd simulation, Vera and Crossan’s (2005) 7-item scale of 
“improvisation in teams” was included in the questionnaire. Vera and Crossan’s (2005, 
p. 205) define improvisation as “as the creative and spontaneous process of trying to 
achieve an objective in a new way”. They emphasize that in the previous literature the 
‘spontaneity’ element of improvisation is exaggerated and the concept is mainly 
associated with positive outcomes, which does not have to be the case (Vera and 
Crossan, 2005, p. 203). In the development of the scale, they adapted four items from 
Tierney et al.’s (1999) employee-creativity scale and the remaining three items were 
generated by utilizing Unger and Kernan’s (1983) measure of spontaneity and 
Moorman and Miner’s (1998) measure of improvisation. Cronbach’s alpha for the 7-
item scale is 0.91.  
Team cohesion: Particularly in the team resilience literature, several empirical studies 
found team cohesion to be among the enablers of resilience (e.g. Amaral, Fernandes and 
Varajão, 2015; Morgan, Fletcher and Sarkar, 2015; Vera, Rodríguez-Sánchez and 
Salanova, 2017). I also observed it to be an important facilitator while overcoming 
problems in my exploratory study. Hence, I included it in my research model. To 
measure cohesion within the teams, items from Chang and Bordia’s (2001) study were 
adopted without any adjustments. Chang and Bordia (2001) adopted the items from 
Widmeyer, Brawley and Carron’s (1985) questionnaire, which measured team cohesion 
in sports teams. Chang and Bordia (2001) adjusted the items to be also used for teams 
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in different contexts as the items were very specific to the sports teams in their original 
version. Just as with the collective improvisation scale mentioned above, the team 
cohesion scale was also used in this study starting from the second year. In the first 
year, three items constructed specifically for this study were used with the aim of 
measuring levels of team agreement and team unity. However, later on, the research 
team decided to use a more robust and comprehensive scale to measure cohesion.  
Team potency: Resilience researchers have investigated the effect of the confidence in 
an entity’s own abilities on its resilience to the challenges it faced; and proposed that 
these two concepts have a positive relationship both at the individual (Bowers et al., 
2017) and collective (Lengnick-Hall, Beck and Lengnick-Hall, 2011; Vera, Rodríguez-
Sánchez and Salanova, 2017) levels. To test this proposition, team potency is included 
in the conceptual framework as defined by Guzzo et al. (1993, p. 87) as “the collective 
belief in a group that it can be effective”; and it is measured using the scale they 
developed and revised (Guzzo et al., 1993, p. 98). The revised version consists eight 
items and employs 5-point response scale ranging from ‘to no extent’ to ‘to a great 
extent’, with the internal reliability measured as 0.88. This scale was used without any 
wording adjustments and also with a 5-point response scale, but with answers ranging 
from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ in order to provide consistency throughout 
the questionnaire.  
Team average individual resilience: Resilience scholars have also proposed that there is 
a relationship between the resilience of a collective entity (a team or an organization) 
and the resilience of its individual members (Lengnick-Hall, Beck and Lengnick-Hall, 
2011; Duchek, 2014). To investigate this, an individual resilience measure was included 
in the pre-trading questionnaire and I considered it as a control variable in my 
quantitative analysis. Although a number of scales have been developed by different 
researchers to measure individual resilience (for e.g. Wagnild and Young, 1993; Block 
and Kremen, 1996; Connor and Davidson, 2003), the one that best fits with the criteria 
mentioned above was determined to be the ‘Brief Resilience Scale’ developed by Smith 
and his colleagues (2008). They administered the scale to four samples and obtained 
Cronbach’s alpha levels ranging between 0.80-0.91 (2008, p. 97).  
Affective well-being: In order to check whether the trading period was sufficiently 
challenging to the participants, affective well-being was measured in the post-trading 
questionnaire using Warr’s (1990) scale. Warr (1990) suggested several versions of his 
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scale to measure job-related affective well-being. We preferred the version that has a 
balance of shortness and comprehensiveness. This version produces a two-factor 
solution (arousal and pleasure emotions), and includes the emotion items (such as 
cheerful, depressed, tense, etc.) with the factor loadings higher than 0.40 (Warr, 1990, 
p. 200). A 5-point Likert-type scale was used as the response format. The main purpose 
of this measurement within the context of my study was to do a manipulation check to 
ascertain how challenging the trading period was perceived to be by the participants. If 
they were feeling positive (such as cheerful, relaxed, enthusiastic) most of the time, 
then this suggested that the trading period was not creating adequate levels of 
adversity and hence anxiety for the teams.  
Open-ended questions: In addition to the scales, a number of open ended items were 
used in both the pre- and post-trading questionnaires to collect detailed qualitative 
information. In the pre-trading questionnaire, a very general item was included, asking 
respondents about any general comments they would like to add. In the post-trading 
questionnaire an item asked respondents whether their team had experienced a crisis 
during the trading period, and, another open-ended question followed for this asking 
them detail the nature of the crisis. Lastly, two additional open-ended questions asked 
about any positive and negative factors that had affected their team’s performance. 
These two open-ended items elicited few useful responses and so were excluded for 
simulations 6 and 7 in order to condense the questionnaire and create space for new 
items.  
Response rate and participant accuracy (whether the participant filled the 
questionnaire himself/herself) have not been issues for the project. Participants were 
asked to complete the pre-trading questionnaire in class 1-3 days before the trading 
period. Post-trading questionnaires were completed immediately after the trading 
period, before teams received their trading results. Hence, almost all the participants 
filled them out. This also ensured that the participant himself/herself filled the 
questionnaire rather than making somebody else fill it for him/her. However, 
participants were given an option of exclusion from the research and sole inclusion in 
the educational aspect of the project. This option was represented with a tick/no-tick 
statement at the end of the questionnaires which was formatted as in Figure 7. The data 
from the respondents who ticked this item were excluded from the research. 
Consequently, the response rate has been 99.63% and the percentage of questionnaires 




Figure 7. Opt-Out Item 
4.4.2 Objective performance data 
As pointed out in the introduction chapter, many prior investigations of resilience have 
been mainly restricted to extreme settings of high-risk industries and one-off disasters. 
This has led to much resilience research being rather esoteric, limiting  its 
generalizability to wider organizational contexts (Linnenluecke, 2017). In contrast, I 
wanted to investigate resilience to the more frequent challenges of less extreme 
operational conditions and be able to advise much wider populations with the results I 
obtained. An immediate implication of this choice was on my research question. As 
elaborated in section 2.5.2 of the literature analysis, while the outcome of resilience is 
the survival of the organization and its members in an extreme setting, it is more likely 
to be the preservation and improvement of performance in non-challenging settings. 
Hence, I identified my second research question as “whether and how resilience is 
related to performance?”  
One of the benefits of the simulation used in this research is that it yields objective 
measures of performance. As opposed to approaches where performance is measured 
subjectively, for instance by the subjective judgement of a supervisor, in this research 
performance was measured by objective indicators of the accuracy and the rapidity of 
the work done by the teams throughout the trading period. As mentioned above, during 
the trading period, teams produced greetings cards in accordance with the orders 
selected from an order board (the marketplace). Outcomes of this production process 
reflected their performance and were measured by using various indicators. In my 
analysis, I utilized five performance indicators to represent various dimensions of 
performance, namely, productivity, quality, efficiency and strategy. Four of these 
performance indicators corresponded to a different dimension of performance, and the 
other one measured all dimensions. Below are the details of these indicators:  
Profit/Loss: This measure is the ultimate and most fundamental performance indicator 
in the simulations as well as in my analyses. It takes all the incomings and outgoings of 
a team into account. It is calculated by adding all the cash and 30% value of all the 
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assets a team returns to the controllers at the end of the trading period and subtracting 
all the loans (and their interest) and any fines the team incurred from the value of cash 
and assets. As it is quite easy to make a loss, this number is negative for the 77.94% of 
the teams in the research.  
This measure is also fundamental to my study as being the ultimate dependent variable 
in the tests of my research model. My research aims to identify the antecedents of team 
resilience and to investigate how, in turn, resilience is related to team performance in 
challenging conditions. In this regard, profit/loss is used to indicate the team 
performance in the quantitative investigation of the research model. profit/loss is not 
the only performance variable that is correlated with team resilience, nor has the 
highest correlation among all the performance indicators. However, I chose it as the 
ultimate indicator of the performance because it reflects multiple aspects of a team’s 
performance, namely, productivity, quality, efficiency and strategy. In that regard, none 
of the other performance indicators is as comprehensive as profit/loss. 
Number of cards delivered: A second essential performance indicator which mainly 
reflects the productivity dimension of performance is the number of cards produced 
and delivered by the team to the controllers. This number indicates all the cards that 
reached the controllers regardless of whether they met the specifications or not. Thus, 
it essentially measures how fast a team was in producing cards. Since, this is a rather 
quantity-related performance measure, and hence, number of people allocated to do 
the production task might affect it in a great deal, a more unbiased measure is ‘cards 
delivered per person’, that is the total number of cards delivered by a team divided by 
the number of team members.  
A similar measure considered as productivity-related was ‘number of accepted cards’, or 
‘accepted cards per head’ that is the number of the cards delivered and accepted by the 
controllers. I first considered this variable as an indicator of productivity. However, 
although this variable demonstrates how efficiently a team produces cards, the cards 
also need to meet the specification. The measure therefore becomes contaminated with 
the quality aspect of performance and does not effectively reflect productivity aspect of 
performance. Thus, I decided to use ‘cards delivered per person’ in the analyses to 
determine how productivity-related performance is related to certain variables.   
Number of orders rejected: In order to measure quality dimension of performance, 
which means how accurate the team was in understanding, interpreting and applying 
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product specifications to their production, we count the number of delivered orders of 
a team that were rejected by the controllers (as a percentage of total orders taken) 
because they did not meet the specifications. Teams that are able to address and 
overcome the challenges of their operational environment (for e.g. lightening and noise 
problems, inventory problems, problems associated with securing desired orders etc.) 
may better concentrate their work on producing in line with the strict product 
specifications. Hence, this measure is expected to be strongly and negatively correlated 
with resilience. In addition, rejections create frustration and shock within the team, and 
hence, constitute an additional source of challenges testing their resilience and 
requiring them to understand and fix the problems with the production process and 
continue operating. Conclusively, a two-way negative correlation is expected between 
team resilience and rejection percentage. 
Delivered cards (as a percentage of sheets consumed): Another key performance 
measure is ‘delivery percentage’, which is calculated by dividing the total number of 
cards delivered (both accepted and rejected cards) by the total number of sheets 
consumed by the teams. This measure is calculated to understand how efficient the 
team was in using all the sheets they bought. In particular it measures their internal 
defect rate, the level of the production errors made prior to bringing the order to its 
submitted version. Hence, I included this performance indicator to represent the 
efficiency dimension of performance. 
Average value per order: The last essential performance measure is average value per 
order, which is the total cash value of all the orders taken from the order board by a 
team divided by the number of these orders. This essentially shows the type of orders 
the team selects in terms of order profitability. Fundamentally, a team with a high 
average value per order pursued a strategy of taking high value, high profit, but hard- 
to-complete orders with a high number of cards per order and tight deadlines. In 
addition, it may also imply how quick a team in identifying the most profitable orders 
on the order board and in getting them before any other team. 
Other measures: In addition to these primary measures, which have been used in the 
main data analysis, there are also intermediary performance measures that are used in 




4.4.3 Other data collection tools 
Within the scope of the parent project of my study, a wide variety of quantitative and 
qualitative data collection methods were utilized. However, within the scope of my 
study, I only used the part of that data that allowed me to test my research model. As I 
quantitatively tested several relationships of my research model, I particularly used the 
quantitative data. Nonetheless, I have also used rich, qualitative data regarding the 
critical incidents in order to demonstrate the mechanisms behind the relationships I 
could and could not tested with the quantitative analysis. There are four sources of 
qualitative data. 
Firstly, teams were asked to prepare strategic plan documents and to attend strategic 
review meetings with the controllers; both of which were used as qualitative data 
sources in my study. Both of these sources provide information about the preparation 
and the strategy formation of the teams prior to the trading period. This information is 
crucial for differentiating between the teams that prepared and strategized well and 
those that did not and to link this to team resilience and performance. As pointed out 
by several resilience scholars (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; for e.g. Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007; Maynard and Kennedy, 2016), accumulated knowledge and a learning culture is 
extremely important to formulate effective responses to challenges. The teams in this 
study were newly formed and they experienced the trading period for the first time, 
and so, they did not have prior experience or accumulated knowledge. Therefore, the 
only opportunity for them to accumulate the required knowledge to respond to the 
challenges of the trading period was to practice and model it in the preparation phase. I 
therefore used data from strategic plan documents and strategic review meetings in 
order to examine the relationship between resilience and accumulated knowledge. 
I was also involved in several strategic review meetings as a controller. For the 
meetings I did not attend, I had access to audio recordings to gather the data. From the 
documents, I gathered information about teams’ missions, objectives, strategy and 
organization. In these documents, teams described what they aimed to accomplish in 
the trading period, how they hoped to accomplish this mission, what specific 
approaches they would adopt, and also how they intended to organize themselves (an 
example template for strategic plan document may be found in Appendix - 10.8). 
Within this context, teams identified their own strengths and weaknesses; general and 
specific risks they expected to encounter; and produced a financial plan. Some teams 
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also indicated the intensity of their preparation for the trading period, in the form of 
number, duration and attendance level of meetings and practice sessions. Walliman 
(2006) suggests that, when using documents as a source of data, it is better to support 
them with other forms of data collection. Thus, through the strategic review meetings I 
was able to obtain additional information about the preparation and strategies of 
teams. These meetings lasted about half an hour and had a semi-structured design with 
standardized guidelines (may be found in Appendix - 0) but some flexibility. Two 
researchers participated in each meeting, both questioning the team and taking notes 
throughout the meeting. 
Secondly, observational data is gathered during the trading period in the form of direct 
observation and video-recordings carried out for all runs of the simulation with different 
degrees of detail and visual/audio quality (for e.g. for certain runs of the simulation 
roaming cameras were used in addition to static cameras). The video-recordings may 
be classified under observational data collection; and, as McKechnie (2008) pointed, 
observational data may be used both for “ the discovery of new information” and for 
“the validation of existing knowledge”. In this regard, I have occasionally used the data 
gathered from these recordings to understand whether and how the relationships I 
proposed manifested during the trading period. These recording were particularly 
important because I acted as a controller for all runs of the simulation and was engaged 
with administrative tasks for the most of their duration and could not therefore 
perform systematic direct observations. Therefore, as McKechnie (2008) referred as 
one of the advantages of observational research, “the rich descriptions” generated as a 
result of the analysis of these video-recordings facilitated the understanding with 
regards to the relationship between resilience, its antecedents and its outcomes.  
Thirdly, a few days after the trading period, teams were required to collectively reflect 
on their performance in the simulation. Each team had 10-15 minutes to make a 
presentation followed by 5-10 minutes of Q&A and discussion involving controllers and 
members from the other teams. Out of 13 presentation sessions, I attended six, and 
asked questions and took notes during them. The other seven sessions were audio and 
video recorded; hence, I gathered information from them when needed.  
The information gathered from these presentations was extremely valuable. As 
mentioned previously, it was not feasible to make systematic direct observations 
during the trading period; first, because all the researchers acted as controllers and 
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engaged with administrative tasks, and second, observing all the teams all the time 
would have required a huge research team (considering at least one observer per team, 
4-16 observers would be needed for a single run of the simulation). Thus, most of what 
teams have been through in the simulation is only known to the teams themselves. 
Team presentations were the main opportunity to hear teams’ own accounts of the 
exercise. Although these accounts are based on self-report, and hence have the 
potential of not accurately representing the reality, combining these with direct 
observations and video-recordings helped me to better make sense of their 
experiences. Thus, I had a much stronger idea of the mechanisms of achieving resilience 
and satisfactory performance.  
Finally, data from the individual reflective assignments of participants were also used as 
a source of qualitative data. Each participant individually completed and submitted a 
2000-word report, 2-4 weeks after the trading day and they were graded from them. 
These assignments were only visible to the faculty members who were teaching the 
courses in which the simulations were carried out. Therefore, the two faculty members 
who reviewed the reports extracted the necessary information from these assignments 
anonymously. I have used this anonymized data to get further information about the 
challenges teams faced and how they responded to them and to better reveal the 
mechanisms of resilience and performance. 
 
4.5 Data Analysis 
4.5.1 Quantitative data analysis 
The quantitative data analysis in this study was carried out using the data gathered 
from the questionnaires and objective performance indicators. I conducted this 
analysis using SPSS 24 and AMOS 23. The main purpose of this analysis was to test and 
validate the various paths of the research model that had been developed as a result of 
the literature analysis and the exploratory study.  
Data entry process: 
Data on objective performance were collected during the trading period. For instance, 
after a team delivered an order and it had been inspected by a controller, the SODN 
document passed to the data entry team. The SODN shows the details of the order (cash 
value, number of cards, occasion, colour, size, etc.) as well as the decision of the 
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controller (accepted, rejected or marked as late delivery). The data entry team, then, 
recorded the number of cards and the cash value of the order into an Excel database. At 
the end of the entry process, the total cash value and card amount of accepted, rejected 
and unfulfilled orders were calculated for each team. To finalize this process and 
determine the overall performance results, data from the final accounts of the teams 
(for e.g. value of the loan and the interest incurred, value of the assets left unused at the 
end) is incorporated into the Excel Workbook. 
Data from the questionnaires are processed into a SPSS database after the participants 
complete and deliver them. Then, to represent the research concepts, scales were 
calculated by combining data from several items. When the data entry is completed at 
the individual level, the steps to build the team-level database start. For that, first, the 
reliability levels were confirmed; second, Inter-rater values are calculated using the 
methods of Dunlap et al. (2003); and third, with the confirmation of inter-rater value 
levels, variables (including scales) were aggregated to team level. In the final step, the 
objective performance data is copied into the database from the Excel Workbook.  
Variables: 
There are four different types of variables in the database. The first type are the 
demographic variables. These variables provide information about the different 
characteristics of participating teams and their members. Examples include be gender, 
nationality, programme of study, team ID, etc. The second type are variables created to 
quantitatively codify the questionnaire items. Some of these variables directly codified 
whereas others reverse-coded or the values were grouped. The third type are the 
construct/scale level variables. These variables are created by using a number of item 
level variables and by averaging the scores on each item to represent the overall scale 
score, as instructed in Parke’s (2013) work. These variables are crucial for the main 
analysis as they are reflections of the concepts investigated in this study. The fourth 
type are performance indicators. The results calculated during the trading period 
directly processed into the database first (for instance, profits, sales, loans, etc.). Then, 
based on these primary performance indicators, other more complicated indicators 






I utilized various methods in order to test the research model. To begin with, I used 
descriptive statistics (mean, range, frequency, etc.) to provide information about the 
characteristics of the participants, both at the individual and team level. These statistics 
give information about the attributes of participating teams and their members. 
Moreover, I conducted ANOVA to determine the significance of the descriptive 
attributes for the dependent variables (namely, team resilience and team 
performance). Results of ANOVA helped me decide which demographic measurement 
variables to include as control variables.  
In order to test the one-to-one relationship between resilience and the proposed 
precursors as well as resilience and performance, I employed correlation analysis. 
Correlation “refers to a group of indices that are employed to describe the magnitude 
and nature of a relationship between two or more variables” (Sheskin, 2010, p. 265). 
Such indices do not provide information with regard to a causal inference; hence, one 
cannot comment on which variable affects the other (Muñoz, 2011, p. 86), without 
utilising previously established theories or knowledge of the variables’ occurrence 
order. There are several different types of measures (e.g. Pearson's r, Spearman's rho, 
Kendall's correlation, intra-class correlation, etc.) used to conduct a correlation analysis 
(Shapiro, 2008, p. 155). Pearson’s r, which assumes a linear relationship between two 
variables and shows the size and the direction of that relationship, is the most 
commonly used measure among all. The value “r” denotes the correlation coefficient 
and calculated to reflect the size and the direction of the relationship. Examining the 
scatter plots between the variables in this study, I decided that the relationships are in 
linear shape; therefore, I used Pearson’s R in the correlation analyses.   
Correlation analyses were also conducted to reveal the likelihood of the 
multicollinearity problem in the following regression analyses. Multicollinearity means 
that one or more independent variables of the regression is strongly correlated and 
because of that it becomes harder to identify their incremental effects (Vogt, 2011b, p. 
198). Correlation analysis is one of the ways to reveal the possibility of 
multicollinearity: where the correlation between the independent variables of a 




Correlation analyses were followed by regression and path analyses for the overall 
testing of the research model. Regression is a statistical analysis technique to 
demonstrate the relationship between one variable and one or more other variables 
(Stolzenberg, 2011). Although, generally a causal inference is implied by stating that 
one variable, called dependent variable, is affected by the other variables, which are 
called independent variables, this inference is informal and should be supported by 
previously established theory. Regression is one of the most commonly preferred 
analysis techniques to investigate the relationship between variables (Lewis-Beck, 
2011), particularly in social sciences, because of the convenience of its implementation 
and the richness of the information gathered. 
When conducting a regression analysis, it is important to demonstrate whether the 
assumptions of “linear regression analysis” were met in this particular analysis. There 
are six important assumptions one has to check to see whether the relationship 
hypothesized may appropriately explained by linear regression analysis (Meuleman, 
Loosveldt and Emonds, 2013). Firstly, by entering the independent and dependent 
variables into the linear regression analysis, one assumes that each independent 
variable’s relationship with the dependent variable is linear. To check whether it is 
true, one should run the lack-of-fit test for each independent variable and should get a 
significance level below 0.05, which means the alternative hypothesis of a non-linear 
relationship is rejected. Secondly, the regression model should be homoscedastic, 
which means the variation of the model error terms (residuals) should be constant. In 
order to detect this, scatterplots of predicted values of dependent variable against the 
standardized residuals should be analysed visually. If the variation of residuals is 
constant throughout the different predicted values of dependent variable, then the 
assumption is met. If the reverse is true, then the model is heteroscedastic and the 
assumption is violated, in which case the inferences made out of the results may be 
incorrect. Thirdly, there should be no pattern associated with the residuals of the 
model. In other words, they should be independent. The Durbin-Watson test 
measures whether there is a pattern among the residuals (Boef, 2004). The test statistic 
takes a value between 0 and 4, where there is perfect negative correlation if it is 0 and 
perfect positive correlation when it is 4. Thus, a value between 1 and 3 implies that no 
correlation (i.e. pattern) exists. Fourthly, the distribution of the residuals should be 
normal (normality assumption). The consequences of a violation of the normality 
assumption are not as severe as the violation of other assumptions, because regression 
109 
 
parameters are robust against non-normal distributions (Meuleman, Loosveldt and 
Emonds, 2013). Nonetheless, one can plot a histogram of residuals and visually 
examine the closeness of distribution to normality. Alternatively, residuals of the 
regression may be saved and Shapiro–Wilk or Kolmogorov–Smirnov normality tests 
may be run on them. Fifthly, there should not be any extreme data points 
(observations) that affect the results. In other words, the deletion of no single variable 
should significantly change the results. To detect this, Cook’s distance values may be 
calculated for the cases. Any value over 0.5 should be further examined (i.e. the 
researcher should run the regression without it and check whether there are any 
significant changes) and any value over 1.0 should be excluded from the analysis (Berk, 
2013). Finally, the existence of multicollinearity should be examined. Although an early 
detection is done by checking the bivariate correlations between independent 
variables, one should still calculate VIF values for the independent variables to make 
sure this problem does not occur in the analysis. Any VIF value over 10 indicates that 
multicollinearity is a problem for the analysis (Meuleman, Loosveldt and Emonds, 
2013); and hence, the interpretation of the results may be incorrect.     
Finally, the overall model was tested by path analysis, also referred as simultaneous 
equation modelling, which is a particular form of Structural Equation Modelling (Kaplan, 
2012). It “is a confirmatory, multivariate technique that looks at causal relationships 
between variables in a diagrammatic form” (Foster, Barkus and Yavorsky, 2011b, p. 
103). In structural equation modelling, the relationship between latent variables are 
investigated over observed variables. Thus, this technique involves both factor and 
regression analyses. On the other hand, in Path Analysis, only observed variables are 
included in the analysis, and hence, no factor analysis is involved. Therefore, Path 
Analysis may be considered a more advanced form of multiple regression analysis 
(Foster, Barkus and Yavorsky, 2011a), where categorical variables and more than one 
dependents can also be included. An additional important difference between Path 
Analysis and Regression Analysis is the fact that Path Analysis takes the covariances 
between the independent variables into account, and hence, deals with 
multicollinearity.  
There are four important assumptions of Path Analysis (Foster, Barkus and Yavorsky, 
2011a) and they should be considered before interpreting any Path Analysis results. 
Firstly, the causal relationship(s) proposed should be in a single direction. In other 
words, the point of all the arrows demonstrating causal relationship in the diagram 
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should be pointing one way, meaning the model is recursive. Moreover, as in the 
regression analysis, the residuals should be uncorrelated and the relationships 
proposed between individual variables should be close to linear form. Lastly, the 
sample size should be big enough for the results to be interpreted confidently. There 
are different views in terms of what sample size considered enough. There are some 
studies that advise a certain absolute number (for e.g. Barrett, 2007) as well as other 
studies that advise a certain ratio between number of cases and variables or 
parameters (Jackson, 2003). Foster et al. (2011b) suggest a formula between the 
number of cases and independent variables to decide if the sample size is sufficient. 
They propose that if there are [k(k + 1)]/2 cases (where k is the number of ‘predictor’ 
variables) to conduct the analysis, then the sample size is sufficient. 
With the results of the path analysis, one may examine the direct and/or indirect effects 
of the independent variables on the dependent variables. However, in addition to that, 
path analysis also provides statistics for the overall significance of the model proposed. 
There are two types of such statistics that may be interpreted to determine whether the 
model proposed is meaningful in its entirety: model test statistics and approximate 
fit indexes (Kline, 2011, pp. 193–5). 
Model test statistics are the initial set of statistics considered when a path analysis has 
been conducted. The model test is similar to the lack-of-fit test in a regression analysis, 
and indicates how far the data is from fitting the model proposed. In that sense, the null 
hypothesis proposes that the model fits the data, and so, any significant result implies 
that the level of the fitness between model and the data is low. When one of the most 
preferred methods of estimation, Maximum Likelihood, is used to conduct the path 
analysis, the model test statistic is called model chi-square. As commonly accepted, 
when the p-value for model chi-square is under 0.05, then the result is accepted as 
significance and the model fit is low. Nonetheless, many researchers concluded that the 
model could still be valuable even though the test statistic is significant and measured 
fit per degree of freedom by dividing model test statistic by degree of freedom 
(Wheaton et al., 1977, p. 99). As a rule of thumb, if the value is below 5, then the model 
is accepted to have an adequate fit according to the model test statistic. However, the 
value of model test statistics is affected by various parameters such as the sample size, 
the correlation among the observed variables, non-normality, etc. (Kline, 2011, p. 201), 
hence, researchers proposed other indices that are independent from some of the 
limitations of the test statistics. 
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These indices are called approximate fit indexes and generally classified under three 
categories. Firstly, there are absolute fit indexes which measure how successful the 
model is in replicating the actual covariance matrix (Foster, Barkus and Yavorsky, 
2011b). The limitation here, however, as Kline (Kline, 2011, p. 195) stated, “explaining 
a high proportion of the sample covariances” does not necessarily mean that the model 
is correct as incorrect models might have the same explanatory power. Secondly, there 
are incremental fit indexes, which measure the appropriateness of the proposed 
model compared to a baseline model, where zero covariances were assumed. Thus, it is 
assumed that the higher the covariances between observed variables, the better the 
model proposed, meaning an absolute model appropriateness is not measured. Lastly, 
there are parsimony adjusted fit indexes, which measures absolute model fit, 
however, takes the number of parameters into account to eliminate the limitation 
caused by absolute fit indexes (Marsh, Balla and Mcdonald, 1988, p. 393).  
In this study, I reported four model indices to determine the overall fitness of the 
models proposed. The first statistic is CMIN/DF, which is basically model test statistic 
divided by degree of freedom, and as mentioned above, a maximum value of 5 is 
desired for better fit. Secondly, Normed Fit Index (NFI) and Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) are reported, both of which are incremental fit indexes developed by Bentler and 
Bonett (1980) and Bentler (1990) respectively, and they demonstrate the goodness-of-
fit compared to “an arbitrary covariance structure model” (1980, p. 599). The values for 
these statistics range between 0 and 1, and the greater the value is, the better the 
model fits compared to a zero-covariance model. In addition, CFI has a correction for 
the small sample problem and this eliminates “the underestimation of fit” (Bentler, 
1990, p. 238). Finally, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is also 
reported in this study. This is an absolute fit index developed by Steiger (1990), but 
additionally has a parsimony adjustment (Kline, 2011, p. 204). The RMSEA has a 
significance value and if this value is lower than 0.05 (alternative hypothesis), then the 
model is said to have an adequate fit. Additionally, RMSEA has a distribution with 
confidence interval and hence a one-sided test could be calculated to determine 
whether it is significantly above 0.05 (Kline, 2011, p. 206). The p-value that 
demonstrates whether RMSEA is greater than 0.05 is called PCLOSE, and it is also 
reported in this study to examine the information related to RMSEA (with null 
hypothesis being RMSEA is between 0 and 0.05, and alternative hypothesis being 
RMSEA is greater than 0.05).  
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4.5.2 Utilization of the qualitative data 
In addition to the quantitative data, I used qualitative data to reinforce the quantitative 
findings; to identify the mechanisms behind the relationships revealed by the 
quantitative findings; and to explore the paths of my research model that I could not 
test with quantitative analysis.  As Gibbs (2012a, p. 7) pointed out, “[i]n qualitative 
research there is a strong emphasis on exploring the nature of a particular 
phenomenon”, which is why I (selectively) utilized qualitative data to supplement the 
quantitative data. Although quantitative analysis can test and confirm the research 
model, it is inadequate in terms of elaborating the processes and the mechanisms 
behind these relationships. Although quantitative results provide the strength and 
importance of a relationship, it does not tell how two concepts affect each other. As 
mentioned before, revealing and understanding the processes and mechanisms of the 
relationship between resilience and its antecedents is one of the most important gaps 
in the resilience field. As stated by Kalaian (2008), qualitative data provide “a detailed 
narrative description and holistic interpretation that captures the richness and 
complexity of behavio[u]rs, experiences, and events.” Thus, by also utilizing qualitative 
data that provides information from the anecdotes and events occurred during the 
preparation and trading periods, I aim to reveal the mechanisms behind the 
relationships tested in the quantitative analysis; and hence, address this important gap.  
All the relationships I proposed and tested with my research model come from the 
literature analysis and the exploratory study I conducted in the first year of my study. 
Then, within the scope of quantitative analysis, I tested a part of these propositions 
using quantitative information. Thus, manifestations of these relationships during the 
trading period or preparation (i.e. how one concept affects the other or how they 
interact) are not considered in the quantitative analysis process. For example, the 
results of the quantitative analysis tell if there is a relationship between cohesion and 
resilience, however, it does not reveal whether and how cohesiveness facilitates 
resilience, or vice versa. Although this is not a requirement for the quantitative 
analysis, it is important and very helpful for the accurate interpretation of its findings, 
particularly to reinforce the propositions of causal relationships. Therefore, to support 




In addition to this, I could not collect quantitative data for all the relationships 
proposed in my research model. Thus, some of these relationships could not be tested 
with quantitative analysis. When this was the case, I utilized qualitative data, extracted 
information with regards to these relationships and tried to explore them using 
qualitative data.  
I extracted the qualitative data from my own notes of observations of the teams 
throughout the exercise and from the various information sources available. These 
sources included strategic review documents, strategic review meetings and their 
audio recordings, video-recordings of the trading period for each run of the simulation, 
observations I made during these runs of the simulation, post-game presentations by 
the teams and their video recordings, and finally, information extracted from the 
individual reflective reports by one of the other researchers of the project. For each 
team, I created a separate section in a Word document and under these sections, I 
added all my notes and other written information belonging to the corresponding team. 
Then, utilizing a combination of the procedures described by Schreier (2013), Gibbs 
(2012b), and Lieber and Weisner (2015), I employed simple content analysis and 
thematic coding on this data to form it into a more structured form. I made particular 
use of ‘concept-driven coding’, where categories (or concepts) of the coding scheme are 
identified before coding the text. These categories “can be taken from the literature and 
previous research” (Gibbs, 2012b, p. 44). I used my conceptual model and the results of 
my quantitative analysis to derive my coding framework, and collated the information 
from events and experiences under themes that corresponded to the concepts under 
investigation. Specifically, after completing the quantitative analysis, I considered the 
key results of the analysis along with my conceptual framework and identified the 
important issues to be interrogated in the Word document. I prepared a set of 
keywords and made searches in the document to extract relevant data.  
For example, based on the quantitative support for the relationship between collective 
mental models and team resilience, I searched the document using the keywords 
“specialization”, “trust”, “coordination”, “blame”, “mistakes”, “preparation”, 
“contingency”, “plan-B”, “flexibility”; and extracted the anecdotes that supported (or 
questioned) and illustrated the mechanism of this relationship. Similarly, for the parts 
of the framework that I could not test quantitatively, I searched the Word document for 
pertinent evidence. For instance, to investigate the relationship between accumulated 
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knowledge and team resilience, I searched the document using the keywords 
“knowledge”, “knowledge accumulation”, “learning”, “training”, “practicing”, “testing”, 
“challenging”, “action repertoire”, “strategizing”, “planning”, “specializing”; and tried to 
understand how different activities of knowledge accumulation helped teams in 
overcoming challenges. While doing the keyword searches, I paid attention to doing the 
search for different spellings of the same words (for e.g. specialising vs. specializing) 
and for the versions with different suffixes (for e.g. specialization and specializing).  
I included anecdotes from various teams in this analysis. The most vivid and powerful 
anecdotes generally came from the best and the worst performing teams. I used these 
data to further explore the quantitative findings; to demonstrate how the relationships 
between resilience, performance and proposed collective dynamics formed; and how 
they interacted with each other. Moreover, I also used it to understand the 
manifestation of resilience, to explore possible other precursors effecting its 
manifestation and to elaborate on how resilience contributed to operational 
performance.  
In order to anonymize the teams and the individuals experienced the incidents I 
analysed in the qualitative analysis, I ordered all 68 participating teams of the study 
according to their profit/loss value; and gave them a corresponding identity number 
(i.e. the team with the highest profit/loss value has been Team-1 and the team with the 
lowest profit/loss value has been Team-68). When I needed to refer a team, I referred 
using this identity number. Moreover, when I needed to mention an information that 
might reveal the identity of a team or a person, I anonymized that information as well. 
For instance, while analysing an incident about cultural problems, instead of revealing 
the cultures of participants, I used the expressions Culture-A and Culture-B to refer to 
the cultures.  
 
4.6 Testable research model and the hypotheses  
As illustrated in section 2.6, as a result of the comprehensive literature analysis I 
conducted in the first year of this study, I developed a tentative research model. Then, I 
conducted an exploratory study with two teams, where, with the help of the model in 
Figure 5, I observed and analysed the factors affected the resilience of teams to the 
challenges they faced. As a result of this analysis, the initial model was improved and 
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brought into the form in Figure 6. Finally, following the exploratory study, the main 
study was designed. The design process involved decisions about research methods, 
data collection tools and implementation. In accordance with this design, I brought the 
research model to an operationalizable form illustrated in Figure 8, to be investigated 
in the main study. As mentioned throughout this chapter, data were collected with 
regard to the concepts operationalized in this model, using various data collection tools 
that include a combination of objective, observational and self-report measures.  
In the model depicted in Figure 8, the concepts I could measure quantitatively were 
marked in yellow boxes. To guide the quantitative testing process, the hypotheses 
below were formed in accordance with the research model in Figure 8. For the testing 
of the relationships in the model which I did not have the quantitative data, I utilized 
the qualitative data. 
Hypothesis 1. Collective mindfulness is positively related to 
resilience. 
Hypothesis 2. Transactive memory systems is positively related to 
resilience. 
Hypothesis 3. Collective improvisation is positively related to 
resilience. 
Hypothesis 4. Team cohesion is positively related to resilience. 
Hypothesis 5. Team potency is positively related to resilience. 
Hypothesis 6. Resilience is positively related to operational 
performance. 
Hypothesis 7. Resilience mediates the relationship between 





Figure 8. Operationalized research model 
 
4.7 Concluding remarks  
In this section, I have described how I conducted the main empirical research in this 
study. In accordance with the gaps and limitations I identified in the previous studies of 
resilience and with my initial empirical trial in my exploratory study, I decide to utilize 
team simulation method for my main empirical investigation. The nature of this 
simulation is detailed in section 4.3. Following a description of the simulation, I 
elaborated on the data collection tools utilized to capture data and the analysis 
methods I employed to obtain the results. Finally, I laid out my operationalized 
research model and the hypotheses I formulated to guide the analyses. These analyses 





5 Results 1: Quantitative Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the quantitative findings obtained from my main study. The 
data I analysed comes from 68 teams and 547 participants, collected over seven runs of 
the simulation carried out over the course of three years. Quantitative data were 
collected using questionnaires (see section 4.4.1) and objective performance measures 
(explained in section 4.4.2). In the first section of the current chapter, I explain the 
steps of preparing the questionnaire data for the analysis. Firstly, as the analysis is at 
the team level but the data collected at the individual level, I calculated the interrater 
agreement rates to make sure there was enough agreement within the teams to 
aggregate the individual data at the team level. The analysis of this is illustrated in 
section 5.2.1. Secondly, the concepts investigated in my research are represented by 
scale variables which are comprised of several items. Thus, to confirm that the validity 
and reliability levels were adequate, I calculated Cronbach’s Alpha values and 
performed exploratory factor analysis. The results of these analyses are given in 
subsections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.  
Following these checks, I illustrate the manipulation checks for the simulation in 
section 5.3. These manipulation checks are presented under two subsections. In the 
first one, the reactions of participants to the trading conditions are shown. These 
reactions are important in demonstrating that the conditions of the trading day were 
perceived as challenging by the participating teams. In the second subsection, the 
unexpected nature of the simulation is demonstrated. Again, for team resilience to 
emerge and be manifested, it was necessary for teams to face novel and unexpected 
conditions and the simulation’s adequacy in providing such unexpectedness is 
evaluated in section 5.3.2.   
In section 5.4, I present demographic analysis and descriptive statistics. In the first 
section, variables associated with resilience, performance and all the other concepts of 
investigation are introduced, and teams compared with regard to these variables. It is 
possible to understand the features of the sample in this section. In the second section, 
the relationships of possible control variables with team resilience as well as with 
performance examined. Then, according to the significance of these relations, I selected 
which of these variables of include in the complex analyses.  
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Finally, the findings from the hypothesis-testing are given in section 5.5 in three 
subsections: correlations, regressions and path analysis. I formed the subsections 
according to the nature of the analysis I performed. My logic behind this sectioning is 
that each analysis type demonstrates different kinds of patterns. Thus, it is more 
straightforward to present these patterns in separate sections. The hypotheses that 
guided the main study analyses derived from the operationalized research model 
presented in Figure 8, section 4.6. I tested these hypotheses tested step by step, 
following the paths of the research model. At the final step, I tested the validity of the 
entire model using path analysis in AMOS 23. I provide the results of the hypothesis 
testing in this chapter. Moreover, the interpretations of the results are also provided in 
the current chapter; however, implications of these findings are discussed in Chapter 7.   
 
5.2 Data preparation for the analysis 
As mentioned above, the pre- and post-trading questionnaires were administered at 
the individual level by participants before and after the trading period respectively. 
However, performance required teamwork and, hence, measures were recorded and 
calculated at the team level. Furthermore, the main unit of analysis was identified as 
the team and the measures and items of the questionnaire were selected accordingly. 
Thus, once the questionnaire data were processed into the database at the individual 
level (for 541 participants), it then had to be aggregated into the team level (for 68 
teams) for the planned analyses to be performed. This method of collecting team level 
data by using individual level questionnaires is a common method in the organizational 
sciences (van Mierlo, Vermunt and Rutte, 2008, p. 368).  
When applying this method, the researcher should adopt a composition model: a form 
of operationalization at the individual level and a form of aggregation at the team level 
(van Mierlo, Vermunt and Rutte, 2008, p. 369). Two of the most common methods have 
been proposed by Chan (1998), both of which are adopted in this research, are direct-
consensus and referent-shift consensus methods. In the direct-consensus method, 
questionnaire items are worded at the individual level and the construct is 
operationalized as such, and in aggregating to the team level the construct is adapted to 
team level (Chan, 1998; van Mierlo, Vermunt and Rutte, 2008). For instance, in this 
research the construct to measure ‘team average individual resilience’ is defined at the 
individual level and the items are worded for individual completion (e.g. “How often 
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did you feel tense in the game?”). However, the data are aggregated to team level to 
reflect average member resilience for each team after the trading period. On the other 
hand, in the reference-shift consensus method, the items are designed or altered to 
directly make the assessment at the team level (Chan, 1998; van Mierlo, Vermunt and 
Rutte, 2008). For example, to collect data on collective mindfulness, questionnaire 
items referred to the team as a whole (e.g. “We discussed our unique skills with each 
other so that we knew who has relevant specialized skills and knowledge”). All the 
remaining concepts were measured using this method (team resilience, transactive 
memory systems, improvisation, cohesion, etc.). 
Such aggregation is a straightforward process in SPSS, however, I had to ensure that the 
data qualified for aggregation. In other words, first, there has to be enough agreement 
within the teams to confidently conduct analysis on the aggregated data and, second, 
construct reliability and validity has to be adequate at the team level for each scale that 
is used in the analyses. In subsection 5.2.1, I illustrate the way I calculated agreement 
levels within teams and the results I obtained and discuss the results in terms of their 
adequacy. In subsections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3,  I demonstrate the construct reliability and 
validity at the aggregated level, again, discuss the adequacy of the results.  
5.2.1 Interrater agreement (IRA) 
5.2.1.1 What is IRA and Interrater reliability (IRR) and why they are used? 
As described in LeBreton and Senter’s (2007, p. 816) paper, IRA is “the absolute 
consensus in scores furnished by multiple judges for one or more targets” and IRR is 
“the relative consistency in ratings provided by multiple judges of multiple targets”. In 
the context of responses to a questionnaire, for team members responding to several 
questionnaire items, IRA refers to the similarity of the responses themselves among the 
same team’s members and IRR refers to the similarity of the responses given to 
different items, again, among the same team’s members. While aggregating responses 
from an individual-level questionnaire for the team-level analysis, it is very important 
to be able to demonstrate that there is enough agreement among the team members to 
demonstrate the validity of a single response for the whole team. IRA and IRR both 
indicate the level of the acceptability of the aggregation. If a single item is aggregated, 
then only IRA can be reported (as there is no relativity between items), however, if a 




There are several measures of IRA and IRR proposed in different studies. The most 
popular measure, estimates IRA, is the rwg indices, first proposed by James, Demaree 
and Wolf (1984). Other commonly used estimates of IRA are standard deviation 
(proposed by Schmidt and Hunter, 1989), average deviation indices (proposed by 
Burke, Finkelstein and Dusig, 1999) and awg indices (proposed by Brown and 
Hauenstein, 2005). There are also measures that only estimate IRR (for e.g. Pearson 
product-moment correlation is proposed by Schmidt, Viswesvaran and Ones, 2000) or 
both IRA and IRR (ICC ratings suggested by Mcgraw and Wong, 1996). In their paper, 
LeBreton and Senter (2007) detail all the advantages and disadvantages associated 
with these measures and leave the choice the researcher with the suggestion of 
justifying the fit of chosen measure with the research.  
5.2.1.2 Selection of the measures 
In this study, I chose the rwg measure to report the agreement levels among individual 
responses and justify aggregation to the team level. First of all, it is the most preferred 
and most cited measure (at the time of writing in April 2018 James and colleagues 1984 
work has been cited 4283 times according to Google Scholar Citations). Second, its 
reporting frame is fairly straightforward ranging from 0.0 to 1.0, 0.0 indicating no 
agreement and 1.0 indicating perfect agreement. Third, it is not as sensitive to sample 
size as the standard deviation measure is (LeBreton and Senter, 2007, p. 820), though 
sample size in the current study is not small. Fourth, it is independent of the effect of 
IRR as opposed to ICC ratings, in which low values may mean low IRR but high IRA 
(2007, p. 823). Although IRR is a useful concept, the existence of absolute agreement 
among the individual responses (which is indicated by IRA) is the main reference point 
for aggregation. Lastly, I should also note that previous studies concluded that the 
results obtained with these different measures were similar (Brown and Hauenstein, 
2005; Roberson, Sturman and Simons, 2007).  
An important issue associated with the rwg measure is the choice of the null distribution. 
While performing the calculation, the researcher has to make an assumption with 
regard to the distribution of random responding, to compare “the observed variance to 
the variance expected when judges respond randomly” (LeBreton and Senter, 2007, p. 
819). The most straightforward selection is uniform distribution where each response 
point is equally represented (for e.g. for 5-point Likert-type scale each point has 20% 
chance of being selected). In addition to this, LeBreton and Senter (2007, p. 832) 
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suggest alternative distributions to assume and use in the calculations (for e.g. skewed, 
triangular, normal, uniform, etc.).  
5.2.1.3 Implementation of the procedures to report rwg values 
I adopted the procedures to obtain and report rwg values for the single items and rwg(J) 
values for the constructs from the appendices of LeBreton and Senter’s (2007, pp. 842–
849) and implemented these procedures using SPSS 24. The equations I used to 
calculate rwg and rwg(J) are as follows, where S denotes standard deviation and σ denotes 
the expected variance when there is no agreement, and J denotes the number of items 
in the construct: 
 
Figure 9. Formulas for rwg and rwg(J) 
To calculate these equations and in line with the procedures illustrated, first, I sorted 
the individual data according to company_ID (i.e. the identifier of each of the 68 
groups). Following the sort, I aggregated all the questionnaire items according to 
company_ID and using SD function transferred these to a new database. Then, initially, I 
calculated rwg value for each item, applying the formula above. As mentioned earlier, for 
the calculation of the expected variance of random rating (zero agreement), a null 
distribution has to be assumed. I selected uniform distribution as the null distribution, 
and applied in the calculation of the rwg values. I selected uniform distribution based on 
the statement made by LeBreton and Senter (2007, p. 827) to give a possible 
explanation for the rwg values below or above the 0-1 interval. LeBreton and Senter 
state that one explanation for these out-of-range values is inaccurate null distribution 
selection. With this logic, I calculated rwg values with different null distribution 
assumptions and I obtained the least number of out-of-range values with uniform 
distribution. Following the calculation of rwg values for all the items that were intended 
to be aggregated, I calculated the rwg(J) values for the scales. The final step before 
reporting these values was to set the remaining out-of-range values (there were only 
176 out-of-range values among 8,432 values calculated) to zero, as recommended by 
James et al. (1984), assuming that the reason for the occurrence of such values was 
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attributable to sampling error. The results of the calculations are summarized in the 
section that follows. 
5.2.1.4 rwg and rwg(J) values in this study 
Once all the rwg and rwg(J) values were calculated, an important issue was to bring them 
into a reportable form as there were more than 7,000 rwg values and more than 700 
rwg(J) values and it would be very confusing to report all these values. As a solution to 
this, Cohen et al. (2001) recommend reporting mean values. Thus, Table 5 
demonstrates mean rwg(J) values for the eight constructs used in this study and the 
corresponding the acceptance levels advocated by LeBreton and Senter (2007, p. 836). 
These suggest strong to very strong agreement levels for each of the constructs. Mean 
rwg(J) values range between 0.87 and 0.97; and for most of the constructs, even 
minimum values are above the 0.70 cut-off point of strong agreement. As a result of the 
examination of all the rwg and rwg(J) values, I concluded that IRA levels are high enough 






Team Resilience  
(Post-Trading) 
68 0.89 Strong agreement 0.48-1.00 
Collective Mindfulness  
(Post-Trading) 




















68 0.95 Very strong 
agreement 
0.88-0.98 
Team average individual 
Resilience 
(Pre-trading) 
68 0.87 Strong agreement 0.63-0.96 
Affective Well-being  
(Post-trading) 
68 0.95 Very strong 
agreement 
0.83-0.99 
Table 5. Mean rwg(J) values for the constructs 
5.2.2 Reliability analysis (Internal consistency) 
Reliability refers to “the degree to which measures are free from error and therefore 
yield consistent results” (Peter, 1979, p. 6). The most common test of the reliability of a 
construct is Cronbach’s Alpha value (Lounsbury, Gibson and Saudargas, 2006). As 
Cronbach and Shavelson (2004, p. 398) stated in their study, this value can be used to 
measure “the consistency among items in a test”, “agreement among scorers of a 
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performance test” and “the stability of performance of scores on multiple trials of the 
same procedure”.  
In my study, eight constructs were adopted from previous studies (explained in detail 
in section 4.4.1). Reliability and validity of these constructs were demonstrated in the 
original studies and in other subsequent studies. The existence of statistics on validity 
and reliability for these constructs was among the reasons for using these constructs in 
the current study. However, it is still necessary to demonstrate their adequacy with 
regard to the concepts within the scope of this study. Therefore, initially, I performed a 
reliability analysis for all the constructs, conducting two separate analyses for the 
constructs that were measured both before and after the trading period). The results of 
this analysis were shown in Table 6.  














Team Resilience  
(Post-Trading) 








15 524 0.820 0.850 0.468 
Team cohesion  
(Post-trading) 




7 378 0.763 0.763 0.490 
Team Potency 
(Pre-trading) 








12 516 0.849 0.841 0.518 
Table 6. Summary of reliability analysis, n=541 
There are different views on what constitutes adequate reliability for a construct to be 
confidently used in further analysis. Peterson (1994) conducted a detailed review of 
this, examining suggestions from previous studies (1994, p. 382) together with the 
statistics of reliability levels (of constructs) reported in previous years in several 
different journals (1994, p. 384). His results demonstrated that average value for 
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reported Cronbach’s Alpha levels is 0.77 and 75% of the reported values were above 
0.70 (Peterson, 1994, p. 388). Lounsbury et al. (2006) recommended that Cronbach’s 
Alpha for scales should be at least 0.75 or, alternatively, items in the scale should have a 
corrected item-total correlation of 0.40, which means that the item is adequately 
correlated with the mean value of all the remaining items. Especially with newly 
developed scales, a third assessment is the Cronbach’s Alpha level if an item is excluded 
from the scale, although when using a well-established scale, excluding an item in order 
to achieve a higher reliability level might affect the validity of the scale.  As pointed out 
by Furr (2013) “modified scales might not have the psychometric properties or quality 
of an original scale”.  
Considering these insights from previous studies about adequate reliability levels, the 
scales of team resilience, collective mindfulness, transactive memory systems, affective 
well-being and team potency constructs can be read as strongly reliable. They all have 
sufficiently high Cronbach’s alpha levels; and, for each construct, this level either 
decreases or stays very much the same when any one of the items are excluded. 
Moreover, corrected item-total correlations are considerably higher than the minimum 
recommended value.  
On the other hand, for the collective improvisation, team cohesion, and team average 
individual resilience constructs, the interpretation is more complicated. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the collective improvisation scale is above the recommended levels, although 
it is not very high. However, when examining the average value for corrected item-total 
correlation, it is sufficiently above the level recommended by Lounsbury et al. (2006). 
Thus, the scale is considered adequately reliable. Furthermore, the team cohesion scale 
is just below the minimum recommended level for Cronbach’s Alpha and also just 
below the recommended level for the corrected item-total correlation. In the light of 
the fact that this is a previously established and validated scale, it was retained for the 
analyses. Deleting any item did not improve the reliability of this scale, so all items 
were utilized. Finally, the Cronbach’s alpha for the individual resilience scale is also just 
below the recommended levels, although the average value for the corrected total-item 
correlation is at the recommended level. Thus, this scale was retained for the analysis. 
Removing the item “I usually come through difficult times with little trouble” brought 
Cronbach’s alpha to just above the threshold, however, it was deemed preferable to 
keep the scale in its original version. So, this item was not removed.  
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5.2.3 Factor analysis (discriminant validity) 
The final step in preparing the data for the analysis was to demonstrate the 
discriminant validity of the constructs in the questionnaires. This means demonstrating 
that all the constructs are distinct in terms of what they are measuring; in other words, 
they are all “nonredundant” (Lounsbury, Gibson and Saudargas, 2006). This is also one 
of the very limited number of ways to statistically support construct validity. Carless 
(2011) suggests that factor analysis may be used to demonstrate discriminant validity. 
Although the scales were developed in previous studies, there were no prior models 
that tested the discriminant validity of these constructs together (Suhr, 2006, p. 5); 
hence, I decided to measure discriminant validity without specifying a model or the 
number of factors. In line with this, exploratory factor analysis was conducted (as in 
Grant (2008) and Golgeci and Ponomarov (2014)), separately for pre-trading items and 
post-trading items. Table 7 gives the adequacy statistics and Table 8 gives the rotated 
factor loadings for pre-trading items. Moreover, Table 9 gives the adequacy statistics 
and Table 10 gives the rotated factor loadings for post-trading items. 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .914 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 6886.772 
df 595 
Sig. <.001 
Table 7. Adequacy tests for factor analysis for pre-trading items 
 
Item 1 2 
Team Potency  
1 0.688 - 
2 0.721 - 
3 0.778 - 
4 0.618 - 
5 0.752 - 
6 0.536 - 
7 0.557 - 
8 0.607 - 
Team average individual resilience 
1 - 0.519 
2 - 0.693 
3 - 0.591 
4 - 0.729 
5 - 0.374 
6 - 0.765 




KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .882 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 10252.438 
df 1953 
Sig. <.001 
Table 9. Adequacy tests for factor analysis for post-trading items 
 
Item Factor Loadings  Item Factor Loadings 
Affective well-being Collective Mindfulness 
 4 7 8 -  6 9 2 
1 0.800 - - - 1 0.332 - 0.441 
2 0.655 0.351 - - 2 0.594 - - 
3 0.607 0.367 - - 3 0.534 - 0.310 
4 0.778 - - - 4 0.773 - - 
5 0.330 - 0.389 - 5 0.645 - 0.346 
6 0.817 - - - 6 0.475 - - 
7 - 0.754 - - 7 - 0.752 - 
8 - 0.763 - - 8 0.451 0.563 - 
9 - 0.765 - - 9 0.307 0.634 - 
10 - 0.273 - - Team cohesion 
11 - 0.413 - -  3 11 14 
12 - 0.351 - - 1 0.584 - - 
Team resilience 2 0.594 - - 
 5 - - - 3 0.729 - - 
1 0.666 - - - 4 0.639 - - 
2 0.666 - - - 5 - 0.636 - 
3 0.622 - - - 6 - 0.695 - 
Transactive Memory Systems 7 - 0.752 - 
 2 12 11 5 8 - - 0.833 
1 0.673 - - - Collective Improvisation 
2 0.391 - - -  10 13 1 
3 0.653 - - - 1 0.689 - - 
4 0.696 - - - 2 0.677 - - 
5 0.765 - - - 3 0.632 - - 
6 0.425 - - - 4 - 0.594 - 
7 0.431 0.376 - - 5 - 0.573 0.376 
8 0.355 0.492 - - 6 - 0.785 - 
9 - 0.727 - - 7 - 0.537 - 
10 - 0.636 - -  
11 - - 0.306 - 
12 - - - 0.630 
13 - 0.346 0.512 - 
14 - - - 0.496 
15 - - 0.564 - 





To obtain the results given here, I used principal component analysis and I applied an 
orthogonal rotation (varimax) to determine the factor solution. Along with the 
principal component method, I also tried the principal axis and the maximum 
likelihood methods, which are two other dimension-reduction techniques, and I found 
the factor solutions yielded very similar results. Moreover, for the rotation, I also tried 
an oblique rotation (direct oblimin) considering the significant correlations between 
constructs, and, again, obtained similar results. For a more convenient interpretation 
and to conform to the commonly preferred methods, I used principal component 
analysis and orthogonal rotation as the final method. 
Along with the factor analysis, I implemented Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) (Kaiser, 1974) 
and Bartlett (Bartlett, 1950) tests to confirm that the data were appropriate for the 
factor analysis. Particularly, there needs to be sufficient correlation among the items 
that will be entered to the factor analysis (Pett, Lackey and Sullivan, 2011). KMO is a 
measure of sampling adequacy and, according to Kaiser (1974, p. 35), should be over 
0.6 in order for factor analysis to be conducted on the sample. On the other hand, 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity is a hypothesis test where the null hypothesis suggests that 
there is no relationship among the items. As factor analysis prerequires a certain level 
of correlation among the items entered into the analysis (Pett, Lackey and Sullivan, 
2011), Bartlett’s test has to yield a significance level that accepts the alternative 
hypothesis (i.e. below 0.05). As seen from Table 7 and Table 9 for both pre- and post-
trading items KMO and Bartlett tests yielded the desired results, and hence, I was 
confident that factor analyses were appropriate. 
The interpretation of the factor analyses is straightforward for both pre- and the post-
trading items. For the pre-trading items, Table 8 demonstrates that all the items from 
different constructs were loaded under different factors. Moreover, both team potency 
(factor 1) and team average individual resilience (factor 2), the items are loaded on a 
single factor.  
For the post-trading items, Table 10 presents slightly more complicated results. In 
general, factor analysis therefore supported the validity of the main constructs. Items of 
team resilience (factor 5) were loaded on single factors; whereas, affective well-being 
(factor 4 and 7), collective mindfulness (factors 6 and 9) and collective improvisation 
(factors 10 and 13) were loaded under two factors; team cohesion (factors 3, 11 and 14) 
loaded under three factors; and transactive memory systems (factors 2, 12, 11 and 5) 
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loaded under four factors. Moreover, almost all the items from different constructs 
loaded under different factors with two exceptions. First, two items from transactive 
memory systems loaded onto the same factor as the team resilience items (factor 5), 
and second, three items from transactive memory systems and two items from team 
cohesion loaded under the same factor (factor 11). As these results do not concern the 
entirety of the scales and apply to a limited number of items, and considering the fact 
that these three constructs were previously tried and validated in the literature, I 
decided to use them without any alterations.  
 
5.3 Manipulation Checks 
One important question that might be asked about this research is whether the 
simulation used is capable of generating the conditions for the emergence and the 
manifestation of resilience on the part of the teams. Although the simulation was 
designed with the intention of creating challenging conditions and the unexpectedness 
of a real operational environment, did it achieve this? Did teams have to be resilient in 
order to perform well? In order to test this, several manipulation checks were included 
in the research design and the findings from these presented in the next section.  
5.3.1 The effects of the challenging conditions 
Firstly, it is important to check whether the challenges intended in the design of the 
simulation were indeed faced by the teams. Regarding this, video-recordings of the 
trading period are useful in demonstrating the dynamism of the trading period. 
Participants (and the controllers) rarely have an idle moment throughout the whole 
trading period. Those selecting orders and procuring materials are constantly ‘on the 
run’, shuttling back and forth in between tables and controllers’ area. Audio recordings 
capture non-stop, often disruptive, background noise, proving the ongoing frenzy of 
audial distraction throughout the trading period.  
Furthermore, teams often spontaneously mention the challenges they faced before and 
on the trading day, during the strategic review meetings and during post-trading team 
presentations. For instance, regarding the preparation phase, they talk about 
experiencing adversities ranging from role-related conflicts to the difficult to coming up 
with realistic production and financial plans that project a profit. In the course of the 
trading they may experience communication problems which pave the way for crises in 
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the production process (e.g. inadequate stocks of materials for the order taken or order 
specifications that are communicated improperly to production workers and are 
therefore produced incorrectly).  
 
 N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean 
Number of orders 
rejected 
68 0 7 165 2.43 
Rejection percentage 68 0.00% 66.70%  20.09% 
Number of unfulfilled 
orders 
68 0 7 59 0.87 
Unfulfilled orders (as 
% of orders taken) 
68 0.00% 53.85%  6.68% 
Table 11. Rejection and non-fulfilment levels 
 
In addition to these, the objective performance data also show the challenges 
experienced by the team in the form of order rejection and non-fulfilment levels. As 
seen in Table 11, some teams had as many as 7 rejections and 7 unfulfilled orders, 
which means their operations faced an unexpected adversity at least 7 times in the 
trading period. A total of 165 rejections and 59 unfulfillments were experienced over 
the course of seven runs of the simulation by 68 teams, which means, on average, each 
team had 2-3 orders rejected and 1 order unfulfilled, i.e. that missed the delivery 
deadline (see also the Mean column in Table 11).    
Finally, in the post-trading questionnaire, participants were asked to declare how they 
felt (in terms of certain emotions) and whether they felt that their team had 
experienced crisis. More than half of the participants (51.4%) reported that their team 
experienced a crisis. Answers to the other questions are presented in Table 12 below. 
As seen from the table, almost all the participants felt tense at least once during the 
trading period. Most of them felt uneasy and worried at least once; and around a third of 
them stated feeling even stronger negative emotions such as depressed or miserable. 
Moreover, considering less intense negative feelings (tense, uneasy and worried), more 
than half of the respondents stated that they felt that way at least sometimes during the 
trading period (these figures include the respondents who stated feeling that particular 
emotion always and the participants who stated feeling that often during the trading 
period). Considering that 82.9% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they 
are individually resilient, the statements regarding their negative feelings during the 
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trading period can plausibly be ascribed to the challenging nature of the trading period 
rather than simply that the sample comprised participants who were naturally inclined 
towards negative emotions.   
 
Emotion % stated feeling 
at least once 




Tense 94.1% 77.7% 543 
Uneasy 80.3% 52.8% 538 
Worried 86.0% 54.6% 542 
Depressed 38.1% 17.8% 540 
Gloomy 37.4% 19.1% 540 
Miserable 28.0% 13.7% 542 
Table 12. Emotional status of the participants after the trading period, n=541 
 
5.3.2 The unexpectedness of the trading period 
The best indicator of the unexpectedness of the trading period is perhaps the difference 
between what the teams had anticipated they would achieve prior to the trading period 
(in terms of production and profit) and what they actually achieved. What they actually 
achieved can be seen from the objective performance data available after the trading 
period. Their expectations can be seen from their forecasts of production, revenue and 
profit or loss contained in their pre-trading strategic plans. Table 13 provides 
descriptive statistics of these forecasts contrasted by the actual results and illustrates 
the differences strikingly. Except the forecast average for the number of cards 
produced, overall team forecasts differed significantly from the actual results. When 
comparing the forecasts with the actual results, it is clear that on average teams 
performed below their own expectations. Specifically, the performance levels are 20% 
to 40% lower than forecast for number of order expected to be produced, number of 
cards produced and value of sales, whereas the actual is 200% lower than forecasts for 
profit/loss. Since profit/loss is the product of many factors, it is to be expected that 
profit was difficult for the teams to forecast. Nonetheless, these differences clearly 
demonstrate that the trading period conditions were different to what many of the 
teams had anticipated, including their own ability to produce. Most of the teams 
generated their forecasts on the basis of their trials conducted before the trading day. 
Therefore, at least some of the discrepancy between the forecasts and the actual results 
is likely to have been caused by teams’ inability to anticipate the dynamism and the 




 N Minimum Maximum Mean Comparison sig. 
Profit forecasts 
(£) 




68 -6879 5478 -1161.79 
Sales forecasts 
(£) 
64 2850.00 19,380.00 6939.13 
<0.001 




41 48 240 118.12 
0.319 
Actual number of 
cards produced 
(N) 
68 32 184 98.94 
Order forecasts 
(N) 
24 5 35 15.42 
0.001 Actual number of 
successful orders 
(N) 
68 2 20 10.35 
Table 13. Forecasts vs. Actual results 
 
5.4 Nature of the data and the identification of control variables 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
5.4.1.1 Demographic Analysis 
In this section, I present the characteristics of the participants of the simulation. These 
participants, whose data I used to conduct my analyses, have been the students that 
took a business school course and the simulation has been conducted as a part of that 
course, as it also facilitates the teaching of the course. As mentioned previously, a total 
of 547 students participated in the simulation and questionnaire data has been 
obtained from 541 of them. Table 14 summarizes the demographic data associated 
with these respondents.  
As seen from the table, the sample has fairly equal distributions with regards to gender, 
nationality and study programme. The participants came from 72 different 
nationalities, which strengthens the diversity of the sample and allows it to represent 
cultures and populations from all over the world. Moreover, 64.2% percent of the 
sample is female and 35.6% is male. This might not be an ideal distribution, however, 
both genders are still adequately represented. Finally, six different post-graduate level 
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study programmes are represented by the sample and students enrolled in these 
programmes come from various educational, occupational and cultural backgrounds.  
 
 Frequency Percentage   Frequency Percentage 
Nationality Gender 
China 124 22.9 Female 348 64.3 
UK 70 12.9 Male 192 35.5 
Germany 48 8.9 MISSING 1 0.2 
USA 38 7.0 TOTAL 541 100 
India 28 5.2  
Thailand 20 3.7 
Taiwan 17 3.1 Programme of Study 
Indonesia 14 2.6 MSc_ 
Management 
167 30.9 
Canada 12 2.2 MBA 134 24.8 
France 12 2.2 MSc-HRM 109 20.1 
Greece 12 2.2 MSc-IHRM 81 15.0 
Mexico 11 2.0 EMBA 28 5.2 
OTHERS 134 25.1 MSc-IBEM 22 4.1 
MISSING 1 0.2 TOTAL 541 100.0 
TOTAL 541 100  
Table 14. Demographic features of the sample 
 
Since data comes from the participants with diverse backgrounds, team performance 
differences may be related to this diversity. For example, a team might perform better 
because of having hard-working individuals or individuals that are used to working in 
teams. So, I also examined the educational, psychological, occupational backgrounds of 
the participants with the relevant data. Firstly, I analysed the average of the grades they 
got from the assignments of the course as a proxy for their educational and intelligence 
related background. Out of 100, the level ranged from 40 to 80 with a mean of 64.09 
and a distribution close to normal. Secondly, their self-ratings for the individual 
resilience construct were analysed as a proxy for psychological background, especially 
to make sure that teams were not mostly comprised of people with higher-than-normal 
stress levels. The scores ranged from 1.67 to 5.00 with a mean of 3.66 and a slightly 
negatively skewed distribution. This slight negative distribution implies that the 
sample is actually comprised of moderately to highly resilient individuals, hence the 
main analyses are free from stress-prone participants bias (i.e. the negative feelings 
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reported by the participants after trading are most likely attributable to the simulation 
and not to more general negative tendencies). Lastly, in the last two runs of the 
simulation, participants were also asked to indicate their work experience level as a 
proxy of accumulated experience. Among the 164 responses, there were participants 
with no experience as well as participants with up to 34 years of experience. Average 
work experience was 3.8 years. The distribution for this variable is positively skewed, 
which means that the sample is mostly comprised of people with low work experience. 
This is expected as the sample is comprised of post-graduate students.  
5.4.1.2 Performance indicators 
The trading period generated data from various performance indicators were 
calculated. Based on these and utilizing the data from procurement forms, within the 
scope of my study, I have used five of these indicators in the analyses, which the logic of 
using four of them to represent four dimensions of the operational performance in the 
simulation and the other one to give a comprehensive performance indication by 
representing all four dimensions. Table 15 provides the descriptive statistics associated 
with these variables.  
There is a considerable range among the teams in terms of the level of performance. 
This is particularly observable from the profit/loss variable, where the range extended 
from a loss of –£6,879.00 to a profit of £5,478.00. As mentioned previously, the 
challenging conditions of the simulation make it difficult for teams to make a profit, and 
this may be observed from the mean profit/loss of -£1,161.79. In particular, among the 
68 teams, only 15 of them broke even. Considering the various aspects of performance, 
differences among the teams are also visible. Considering the quantity driven 
performance, there were teams that could only delivered less than 5 cards per person. 
At the other extreme, almost 20 cards per person were delivered, without any 
rejections. On average, teams delivered around 12 cards per person, which means, on 
average, a team produced 1 card every 1.36 minutes. Considering quality, there were 
teams without any rejections as oppose to teams with 66.7% of their orders rejected by 
the controllers. Moreover, on average, teams were efficient enough to produce 
deliverable cards (according to intra-team quality criteria) with more than 80% of the 
sheets they bought (the maximum value for delivery percentage is more than 100% 
because teams occasionally trade sheets and currently there is not a way to record 
these trades). Lastly, on average, teams strategized to secure orders with a value 





Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. N 
Profit/loss (£) -6,879.00 5,478.00 -1,161.79 1810.37 68 
Cards delivered per person 4.57 19.50 12.26 3.64 68 
Rejection percentage 0.0% 66.7% 20.09% 15.21% 68 
Delivery percentage 31.2% 104.1% 80.57% 14.81% 65 
Average value per order 170.0 810.8 403.13 143.62 68 
Table 15. Descriptive statistics associated with performance indicators 
 
5.4.1.3 Constructs 
With the administration of the pre- and post-trading questionnaires, data were 
collected for various constructs that represent the different attributes and capabilities 
associated with resilience. I have used eight of these constructs in the quantitative 
analysis presented in this chapter. As mentioned before, two of these constructs, 
namely, team resilience and collective mindfulness were measured both before and after 
the trading period. As explained in section 4.4.1, team cohesion and collective 
improvisation were measured on in simulations 3-7. All the other constructs were 
measured for all seven runs of the simulation.  
Table 16 summarizes the descriptive statistics associated with these eight constructs. 
Parametric techniques were used to analyse these Likert scale constructs in line with 
the ‘intervalist position’ (Carifio and Perla, 2008, p. 1151), in which researcher assumes 
the measurement level of the Likert scales to be interval rather than ordinal. Although 
there is an ongoing debate with regards to the measurement level of Likert scales, there 
are many studies that argue for the appropriateness and acceptability of parametric 
analysis techniques on Likert scales (Norman, 2010). 
In general, descriptive statistics demonstrate that the distributions of the scales are 
close to normal. Means for the scales range from 3.11 to 4.18 and standard deviations 
are between 0.19 and 0.55. Only two scales, namely, team resilience and affective well-
being, were found to be significantly, but moderately, positively skewed. Positive 
skewness might be attributable to response bias, particularly to social desirability, 
which means respondents’ tendency to choose socially desirable responses (Furnham, 
1986, p. 385). However, since this is not visible in other scales, one might conclude that 
it is not the case in this research.  Moreover, for the affective well-being scale only, 
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kurtosis is significant. Since no skewness value was outside the ±1 range (Antonius, 
2013, p. 106) and no kurtosis value was outside the ±2 range, (Youssef and Luthans, 
2007, p. 787), the scale are deemed to have a distribution close to normal. Thus, 
parametric analysis techniques were used to conduct the further data analysis. 
 
Construct Min Max Mean 
Std. 
 Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis N 
Team resilience 2.67 4.96 4.18 0.55 -0.80 0.10 68 
Collective Mindfulness 3.13 4.75 3.98 0.36 -0.05 -0.23 68 
Team Transactive 
Memory Systems 
3.30 4.64 4.01 0.33 -0.52 -0.42 68 
Collective 
Improvisation 
3.43 4.43 3.90 0.24 0.23 -0.52 47 
Team cohesion 3.48 4.56 4.08 0.28 -0.26 -0.80 47 
Team potency 3.11 4.58 3.94 0.36 -0.28 -0.28 67 
Team average 
individual resilience 
3.04 4.18 3.62 0.24 0.00 -0.16 68 
Affective well-being 2.33 4.39 3.66 0.37 -0.92 1.48 68 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics associated with the constructs 
 
5.4.2 Selection of control variables 
In this section, the control variables and their relationship with team resilience and 
team performance will be demonstrated. Control variables are the variables that are 
not the focus of investigation in a research, but which may affect the dependent 
variable(s) (Taylor, 2012). Thus, in order to be able to see the incremental effects of 
independent variables on the dependent variables in the presence of the control 
variables, control variable must be included in the analysis. In other words, if 
meaningful results are obtained in terms of the relationships between an independent 
and a dependent variable when control variables are also included, this indicates a 
direct relationship between dependent and independent variables.  
In my study, demographic variables (aggregated to the team level), team size, different 
runs of the simulation, and individual resilience are considered as the candidates for 
control variables. Demographic variables were introduced in section 5.4.1, however, in 
order for them to be considered in the analyses they need to be aggregated to the team 
level. Details of this aggregation are given in the current section. Following this, I 
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explain which of the candidate variables are considered as control variables along with 
the reasoning behind the selection.  
Any variable that changes from participant to participant and which may affect the 
dependent variables should be included in the analysis as a control variable. In this 
study, various items of information were recorded with regard to both individuals and 
teams; however, not all of this information is the focus of investigation. Some of this 
information was recorded to control for its possible effects on the dependent variables. 
The first set of such variables are demographic variables, which are detailed in section 
5.4.1. Since the main analysis is at the team level, these variables were aggregated to 
the team level in order to be included as control variables. Table 17 shows how these 




Team level aggregated version Mean Std. 
Dev 
N 
Nationality Number of different nationalities in the 
team  
5.91  68 
Gender Blau Index for gender diversity 0.37 0.15 68 
Assignment 
Grade 
Average grade of the team members 64.07  68 
Table 17. Aggregation of the demographic variables to the team level 
 
Moreover, there are three more variables that vary from one team to another. First, as 
mentioned previously, the data were collected over seven runs of the simulation at 
different times and venues and with different numbers of participants. Thus, the 
different atmospheres in different settings might have affected team resilience and 
performance in various ways. Second, sizes of the teams were also varied, between 6 
and 10. Teams in greater sizes had more manpower to benefit from, particularly 
important for production, however, it also meant that more coordination effort is 
required. Thus, team size might also have affected team resilience and team 
performance in either direction. Third, I anticipated that the resilience of individual 
within a team might be effective on the overall resilience of a team as well as on the 
operational performance, as suggested in the previous literature (Lengnick-Hall, Beck 
and Lengnick-Hall, 2011, p. 245; Duchek, 2014, p. 863). Hence, I also included team 
averages for individual resilience among the candidates of control variables. 
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Once I identified the possible candidates for the control variables, I examined their 
relationships to the dependent variables. Any variable that showed significant 
relationships with any of the dependent variables was included as that dependent 
variable’s control variable. According to my research model, there are two dependent 
variables in the main analyses: team resilience and profit/loss (as the team performance 
indicator). Both of these variables are scale level variables, which means all types of 
statistical analyses can be conducted with them. On the other hand, among the control 
variable candidates, number of nationalities, Blau Index for gender diversity, average 
grade, individual resilience and number of team members are ratio variables whereas the 
identity of a simulation is a nominal variable. Thus, ANOVA was conducted to analyse 
the relationship between simulation and dependent variables, whereas correlation 
analysis was conducted for other control variable candidates. Table 18 illustrates the 
results associated with these analyses. Only average grade and number of team 
members were significantly correlated with team resilience, so I included only these 
two variables as control variables in the main analysis. Moreover, the ANOVA analysis 
for the simulation variable demonstrated that neither team resilience, nor team 
performance varied significantly for different runs of the simulation. Thus, I did not 
include it among the control variables.  
 




 Co. Sig.  Co. Sig.  
Number of 
nationalities 
0.090 0.465 N 0.119 0.335 N 
Blau Index for 
gender diversity 
-0.09 0.465 N -0.021 0.862 N 
Average grade 0.377** 0.002 Y 0.433** <0.001 Y 
Number of team 
members 
0.278* 0.022 Y 0.271* 0.025 Y 
Individual 
Resilience 
0.203 0.096 N 0.062 0.615 N 
Simulation - 0.797 N - 0.337 N 
Table 18. Analysis results for the relationships between dependent variables and the candidates of 




5.5 Steps of the hypothesis testing 
Once I processed all the data into the SPSS database and cleaned and prepared the 
questionnaire data for the analysis, I initiated the hypothesis testing. I laid out the 
hypotheses I formulated in my study in section 4.6 along with the operationalized 
version of my research model. I tested these hypotheses using quantitative analysis 
techniques; and, in the current section, the results of these tests are presented along 
with their interpretation.  
5.5.1 Correlations 
In this section, one-to-one relationships between the main constructs of this research 
are illustrated, using correlation analysis. The section is divided into four parts in 
which analyses of different kinds of constructs are presented. In the first part, the 
relationships between various performance measures are shown, in order to elaborate 
on the various aspects of teams’ performance. In the second part, team resilience is also 
included in the analysis and its relationship with the different measures of performance 
is demonstrated. In the third part, the relationships between team resilience and the 
constructs that are proposed as its precursors (see section 4.4.1) are examined. These 
results played a crucial role in deciding which precursors to include in the overall 
testing of the research model. Finally, in the fourth part, the correlations between 
profit/loss and the precursor constructs are presented. This is important in order to 
detect possible direct effects of these constructs on performance.  
5.5.1.1 Correlations between various team performance measures  
There are various dimensions of a team’s overall performance. I identified four such 
dimensions, namely, quality, productivity, efficiency and strategy. Quality is about the 
ability to satisfy the product specifications; productivity is about the pace of completing 
the orders taken, efficiency is about the cost of production both in terms of use of 
materials and labour hours; lastly, strategy is about identifying the most suitable orders 
(in terms of profitability and compatibility to particular team dynamics) and the ways 
to secure these orders. These dimensions are most comprehensively integrated and 
reflected in profit/loss variable. Hence, I used profit/loss as the indicator of operational 
team performance in the complex analyses, namely regression and path analysis. In 
addition, in less complex analyses, namely correlations, I also used other four 




In Table 19, the performance indicators and corresponding performance dimension(s) 
are given. As seen, profit/loss gives indication of all four performance dimensions 
because; (1) teams need to be fast to deliver as much orders as possible to get paid 
more, (2) all the cards of a delivered order have to satisfy strict product specifications, 
(3) teams need to spend and waste as low as possible not to decrease their overall 
profit, and (4) they need to strategize for and secure high-value orders to increase 
profits. On the other hand, other performance indicators, namely, cards delivered per 
person (productivity), rejection percentage (quality), delivery percentage (efficiency) 
and average value per order (strategy) corresponds to specific dimensions. 
 
 
Productivity Quality Efficiency Strategy 
Profit/loss X X X X 
Cards delivered per person X  
  
Rejection percentage  X 
  
Delivery percentage   X 
 
Average value per order   
 
X 
Table 19. Performance dimensions and corresponding variables 
 
As a result of covering different performance dimensions in different ways and at 
different levels, not all performance indicators are expected to correlate strongly. In 
fact, I anticipated that some of them might not correlate at all. This may also imply 
different dimensions of performance has different relationships with resilience. Table 
20 illustrates the results of the correlation analysis between these variables. As 
expected, profit/loss has meaningful correlations with all the other performance 
indicators, significant at least at the 0.01 level. 
 
 Variable  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Profit/Loss -     
2 Cards delivered per person 0.42** -    
3 Rejection percentage  -0.62** -0.19 -   
4 Average value per order 0.49** 0.29* -0.13 -  
5 Delivery percentage 0.57** 0.31* -0.30* 0.21 - 
Table 20. Correlations between various performance measures 





As expected, there are mostly weak and non-significant relationships between the 
different performance dimensions. For instance, for the relationship between cards 
delivered per person and rejection percentage, the value of r is -0.19 with no significance 
even at the 0.05 level, as the former is about productivity and the latter is about quality. 
With the similar logic, rejection percentage is also not significantly correlated with 
average value per order; average value per order is not significantly correlated with 
delivery percentage; and, cards delivered per person is only weak to moderately 
correlated with average value per order, only at the 0.05 level.  
This analysis demonstrates that in this research, as possibly is the case for other 
performance related settings, performance has different aspects and associated with 
various different decisions and actions. Therefore, various constructs investigated in 
this research, particularly team resilience, might be related to these different aspects of 
performance differently; or might be related to some aspects and not the others. The 
following parts of this section provide insights regarding these propositions. 
5.5.1.2 Correlations between team resilience and various team performance measures 
Using the team resilience construct from the post-trading questionnaire, I conducted a 
second set of correlation analyses in order to examine the one-to-one relationships 
between team resilience and various indicators of team performance. As mentioned 
above, these indicators correspond to one or more dimensions of performance. 
Therefore, different strength and significance levels of correlations demonstrate how 
resilience is related with each of these dimensions, which explained and illustrated in 
the previous section. Table 21 summarizes the statistics associated with the 
correlations between team resilience and various performance measures.  
 







Cards delivered per person Productivity 0.251 0.039 68 
Rejection percentage Quality -0.764 <0.001 68 
Delivery percentage Efficiency 0.399 0.001 65 





0.625 <0.001 68 




According to the results of the analyses, team resilience has the most strong and 
meaningful correlation with rejection percentage; hence with the quality dimension of 
performance. This relationship is negative; and this was expected as (1) the teams that 
cannot address and overcome the challenges of the operational environment are 
expected to experience detriments in operational performance and (2) the experience 
of rejections may increase the stress levels within the team and hence decrease the 
efficiency of challenge-response processes. During the trading period, when teams 
experienced challenges and these challenges interfere with the operations, it is mostly 
reflected on the quality decreases in the products. While trying to meet the deadline of 
an order and simultaneously responding to challenges, the concentration on satisfying 
quality criteria deteriorates and hence rejections increase. 
Results demonstrate that quality decreases are followed by the decreases in efficiency 
and productivity. When teams start to make more mistakes because of the challenges, 
their wastage rate increases, which lowers efficiency, and they also slow down to avoid 
mistakes, which decreases productivity levels. Strategy might also be slightly affected, 
as increased rejections and decreased productivity may turn teams towards easier and 
low profit orders (i.e. open orders or orders with fewer cards and/or longer lead 
times), at least in the short-run. However, this is not supported by the evidence: Team 
resilience has a weak and non-significant correlation with average value per order, the 
variable that reflects the strategy dimension of performance. 
5.5.1.3 Correlations between team resilience and the precursor constructs 
Following an initial analysis of the relationship between resilience and performance, I 
conducted an initial analysis of the relationship between resilience and it proposed 
antecedents. My main purpose in conducting this analysis was to identify the precursor 
variables to be used in the regression analysis, in order to reveal any incremental 
effects of these constructs on resilience. The precursors which have meaningful 
relationships with resilience were considered in the next stages of hypothesis testing 
and entered into the regression models. In the current section, I also examine the 
correlations between the precursors in order to check for multicollinearity. Table 22 
demonstrates the correlations between team resilience and precursor constructs. All 
the correlations were run for 68 teams except those of team cohesion and collective 
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improvisation as the data for these two variables were collected only in simulations 3-7. 
Hence, data only exist for 47 teams.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Team resilience -      
2 Collective mindfulness 0.79** -     
3 Team transactive memory 
systems 
0.86** 0.80** -    
4 Team cohesion 0.73** 0.67** 0.70** -   
5 Collective improvisation 0.64** 0.50** 0.61** 0.53** -  
6 Team Potency 0.13 0.25* 0.11 0.34* 0.12 - 
Table 22. Correlations between team resilience and the precursor constructs 
*significant at 0.05 level, **significant at 0.01 level 
 
According to the results, team resilience is very strongly correlated with team 
transactive memory systems; and strongly correlated with collective mindfulness, team 
cohesion and collective improvisation. All these correlations are significant at the 0.01 
level. On the other hand, team resilience is not found to be significantly correlated with 
team potency. In accordance with this, I included transactive memory systems, collective 
mindfulness, team cohesion and collective improvisation in the regression analysis and 
excluded team potency in the following steps. Among the precursors, the ones showing 
a strong association with resilience, namely, transactive memory systems, collective 
mindfulness, team cohesion and collective improvisation, are also strongly and 
significantly correlated with each other. Since these are the variables considered for the 
regression analysis, it is necessary to check the possibility of multicollinearity. In 
accordance with the rule of thumb (Kahane, 2014), between transactive memory 
systems and collective mindfulness, there is a possibility of ‘close to perfect’ linear 
relationship. Thus, in the regression analysis, multicollinearity statistics must be 
calculated and treatments applied if needed. 
5.5.1.4 Correlations between team performance and the precursor constructs 
I ran a final set of correlation analyses in order to investigate the relationships between 
performance and various precursor constructs. As in the previous analysis including 
performance, all five performance variables were included to reflect different 
performance dimensions: profit/loss, as the overall indicator of team performance; and 
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four other variables, each reflecting the different dimensions of performance. All 
precursor constructs were included in the analyses. Table 23 summarizes the results.  
These tests yielded parallel results to those in the previous section which is to be 
expected as we have already seen that team performance is related to team resilience. 
Four precursors strongly associated with resilience, namely collective mindfulness, team 
transactive memory systems, team cohesion and collective improvisation, were also 
found to be positively associated with profit/loss. The strength of the relationships is 
strong for the former two, and moderate for the latter two. Performance is not 
significantly correlated with team potency. Furthermore, precursors showed various 
levels of relationships with the dimensions of performance. Quality (represented by 
rejection percentage) is strongly and meaningfully correlated with collective 
mindfulness, transactive memory systems, team cohesion and collective improvisation. 
Quality (represented by rejection percentage) requires common group understanding 
with regards to the product specifications; and the application of this understanding 
requires proper coordination along with novel adaptations when existing action 
repertoire is ineffective. Hence, these results are expected.  
 











  Quality Productivity Efficiency Strategy 
 r N r N r N r N r N 
Collective 
mindfulness 





0.63** 68 -0.75** 68 0.18 68 0.29* 65 0.27* 68 
Team 
cohesion 
0.33* 47 -0.53** 47 0.32* 47 0.11 44 0.09 47 
Collective 
improvisation 
0.37** 47 -0.49** 47 0.15 47 0.10 44 0.08 47 
Team Potency 0.10 67 0.05 67 0.33** 67 0.11 64 0.20 67 
Table 23. Correlations between performance and precursor variables 
*significant at 0.05 level, **significant at 0.01 level 
 
Moreover, collective mindfulness and team transactive memory systems were also found 
to be associated with average value per order, which represents strategy and delivery 
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percentage, which represents efficiency. This was also expected as these aspects of the 
performance require effective application of collective cognitive capacities. Collective 
evaluation of alternative models, for instance, may facilitate the formation of effective 
strategies. Moreover, effective specialization of individuals on various required tasks of 
the operations; and accomplishment of these tasks in a coordinated manner may 
provide for efficiency. Furthermore, team cohesion was found to be moderately 
correlated with cards delivered per person, which represents productivity dimension of 
performance. Productivity is more about maintaining production rather than applying 
collective cognitive skills and maintaining production might require providing for 
harmony in action. Thus, the interpretation of this result might be that well “aligned 
thoughts and behaviours” (Morgan, Fletcher and Sarkar, 2015, p. 98) of the team 
members speed up the production process.  
 
5.5.2 Regressions 
I used the regression technique to analyse the individual paths of my operationalized 
research model, as an intermediary step before testing the overall model. The analyses 
were conducted to investigate the effects of various independent variables on team 
resilience and team performance. Hence, in the first part of this section, I conducted two 
regression analyses, where team resilience was the dependent variable which was 
entered into the analysis along with the previously identified control variables and 
precursor constructs as independent variables. Following that, in the next phase, I 
conducted another regression analysis with team performance being the dependent 
variable and team resilience being the independent variable along with control 
variables identified in section 5.4.2. All regression analyses were conducted using the 
hierarchical analysis method in which independent variables are entered according to 
an order decided by the researcher (Vogt, 2011a, p. 143). In all analyses, control 
variables are first introduced and then, independent variables added.  
5.5.2.1 Precursors of team resilience 
In order to test the hypotheses with regards to the relationship between quantitatively 
operationalized precursors and team resilience (namely the hypotheses 1-4), I ran two 
regression analyses, treating team resilience as the dependent variable and the 
proposed precursors as the independent variables. In the first analysis, I used a 
hierarchical analysis method to determine the effects of collective mindfulness, 
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transactive memory systems, team cohesion and collective improvisation along with the 
control variables proposed, namely, average grade and number of team members. In the 
first order, only control variables were entered into the analysis, and then, in the 
second order, all precursor variables were included in the model. Table 24 summarizes 
the results of this analysis.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Standardized coefficient 
(significance level) 
Intercept - (0.28) -(0.00) 
Independent variables 




Collective improvisation - 0.13(0.14) 
Team cohesion - 0.15(0.16) 
Control variables 
Average grade 0.46(0.00) 0.05(0.54) 
Number of team members 0.28(0.04) 0.05(0.48) 
R2 0.27 0.81 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.79 
F 8.290 29.020 
Sig. 0.001 <0.001 
Table 24. Regression analysis: Team resilience as the dependent variable, n=47 
 
For the regression analysis summarized in Table 24, I conducted all the tests to check 
for any violation of the regression assumptions. Firstly, for all the independent and 
control variables, I ran simple regressions where team resilience was treated as the 
dependent variable. For all these simple regressions, I conducted lack-of-fit tests and 
none were significant, indicating that the proposed relationships are not significantly 
non-linear. Then, I ran tests and graphs for the residuals. The scatterplot of predicted 
values of dependent variable against the standardized residuals shows that the 
variation of residuals is close to constant and without any clear pattern (Figure 10). 
Thus, the model is homoscedastic. Moreover, I calculated statistics for Shapiro–Wilk 
(α=0.79), Kolmogorov–Smirnov (α=0.20) and Durbin-Watson (test stat = 2.49) tests 
and the statistics suggest that the residuals are independent and normally distributed. 
Following this, I calculated Cook’s distance values and observed that none of them are 
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big enough to be considered as extreme cases (max = 0.18). Lastly, I also calculated VIF 
values and observed that none of them were above 10 (max = 3.55), which 
demonstrates that multicollinearity is not an issue for the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 10. Scatterplot of predicted values of dependent variable against the standardized residuals 
 
Since all the regression assumptions are met with this analysis, I decided that I could 
confidently make inferences from the regression statistics. Firstly, with only control 
variables in the analysis (Model 1), the base adjusted R2 is 0.24 and base F is 8.290. In 
this model, the coefficients for both control variables, namely average grade and 
number of team members are significant with standardized Betas of 0.46 and 0.28 
respectively. Following Model 1, in Model 2 all the proposed independent variables 
(team capabilities and characteristics) were included in the analysis. This yielded a 
higher adjusted R2 (0.79) and an F-value of 29.020. In this model, the effects of all the 
control variables were non-significant. Among the independent variables, collective 
improvisation and team cohesion was non-significant. The other precursor variables, 
namely collective mindfulness and transactive memory systems were significant at the 
0.05 level. In general, both models were significant, and Model 2 had a significant 
intercept. Only 47 teams were included in the analysis, since the data for team cohesion 
and collective mindfulness were only collected in simulations 3-7.  
In the first regression analysis, collective mindfulness and transactive memory systems 
appeared to be the most effective precursors of team resilience. Since this analysis was 
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based on only 47 teams, I decided to run a second regression analysis using all 68 
teams, since data for these two precursors were collected for all teams. In this second 
analysis, all the control variables suggested beforehand were used. Two models were 
analysed using hierarchical regression analysis. Like the previous regression analysis, 
in the first model, only control variables were included in the analysis. In the second 
model, both precursor variables were introduced along with the controls. This analysis 
is summarised in Table 25.   
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Standardized coefficient 
(significance level) 
Intercept - (0.42) - (0.00) 
Independent variables 
Collective Mindfulness - 0.24 (0.02) 
Transactive memory 
systems 
- 0.62 (0.00) 
Control variables 
Average grade 0.36 (0.00) 0.08 (0.20) 
Number of team members 0.26 (0.02) 0.10 (0.10) 
R2 0.21 0.78 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.77 
F 8.486 57.177 
Sig. 0.001 <0.001 
Table 25. Regression analysis: Team resilience as the dependent variable, n=68 
 
For this second analysis, too, all the assumptions of linear regression analysis were met. 
First of all, as mentioned above, for all the independent and control variables, lack-of-fit 
tests were non-significant, which means that the relationship of all these variables with 
team resilience may be accepted as linear. Secondly, I conducted analyses to confirm 
that the regression residuals were homoscedastic, independent and normally 
distributed. Standardized residuals were plotted against team resilience (Figure 11), 
and I observed no obvious pattern and only one data point outside the ±2 range, hence 
I concluded that the data were homoscedastic. Moreover, I calculated Durbin-Watson 
(test stat = 2.63) test for the regression analysis and Shapiro–Wilk (α=0.93) and 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (α=0.20) tests for the saved residuals; and the results 
demonstrated that the residuals are independent (no autocorrelation was observed 
among them) and normally distributed. Thirdly, there were no Cook’s distance value 
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over 0.5 (max=0.12), hence, no case was considered as extreme. Finally, no VIF value 




Figure 11. Scatterplot of predicted values of dependent variable against the standardized residuals 
 
Considering the analysis results, overall, both models were significant and had 
significant intercepts. In Model 1, where only control variables were included, the 
adjusted R2 was 0.18 and the base F was 8.486. Similar to the results with n=47, the 
effects of both variables were significant, though the significance levels were higher. 
However, again similar to the results with n=47, these significant relationships were 
found to be spurious and disappeared when transactive memory systems and collective 
mindfulness were introduced in Model 2. In Model 2, adjusted R2 increased to 0.77 and 
F increased to 57.177. The effects of all the control variables became non-significant. 
When n=68, the standardized beta (0.24) of collective mindfulness decreased slightly 
although its significance level (0.02) improved; and conversely, the standardized beta 
(0.62) of transactive memory systems increased and its significance level (0.00) 
remained the same. This analysis confirmed that the results when n=47 were robust 
and did not change majorly when the number of cases were increased to 68.   
After confirming hypotheses with the correlation analyses, with the regression analysis, 
I wanted to achieve two goals: first to understand the cumulative explanatory power of 
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all the proposed precursors for team resilience; and second, to validate that the 
relationships confirmed by the correlational analyses were not spurious and did not 
disappear when tested along with the other relationships. Regarding the first goal, all 
models are significant at the 0.01 level (and even at the 0.001 level) and when 
proposed precursors are included in the Model, the adjusted R2 is adequately high 
(>0.75). In terms of the incremental effects, each independent variable shows different 
significance and different standardized power in relation to team resilience. To begin 
with, when the proposed precursors are included in the models, the standardized 
effects of control variables decrease. This powerfully signals the superficiality of the 
effects of the control variables. Moreover, among the four proposed precursors, 
collective mindfulness and transactive memory systems are found to be significantly 
related to team resilience at the 0.05 level. On the other hand, the incremental effects of 
collective improvisation and team cohesion were not significant. Hence, these analyses 
served as further validation of the hypotheses 1 and 2; whereas there was not enough 
evidence to support hypothesis 3 and 4. 
5.5.2.2 Team resilience and team performance 
Following the analyses to identify the precursors of team resilience, I tested hypothesis 
6, which proposes that ‘resilience is positively related to operational performance’. 
Although this hypothesis has initially been confirmed in section 5.5.1.2, and at an initial 
glance it may appear that a simple regression analysis is sufficient to test it, the analysis 
in section 5.4.2 demonstrated that there are other variables (control variables) that are 
associated with team performance, and hence, they should also be included in the 
analysis. As a result of the previous analyses, I identified these control variables as 
average grade and number of team members. Moreover, I included the team resilience 
construct, data for which were collected via post-trading questionnaire, as the 
independent variable. Finally, as explained in section 5.5.1.1, I identified profit/loss as 
the ultimate indicator of team performance because it reflects multiple performance 
dimensions, and hence, I selected it as the primary dependent variable in this 
regression analysis. The results of the analysis were presented in Table 26. 
As in the previous section, I conducted a prior step of interpreting the regression 
analysis to confirm that all the assumptions were met. Thus, initially, I put each 
independent variable individually into the regression analysis with using profit/loss as 
the dependent variable and ran lack-of-fit tests to see whether the relationships were 
linear. Except for number of team members variable, all the tests results were non-
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significant, suggesting that the relationships are close to a linear format. As number of 
team members has limited different values (6, 7, 8, 9 or 10), this result was partially 
expected. This variable was subsequently omitted as regression analysis results 
demonstrated that its effect was relatively low and non-significant. Following this, I 
conducted analyses to test the homoscedasticity, independence and normality of 
regression residuals. Figure 12 demonstrates that there is no obvious pattern among 
standardized residual data points along the different values of profit/loss variable, and 
only a few data points are outside the ±2 range, hence, the data are accepted as 
homoscedastic. The statistic for the Durbin-Watson test was 2.24 which means that the 
residuals are independent and both Shapiro–Wilk (α=0.25) and Kolmogorov–Smirnov 
(α=0.20) tests results were non-significant which means that the residuals are 
distributed normally. Following this, the largest Cook’s distance value was 0.42, which 
means that there were no extreme values that individually affected the results of the 
regression analysis. Finally, the biggest VIF value was 1.168, meaning that 
multicollinearity does not exist in the analysis.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Standardized coefficient 
(significance level) 
Intercept - (0.00) - (0.00) 
Independent variables 
Team resilience - 0.50 (0.00) 
Control variables 
Average grade 0.42 (0.00) 0.24 (0.02) 
Number of team members 0.24 (0.03) 0.12 (0.24) 
R2 0.25 0.45 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.42 
F 10.642 17.301 
Sig.  <0.001 <0.001 
Table 26. Regression analysis: Profit/Loss as the dependent variable, n=68 
 
Examining the regression results, one may conclude that the overall model is 
meaningful with a significance level lower than 0.001. The base adjusted R2 level is 0.22 
and the base F level is 10.642, where only control variables are included in the model. 
When team resilience is introduced to the model, the adjusted R2 level increases to 0.42 
and the F-value increases to 17.301. In addition, all the standardized betas and 
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significance levels for the control variables decreases, which suggest that inclusion of 
team resilience removes the spurious effects. However, average grade is still influential 
even after the inclusion of team resilience. The standardized beta for team resilience is 
0.50 and the significance level is lower than 0.001. When team resilience is included in 
the model, the explanatory power of the model increases significantly, marked by a 
0.20 increase in adjusted R2. It may be argued that an R2 level of 0.42 is rather low, 
however, this study does not try to reveal all the precursors of team performance, but 




Figure 12. Scatterplot of predicted values of dependent variable against the standardized residuals 
 
This result was expected as explained in detail in section 2.5.2 of the literature review 
and in section 3.5.4 of the exploratory study. Various scholars have conceptualized 
performance as a natural outcome of resilience when faced with challenges (Pulley, 
1997; e.g. Reason, 2000; Sheffi, 2005). Moreover, several other researchers have 
explicitly stated that resilience leads to better performances (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; 
e.g. Lengnick-Hall, Beck and Lengnick-Hall, 2011; Maynard and Kennedy, 2016). Lastly, 
quite a few empirical studies of resilience investigated the effects of demonstrating a 
resilience capacity in the form of maintained and/or increased performance levels (e.g. 
Gittell et al., 2006; Furniss et al., 2011; Gomes et al., 2014; Meneghel, Salanova and 
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Martínez, 2014). Adding onto the previous studies, my analyses in the exploratory 
study also suggest a meaningful relationship between resilience and performance.  
 
5.5.3 Path Analysis 
Following the regression analyses, the final step in the hypothesis testing, and also in 
the quantitative analysis, was to test the overall model suggested in section 4.6 by the 
research model and by hypothesis 7. This was done by combining the regression 
models proposed in section 5.5.2 and conducting a path analysis. Since SPSS Software 
does not have the path analysis feature, I used AMOS 23 to conduct this analysis. In this 
section, the results of this analysis are presented.  
I used Path Analysis for two purposes: first to determine whether the model proposed 
to explain the overall relationship between certain team dynamics, team resilience and 
team performance is meaningful; and second, to understand the power and the 
direction of these relationships. Path analysis particularly allowed me in 
simultaneously testing the relationships I proposed and in demonstrating the relative 
importance of these relationships. The model fit indicators showed a complex story in 
terms of the overall fit of the proposed model. Therefore, further path analyses were 
conducted to test simpler models, particularly to demonstrate that the nature of the 
relationships in the complex model are very similarly manifested in the simpler 
alternatives. However, with the quantitative analysis, I could only test my research 
model partially as I could not collect quantitative data for all the concepts in the model. 
To investigate the relationships of the model that I could not test quantitatively, I 
utilized the qualitative data and include their interpretation in the Discussion chapter. 
Main Research Models: 
Combining the models of the regression analyses (section 5.5.2) forms the model in 
Figure 13 (number of members variable is excluded because of not having any 
significant relationship with team resilience or profit/loss; and the relationship between 
team resilience and average grade is also omitted because of being non-significant). 
However, based on the studies suggesting possible direct relationships between team 
dynamics and team performance (for e.g. Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; Vessey and 
Landon, 2017), and in accordance with the results of section 5.5.1.4, which 
demonstrate significant correlations between precursor variables and team 
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performance, I also formed an alternative model, proposing additional direct 
relationships between team dynamics and team performance (Figure 14).   
Considering the assumptions of Path Analysis, as demonstrated in the regression 
analyses the relationships between the variables are not significantly different from a 
linear form. In all alternative models, causal relationships point to single dimensions, 
hence, all are recursive models. Lastly, I applied the formula suggested by Foster et al. 
(2011b) for adequacy of sample and accordingly, sample size is found to be adequate.  
 
Figure 13. Path diagram for the overall model (covariances were not shown for simplicity), Model-1 n=47 
 
Figure 14. Path diagram for the overall model (covariances were not shown for simplicity) – Model-2, n=47 
The overall model fit indices for the main research models yielded acceptable results. 
For both models, model chi-square is non-significant. The parsimony corrected fit 
(RMSEA) is above 0.05 for both models; however, PCLOSE values are also above 0.05 
(non-significant) which means that RMSEA is not significantly different that 0.05. 
Hence, one may say that parsimony corrected fit is also at an acceptable level. The 
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absolute model fit is also at the acceptable level (with CMIN/DF below the threshold) 
for both models and the incremental fit indices yield satisfactory results.  
Considering the estimates of Model 1, R2 values for the dependent variables are very 
close to those found in the regression analyses; 0.81 and 0.43 respectively for team 
resilience and profit/loss. Except team cohesion, all the coefficients for the proposed 
precursors of team resilience are significant at the 0.05, with transactive memory 
systems having the biggest standardized effect. Moreover, team resilience is found to be 
significantly related to profit/loss and average grade is also found to significantly 
influence profit/loss. Overall, Model 1 validates the findings from the regression 
analyses.  
 
 Main Models 
Model 1 Model 2 
Standardized coefficient (significance level) 
Precursor variables for team resilience 
Collective Mindfulness 0.22 (0.03) 0.23 (0.02) 
Transactive memory systems 0.47 (0.00) 0.46 (0.00) 
Collective Improvisation 0.17 (0.03) 0.17 (0.03) 
Team cohesion 0.17 (0.09) 0.16 (0.09) 
R2 for team resilience 0.81 0.81 
Precursor variables for profit/loss 
Team Resilience 0.54 (0.00) 0.45 (0.03) 
Collective Mindfulness - -0.02 (0.88) 
Transactive memory systems - 0.47 (0.02) 
Collective Improvisation - -0.09 (0.52) 
Team cohesion - -0.31 (0.05) 
Control variables for profit/loss 
Average grade 0.23 (0.02) 0.21 (0.03) 
R2 for profit/loss 0.43 0.51 
Overall Model fit statistics 
CMIN/DF 1.879 1.390 
NFI 0.967 0.995 
CFI 0.905 0.999 
RMSEA 0.115 0.076 
PCLOSE 0.153 0.277 




In Model-2, the R2 for profit/loss has risen to 0.51 which is to be expected as four more 
independent variables were added to the analysis. Apart from these four new 
independent variables to explain performance, everything looks similar for these two 
models. Thus, better model fit may be attributable to adding direct explanatory links 
from precursors to profit/loss. When these direct links added, the standardized effect 
and the significance of team resilience on profit/loss decreased slightly but the effect is 
still significant and substantial. On the other hand, the standardized direct effects of the 
precursors suggest for meaningful direct relationship between operational 
performance and certain resilience precursors, namely, transactive memory systems 
and team cohesion. Hence, according to the results, resilience fully mediates the 
relationships between performance and collective mindfulness and performance and 
collective improvisation; it partially mediates the relationship between performance 
and transactive memory systems; and it does not mediate the relationship between 
performance and team cohesion.  
Simplified Model: 
Although the main models, particularly Model 1, validated the findings from the 
previous analyses and completed the hypothesis-testing, as mentioned before, there 
are several missing values for collective improvisation and team cohesion constructs, as 
they were not measured in the first two runs of the simulation. Hence, I examined an 
alternative simplified model where these two variables were omitted; to validate that 
the remaining results are robust; and valid when sample size is bigger (i.e. n=68). With 
this purpose, I proposed the model represented in Figure 15. Results from the 
simplified models are shown in Table 28.   
 




As seen from Table 28, in general, model fit indices yielded satisfactory results. The 
model chi-square is non-significant and absolute fit is obtained with CMIN/DF value 
below the threshold of 5. Moreover, both incremental indices NFI and CFI yielded very 
high values as they did with the complicated models. Lastly, parsimony corrected fit 
index RMSEA is above 0.05, however, PCLOSE values is also above 0.05 (non-
significant) which means that RMSEA is not significantly different that 0.05. Hence, 
parsimony corrected fit is also found to be at an acceptable level. Provided model fit is 
acceptable, I examined estimates of the model. According to the results, the effects of 
collective mindfulness and transactive memory systems on team resilience are still 
significant when all participating teams are included in the analysis; and the effects of 
team resilience and control variable average grade on profit/loss are also still 
significant. 
 
 Simplified Model 
Standardized coefficient 
(significance level) 
Precursor variables for team resilience 




R2 for team resilience 0.77 
Precursor variables for profit/loss 
Team Resilience 0.54 (0.00) 
Control variables for profit/loss 
Average grade 0.23 (0.02) 
R2 for profit/loss 0.43 






Table 28. Path analysis results for the simplified models, n=68 
 
Among all three alternative models, model fit indices yielded satisfactory results, in 
general. Moreover, on team resilience, the effects of collective mindfulness, transactive 
memory systems and collective improvisation are significant at the 0.05 level and the 
effect of team cohesion is significant at the 0.1 level. Furthermore, the effect of team 
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resilience on profit/loss is significant in all the models proposed. All these results 
validate that these relationships are robust and also observable when there are no 
missing values. 
Hypothesis 7 guided the analyses conducted in this section. In accordance with this 
hypothesis, team resilience is treated as a mediator between certain team dynamics and 
operational performance of the team. This hypothesis was tested conducting path 
analysis using the operationalized research model. As for the two main model 
alternatives, the one with the direct links from the precursors to team performance was 
found to be a more meaningful model with better overall acceptability statistics. This 
suggests that the precursors, particularly transactive memory systems and team 
cohesion, whose direct effects were significant, might also be directly affecting 
performance as well as effecting it through team resilience.  
In all three models tested, collective mindfulness and transactive memory systems are 
found to be associated to team resilience; and team resilience found to be associated to 
profit/loss. When involved in the model, collective improvisation is found to be 
significantly effective on team resilience; and this result contradicted to the regression 
analysis results while confirming the correlations analysis results. Regarding the 
relationship between team resilience and team cohesion; path analysis confirmed 
regressions results and suggested non-significant effects at the 0.05 level (p-value is 
0.09). As mentioned above, when direct contributions from precursors are tested in 
explaining profit/loss, only contributions of transactive memory systems and team 
cohesion are found to be significant. Finally, R2 for team resilience changes between 
0.77-0.81; it is affected slightly by the exclusion of collective improvisation and team 
cohesion from the model. R2 for profit/loss, on the other hand, changes between 0.43-
0.51; it is it is affected moderately by the exclusion of the direct effects of team 
dynamics.  
Interpreting the results with regard to hypothesis 7: team resilience partially mediated 
the relationship between collective mental models and operational performance; fully 
mediated the relationship between collective improvisation and operational 
performance; and does not significantly mediate the relationship between team 
cohesion and operational performance. Overall, hypothesis 7 is partially confirmed with 






The purpose of this chapter has been to present the findings from quantitative analyses 
described and explained in the Methodology chapter. Using various quantitative 
analysis techniques, I tested the relationship between resilience, its antecedents and its 
outcomes as proposed in my research model and in line with the hypotheses I 
formulated. As a result of these analyses, team resilience is found to be strongly related 
with collective mental models. Moreover, there is evidence for the positive relationship 
between team resilience and collective improvisation and between team resilience and 
team cohesion, although some of the complex analyses suggested these relationships 
might be non-significant. Lastly, according to the quantitative analyses, the hypothesis 
with regard to the relationship between team resilience and team potency were not 
supported. Nonetheless, qualitative data provided additional insight with regard to all 
these relationships.  
Following the quantitative findings chapter, in the qualitative findings chapter, the 
model is further explored with the utilization of qualitative findings. These qualitative 
findings are in the form of anecdotes, either observed by the researchers of the parent 
project (including myself) or told by the participants, and they demonstrate the 
manifestation of the relationships proposed in the methodology. In addition to 
supporting the finding from the quantitative analysis, I also used these qualitative data 
to explore the parts of my research model that I could not test with the quantitative 
data; and to discover new relationships that I did not include in the initial model.   
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6 Results 2: Qualitative Findings 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present and interpret my findings from the qualitative data. I utilize 
qualitative data with three purposes. First, I validate and elaborate the quantitative 
findings. With the help of qualitative data, I illustrate the relationships validated with 
the quantitative data and offer explanations for the relationships that were not 
validated. These illustrations and explanations help to understand the mechanisms that 
may underpin and explain these relationships. I provide illustrations and explanations 
that elaborate on the quantitative findings in chapter 6.2. Second, I seek evidence from 
the qualitative data for the relationships of my framework that I could not test with 
quantitative data. Because of the trade-offs made in the selection of quantitative data 
tools, I could not collect quantitative data on certain attributes in my framework. I 
therefore utilize anecdotal data from direct observations and participant reflections to 
investigate these relationships. Section 6.3 articulates the results of this work. Thirdly, 
qualitative data were also useful in my study in terms of revealing mechanisms that 
were not included in my research model but which emerged in the course of the 
research as apparently significant for resilience and performance. I provide discussion 
with regard to these relationships in section 6.4. The events which I refer to during the 
qualitative investigation were either directly observed by myself (or by other 
researchers), recorded by on video, or revealed by the teams during the strategic 
review meetings or post-trading presentations. 
 
6.2 Further validation of the quantitative findings  
In this section I will elaborate on the key findings from the quantitative analysis, using 
the qualitative data. The main purpose of this elaboration is to explore the mechanisms 
of the relationships revealed by the quantitative analysis and to illustrate and provide 
examples of specific activities and processes within the teams.   
6.2.1 Team resilience and collective dynamics 
The first five hypotheses that guided the quantitative analysis were related to the 
relationship between team resilience and certain collective dynamics. Correlational 
results provided initial support for hypotheses 1-4, based on precursors identified in 
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the literature review and exploratory study. Thus, strong and positive relationships 
were expected between resilience and: collective mindfulness as proposed by Maynard 
and Kennedy (2016) and demonstrated by Weick (1993); team transactive memory 
systems as proposed by Bowers et al. (2017); team cohesion as demonstrated by 
Morgan et al. (2015) and Vera et al. (2017); and collective improvisation as proposed by 
Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) and Boin and McConnell (2007) and demonstrated by Weick 
(1993) and Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003b).  
Regression analysis further supported hypotheses 1 and 2, providing strong support 
for the relationship between resilience and collective mental models. Both collective 
mindfulness and transactive memory systems measures were used to explore this 
relationship; and both provided support. Qualitative data reinforced this. I observed 
that several teams detected problems by establishing a shared and constantly updated 
cognitive map of the operational environment. They also formulated solutions to the 
challenges that they faced using information stored in this collective map. For example, 
when reflecting on their experience after the trading period, Team-11 stated that when 
they faced problems, they collectively discussed how to approach to solve them in 
order to utilize the skills and knowledge of each member, and they made sure that each 
member had the same understanding with regard to the operational conditions. Team-
11 added that they generated this collective capacity by constantly interacting among 
each other; by establishing a common vocabulary; and by gathering information from 
the operational environment.  
In another example, Team-2 revealed that they initial planned to try to complete 22 
orders (the average number of successful orders is 10 and average number of delivered 
orders is 13). However, they later reduced this number to a more reasonable target by 
updating their collective mental model of what was possible by practicing rigorously 
and by collecting feedback from the controllers. This prevented them from putting 
extra stress on themselves by trying to achieve a nearly impossible goal.  
On the other hand, the results of the regression analysis were unexpected with regard 
to the rejection of hypotheses 3 and 4. In the literature, team cohesion is related to 
resilience (West, Patera and Carsten, 2009, p. 259). Moreover, analysis of the 
exploratory study also indicated the importance of being unified and working 
collectively and harmoniously in accomplishing mutual goals and addressing 
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challenges. Hence, I expected team cohesion to be significantly related to team 
resilience.  
The qualitative data also support the existence of this relationship. Many resilient 
teams mentioned the importance of “mutual objectives” (Team-3), “mutual 
understanding” (Team-1), “mutual purpose” (Team-4), “strong team identity” (Team-7, 
Team-16 and Team-5), and “collective identity” (Team-11) to addressing and 
overcoming problems. They particularly drew attention to how this sense of unity 
prevented the possibility of social loafing and made each and every member feel 
responsible for their collective actions. They also mentioned that unity facilitated the 
establishment of shared mental models and decreased the possibility 
misunderstandings that might lead to harmful conflicts. To further improve this unity, 
several teams created mottos and even ordered and wore custom-printed team T-shirts 
on trading day. 
In contrast, there were teams that could not address challenges efficiently because they 
could not work cohesively as a team. For example, Team-67 accounted for their 
avoidance from the possibility of conflicts and admitted that this created “silos”. In the 
preparation phase, the team split into sub-units and practiced separately with very 
weak communication in-between sub-units. The lack of necessary interaction 
continued during the trading period and because of this, they were not able to 
coordinate individual efforts while trying to respond to challenges.  
Moreover, some teams experienced harmful conflicts because of their inability to 
establish strong team unity. For example, in Team-59, some members wanted to start 
the trading period with easier orders to ease the initial adjustment whereas others 
wanted to start right away with the most profitable orders. This caused some team 
members to interfere with the tasks of the order-taker and in turn harmful conflicts 
arose among the team members. This led to a general demotivation within the team 
and slower response to other challenges that they faced because of the attention paid to 
the conflicts. These examples advised for a positive relationship between team cohesion 
and team performance, which is also the result of the quantitative analysis. However, 
this result is not found to be statistically significant. 
Furthermore, improvisation has been proposed (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008) and found (Weick, 1993; Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003b; 
Boin and McConnell, 2007; West, Patera and Carsten, 2009) to be one of the key 
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facilitators of resilience. It also correlates with team resilience using bivariate 
correlation analysis. Therefore, the finding with regard to the superficiality of the effect 
of improvisation on resilience is also rather surprising.  
The qualitative data provides a few idiosyncratic examples of times when teams were 
effectively able to improvise in response to a challenge. For instance, Team-6 took a 12-
card order from the order board and realized that they only had 8 sheets left of that 
colour. They did not have time to buy sheets (as there was a 10-minute lead time for 
material orders). They then did something that they had not planned: they reached out 
to the other teams to try to buy sheets from them, which, indeed, they succeeded in 
doing. They in fact bought sheets from a team for a price that was much cheaper than 
the controllers offered. They were able to finish the order by the deadline to the 
required quality standards. In another example, Team-10 had an order rejected early in 
the trading period. They quickly re-arranged their production organization, adding 
another quality control point to the card production process, a control point on which 
they had not originally planned. They went on to be the only team that made a profit in 
that simulation.  
Nonetheless, there are not many examples of teams being resilient and/or performing 
well because of effective improvisation. There are even teams that were successful in 
spite of showing little improvisation. For instance, Team-12 suggested that one of the 
reasons behind their success was intensive pre-trading practising and modelling so 
that they did not need to leave room for unanticipated events; and hence, they were 
able to perform well even though they did not display an ability to improvise in the 
course of the trading. Similarly, Team-31 also described how they sought to reduce 
unambiguity and clearly define roles and processes in order to avoid having to 
improvise during the fast-paced atmosphere of the trading period. Hence, it appears 
collective improvisation is important to team resilience when teams face unexpected 
challenges. The more a team is able to model the possibilities of the challenging 
environment, the less improvisation is needed to be resilient. On the other hand, 
effective improvisation seems to be an important precursor of resilience when teams 
are faced with unexpected challenges. 
With the path analysis, direct relationships between collective dynamics and team 
performance were also tested, particularly to understand the nature and the strength of 
the mediation effect of team resilience. Surprisingly, the direct effect of team cohesion 
163 
 
on team performance was negative. Regarding this, previous literature suggests that 
excessive desire for cohesion may lead individuals favour conformity in order to avoid 
conflict, and this may lead to ineffective decision-making (Maynard and Kennedy, 2016, 
p. 42). This was also evident in the qualitative data. With the purpose of avoiding 
conflicts, Team-54 developed a culture that did not welcome questioning and 
challenging of others’ positions and ideas. Hence, no proposition was challenged 
explicitly and during the trading period it became clear that some previous decisions 
had not been unanimously accepted. Even during the trading period, this realization 
did not turn into conflict, but rather created a deepening sense of isolation between 
group members. In order not to upset other team members, decision alternatives were 
never expressed. Even the negative (but vital) feedback of the controllers about why 
cards were not meeting the quality standards was not relayed to other members of the 
team. Team members admitted “barely” communicating with each other during the 
trading period and just using words like “yes”, “no”, “here”, etc. The team did not make 
a single adaptation to their production process in response to multiple rejections of 
orders, which contributed to their very poor overall performance.  
In relation to the 5th hypothesis, team resilience is not found to be significantly 
correlated with team potency. This means hypothesis 5 is rejected. It was unexpected to 
see that team resilience was not significantly correlated with team potency. Team 
potency has been proposed to facilitate resilience both at the individual level (Lewis, 
Donaldson-Feilder and Pangallo, 2011, p. 3) and at the team level (and Sutcliffe and 
Vogus, 2003; Lengnick-Hall, Beck and Lengnick-Hall, 2011; particularly in the form of 
‘self efficacy’ by Bowers et al., 2017). From the findings from my exploratory study, 
which found support for the suggestions from Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003, p. 102) and 
Vera et al. (2017, p. 128), I expected potent teams to respond more confidently to 
challenges, and therefore , in turn, be more resilient in their responses. I expected 
potent teams to remain confident and calm in the face of adversities and thereby 
increase the chance of utilizing their behaviour repertoire.  
Of course, if potency is not backed up with a rich and robust behaviour repertoire, it 
may not lead to resilient responses, but simply to hubris and rash, possibly 
inappropriate actions. This distinction between potency and team capability may thus 
explain the lack of relationship between potency and resilience. In the strategic review 
meetings prior to the trading period, I observed signs of potency in both high 
performance and low performance teams. For instance, the worst performing team of 
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all runs of the simulation (Team-68) and one of the best performing teams (Team-2) 
both scored highly on potency. The difference between these two teams was easily 
recognisable through investigation of the qualitative data.  
Team-68 had several errors in their financial plan (and were warned about these by the 
controllers prior to the trading period, something which is quite unusual). They did not 
diligently examine the product specifications and rules of the trading period (for 
example, they thought that they would be paid for late orders) and they did not engage 
in much practice production. On several occasions, they were unable to complete 
orders within the deadline. When faced with adversity during trading (e.g. rejections), 
they did not have the necessary cognitive resources (e.g. knowledge) to overcome it. On 
the other hand, Team-2 had a viable team structure with clear roles defined according 
to their perceived strengths and weaknesses, had a rigorous quality control system 
with effective, rapid double-check mechanisms, and engaged in intensive practice and 
modelling in the preparation phase. In fact, they were so aware of and confident in the 
accuracy of their strategy that they sacrificed several minutes during the trading period 
by waiting for their preferred orders (i.e. profitable) to appear on the order board. 
During the trading, every idle second could better be spent by producing more cards to 
earn more profits; hence, only a team with a strong belief in its decisions and 
capabilities could risk losing time to obtain more profitable orders. 
Another reason for this unexpected result might be the point at which team potency 
was measured, which was before the trading period. As elaborated in the following 
section, the relationship between resilience and performance may be cyclical rather 
than linear, and in such a cycle, increased performance may reinforce team potency, 
and this, in turn, may facilitate resilience. Team potency was not quantitatively 
measured during or after the trading period, so this proposition cannot be tested with 
quantitative data.   
Team potency also did not correlate significantly with almost any of the performance 
measures. The moderate relationship between team potency and cards delivered per 
person is an exception to this; and this could be attributable to the suggestion that 
potent teams, with or without paying attention to the accuracy of their production, 
might be more motivated towards achieving high production levels. This might be 
reflected in their productivity levels; however, it would only be reflected on the quality 
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if they had a good understanding of the specifications and a well-established quality 
control processes.  
Although not strongly supported by the quantitative analysis, the qualitative data 
suggest a mechanism for the relationship between resilience and operational 
performance where team potency is involved. According to this mechanism, increases 
(decreases) in performance boosts (lowers) potency, and, in turn, enhances 
(diminishes) the effectiveness of challenge-response process. For instance, Team-36 
described how the news of the rejection of their initial order lowered their belief in 
their abilities, and this, coupled by increased stress levels, impeded their problem-
solving abilities. This mechanism could not be tested using the quantitative data as 
quantitatively team potency was measured before the trading period.  
6.2.2 Team resilience and team performance 
Overall, the relationship between resilience and performance is validated by the 
correlation analyses, which provide initial support for hypothesis 6. Reinforcing this, 
the results of the regression and path analyses also suggested a meaningful and strong 
positive relationship between team resilience and team performance. Thus, one may 
conclude that for teams operating in the challenging environments, resilience is 
associated with better performance results. Resilience scholars have argued that 
performance can be both conceptualized (Pulley, 1997; e.g. Reason, 2000; Sheffi, 2005) 
and empirically examined (e.g. Gittell et al., 2006; Gomes et al., 2014; Jaaron and 
Backhouse, 2014) as a natural outcome of resilience. I, too, have adopted this view in 
the establishment of my research model.  
Nonetheless, my observations from the simulations also support a two-way interaction 
between resilience and operational performance. The ability to address and overcome 
the challenges of the operational environment allows teams to concentrate on 
producing quickly, accurately and efficiently. Moreover, it encourages teams to aim for 
difficult, high-value orders, and delivering them contributes further to the performance. 
However, increased performance also facilitates resilience to forthcoming challenges in 
the form of boosting potency and reducing stress. Conversely, when performance 
decreases experienced, most prominently observed with rejections, teams’ stress levels 
increase and their belief in their abilities weakens; and this, in turn, diminishes their 
effectiveness in addressing and overcoming of subsequent challenges. For some teams, 
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this creates a snowball effect, where the inability to overcome several small challenges 
leads the team into a major crisis.   
The qualitative data also suggest the existence of such relationship. Testimonials from 
the teams show that almost all teams went through challenging and stressful times one 
way or another during the trading period. The ones that were able to overcome them 
and maintain production despite these challenges were the ones that performed the 
best. For instance, Team-6, which was the winning team of their simulation, in fact 
could not deliver their first order because of an unexpected error they made (the 
wrong templates were used). This did not make them feel depressed, on the contrary, 
they became more motivated towards performing better.  
Team-5 also stated that they experienced very stressful time, adding that instead of 
feeding the stress, they chose to back off from the process and tried to understand the 
big picture. They claim that doing this was why they were able to ‘keep it cool’. On the 
other hand, teams which could not overcome challenges and were caught by negative 
effects tended to be drawn into vicious cycles of demotivation, denial, depression 
and/or blaming and in turn were the ones that performed worst.  
One of the worst performances among all the teams belonged to Team-67. A primary 
reason for this was their inability to pull their team together after the loss of a pen early 
in the Game. A pen is an important piece of equipment (costing £300). However, the 
team could have purchased a replacement. Instead, they became preoccupied with 
what caused this loss, which, in turn, prevented them from overcoming the adversity 
that they faced. “I was writing [i.e. producing], but at the same time I was thinking ‘my 
god, what happened to the pen?’”.  
Another striking example was Team-68 which had three orders rejected and seven 
orders unfulfilled, which clearly shows that there were significant issues with their 
ability to take, produce and deliver orders on time and to the specifications. However, 
instead of processing the feedback they were receiving from the Controllers and 
focusing on generating viable solutions to the problem, the team went into a cycle of 
denial. This shows their inability to establish accurate awareness of their 




6.3 Further exploration of the research model 
This section focuses on the relationships between resilience and its proposed 
antecedents as well as the relationships between resilience and performance; and 
elaborates on the mechanisms of these relationships. As demonstrated in chapter five, 
the hypothesised relationships between resilience and certain team attributes 
proposed as antecedents were tested by the quantitative analysis. However, I was not 
able to collect quantitative data for all the propositions in this model. Hence, I used 
qualitative data, first, to elaborate on the relationships revealed by the quantitative 
analysis and, second, to investigate the relationships that could not be investigated 
through quantitative analysis. The qualitative data also revealed some new 
relationships that were not part of my original research model.  
In this section, I explored the relationships between resilience and its proposed 
precursor that I could not test quantitatively; and I also elaborate on how these 
relationships contributes to operational performance. In general, I noticed that 
although individual traits and skills of team members are important in addressing 
challenges and adversity, teams’ collective dynamics play the key role in resilient 
responses; these collective dynamics are not just merely an aggregation of members’ 
individual skills. The themes discussed below elaborate on how these collective 
dynamics pave the way for resilience, and, in turn, contribute to maintaining of 
satisfactory performance.  
6.3.1 Knowledge accumulation (preparation, modelling, testing and trials) 
Although not directly tested by quantitative data analysis, an important precursor of 
both being resilient and performing well is proposed to be collective knowledge 
accumulated prior to operations. In the simulation of my main study, such knowledge 
arose from the work done by the teams in the preparation phase. As detailed in the 
methodology chapter, teams have around one month from when they form until the 
trading day. They have a great deal of flexibility in how they can utilize the time 
allowed for the preparation; and hence, what is done in this period causes significant 
differences among the teams. The work done in this period is particularly important for 
the development of accumulated knowledge; which, in turn, broadens the action 
repertoire utilized to address and overcome challenges.  
Various choices are made by the teams. These include how many times the members 
will meet, how long the meetings will last, how many members are present in various 
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meetings, how much individual and collective practice members will carry out, etc. and 
these decisions influence the simulation outcomes. However, in addition to these basic 
decisions, and possibly more importantly, teams also make decisions with regard to 
specific preparation actions. There is certain generic work that has to be carried out. All 
teams have to define their mission, generate strategies to achieve that mission, 
organize their team around the strategies and develop the necessary skills. The 
strategic plan that they must submit requires them to do this in a form that can be 
scrutinised by others. However, with differences in the preferred approach to this 
work, teams build different structures and capacities. According to my direct 
observations and my examination of participant reflections, I identified the approaches 
discussed below as those that showed significant differences among the teams. 
6.3.1.1 Effective strategy forming  
In order to be able to make profit, let alone being the best performing team in the 
simulation, teams need to successfully understand the types of orders to select from the 
order board. This requires a thorough understanding of the financial dynamics of the 
trading period, because the profitability on certain types of orders (for instance, large, 
open-ended orders) is so low that it is impossible to cover the outgoings with these 
orders, even if all such orders meet the quality criteria. On the other hand, aiming for 
the most profitable orders might not be the best strategy for all teams. For instance, if a 
team cannot produce the most demanding, but highest profit orders of 12 cards in 15 
minutes, then taking this type of an order from the order board would only bring 
losses. In another example, if a team has two writers with extremely different writing 
styles, then taking a 12-card order is a risk since it could be rejected on the grounds of 
insufficient consistency in the writing; so, a less risky strategy may be to take two 4-
cards orders that are produced on two production lines. However, even adequate 
understanding of financial dynamics and team capabilities is not enough to guarantee 
the best strategy, as competition for orders at the order board is extreme. At a 
particular point in time, there might be several order-takers from different teams that 
are all pursuing similar strategies; and hence, they might all be seeking similar orders 
in front of the order board. Thus, first, the order taker has to be able to manage the 
first-come-first-served (in this instance: first-called-first-served) principle of the order 
board; and, second, alternative strategies have to be formulated in case the order taker 
cannot obtain the desired orders.  
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In this sense, effective strategy forming is about coming up with optimum strategies to 
best serve the ultimate purpose of the team, which is to be a profitable team in the 
context of the simulation (or to be “the most profitable team” or “to win the game” for 
most teams), while at the same time considering the limits of team capabilities in the 
face of the dynamics of the trading period. The latter is extremely important, because 
this is the point at which effective strategy forming facilitates team resilience. 
Strategies that are not compatible with a team’s capabilities or those that do not 
consider trading dynamics are the ones that can pave the way to adversity. Alternative 
strategy forming may then be required to address these adversities or other challenges 
faced during the trading period.  
One of the best examples of this could be seen with Team-6. They were a very confident 
and skilful team, successful at producing the most profitable orders to the 
specifications. They were effective in obtaining these orders from the order board and 
they strategically appointed an order taker with a careful eye to quickly detect such 
orders and a powerful voice that could easily be heard by the controllers. In addition to 
this, the order-taker constantly monitored the order board and detected profitable 
orders. He advised the team’s inventory manager accordingly who acquired the 
necessary materials and then obtained these orders from the order board. In this way, 
the team were able to overcome the problem of losing the desired orders to other 
teams.  
Another example is Team-2 who also formed their strategy around the most profitable 
orders. They encountered a situation in which for a while there were no orders on the 
order board that fulfilled their order selection criteria. Team-2 was sufficiently 
confident of their understanding of the financial dynamics of the trading period that 
they knew they should only take high value orders. Consequently, they allowed their 
production lines to stand idle for more than 10 minutes waiting for the right type of 
order to appear on the order board. In the context of the trading period this is a very 
difficult thing to do, and most teams start to more-or-less randomly take orders under 
these conditions, However, Team-2’s effective pre-trading strategizing activities helped 
them to make the correct decision and their potency (particularly with regards to the 
strategies they formulated) allowed them to implement it.   
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6.3.1.2 Effective planning 
The qualitative data suggested effective planning as another important source of 
knowledge accumulation, as, in the planning process, teams decide what to focus on in 
the development and utilization of their action repertoire. The concept of broad action 
repertoire has been investigated in the resilience literature, and sometimes referred as 
resourcefulness. It is proposed (Hamel and Valikangas, 2003; Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 
2005) and empirically demonstrated (Furniss et al., 2011) as one of the antecedents of 
resilient responses. Effective planning helps teams to decide how best to utilize this 
existing action repertoire and when to deviate to improvised actions.  
In the simulation, four important elements of effective planning help teams to best 
utilize their action repertoire. First, teams have to develop a plausible plan, which 
should be both realistic and applicable considering the nature of the environment and 
the capabilities of the team, and it should be built upon information collected and 
validated rather than on arbitrary or tenuous assumptions. For instance, while building 
up their plan, Team-4, the winner of their simulation, rigorously tested their 
production line. They first tried two production lines, each with one stenciller and one 
writer, but observed that the stenciller became the bottleneck. Then, they tried a single 
production line, where three members stencilled and one member wrote verses. This 
time the stencillers became idle sometime during the process; also, three stencils were 
considered to be a costly investment. The team agreed on one production line with two 
stencillers and one writer after a final trial. The results of the simulation demonstrated 
how such rigorously tested, information-based plans can work out well.  
Conversely, Team-59, admitted that their planning was based on faulty, untested 
assumptions which caused their plan to crash during the trading period. After feedback 
from the controllers during their strategic review meeting that the team were 
overestimating their capacity, they amended their plan according to untested 
assumptions about lower capacity, but not based on capacity-testing. They were thus 
no closer to understanding what their true capacity was. Similarly, Team-68, also built 
their plan on an overly optimistic assumption regarding their production capacity and 
took out a massive initial loan. The team’s inability to fulfil the high-profit hard-to-
make orders resulted in the biggest loss among all 68 teams.  
In another example, Team-31 did their planning based on trials, however, they had not 
considered the negative effect that challenging conditions of the trading period might 
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have upon their production levels. They did not consider the alternative and more 
flexible option of purchasing more material during the trading period; instead they 
bought all the materials they thought that they would require for their anticipated 35 
orders (which was an extremely optimistic forecast, considering that the average 
number for orders fulfilled by all 68 teams is 12.8 and the maximum is 22). This, in the 
end, left them with a huge amount of unused materials which depreciated significantly, 
thus condemning them to a loss. 
The second element of effective planning lies in making contingency plans. One of the 
most important recurring issues in the poor-performing teams is the collapse of the 
plan during in the trading period due to a gap between expectations and reality and the 
lack of any contingency plan in case the original plan runs into difficulty. Unexpected 
adversity is one of the biggest obstacles to performance, and one of the hardest to deal 
with for teams that do not plan how to respond to it beforehand. Therefore, teams will 
be more resilient if they conduct scenario analyses during the preparation and develop 
contingency plans accordingly. 
I argue that this is one of the mechanisms of developing collective mindfulness by 
collectively generating and agreeing on alternative solutions to possible errors and 
problems; and integrating these solutions (and the ways to implement them) into the 
plans for collective action. I found collective mindfulness to be related to team resilience 
in the quantitative analysis. Moreover, this is also demonstrated by the qualitative data, 
as a majority of the low performing and low resilience teams stated that they had not 
considered alternatives to their expectations of the trading period or planned in 
accordance with these. Team-36, for instance, had not envisioned that the Controllers 
would have templates to measure the centrality of the verses and therefore did not 
think that they needed to be precise about centring. That ignorance caused their initial 
production to be rejected. They were not expecting this adversity and were unprepared 
for it, hence it was followed by more adversities such as unbearable work pressure and 
intra-team conflicts and communication gaps, leading the team to unsatisfactory 
performance in the end.  
Similarly, Team-54, Team-63 and Team-53 were among the worst performing teams 
and all mentioned how not having a contingency plan left them unprepared for the 
challenging conditions of the trading period. Because of this, they could not formulate 
resilient responses to these challenges, and in turn, they could not provide satisfactory 
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performance. Conversely, a majority of the high-performance teams (e.g. Team-1, 
Team-16 and Team-2) all described how they conducted scenario analyses prior to the 
trading period, generating alternatives to their original plan and applying them when 
their original plan did not work.  
A third element of effective planning is the ability (and maybe also the courage) to 
deviate from the original plan when necessary. This is mainly about fighting against 
tendencies towards rigidity. Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003, p. 107) proposed rigidity as the 
reason behind the ‘negative adjustment’ under challenging conditions. In the trading 
period, rigidity is mostly exercised by the low performing teams. For instance, Team-68 
insisted on going after high-end orders even though they did not have the capability to 
produce them in time and to the specifications. However, even high-performing teams 
could find it hard to abandon a plan that had served them well up to that point. For 
example, Team-16 delivered effective performance until the last 30 minutes of the 
trading period. At that point there were no orders left on the order board that matched 
the team’s inventory, which consisted only of the particular colours they planned to 
produce from the very beginning. At that point, instead of purchasing other colours to 
match the orders on the order board, they ‘stalled’, waiting fruitlessly in front of the 
order board for the desired type of orders to appear, which did not happen. Here the 
rigidity of their plan, which served them well for most of the trading period, suddenly 
became a liability. The team still did well, but not as well as they might had they been 
more flexible in terms of ‘letting go’ of the plan when circumstances required it. Some 
high-performing teams demonstrated an ability to deviate from their plans when it was 
necessary; such as Team-12; when they realized they were capable of producing high-
end, difficult orders they started taking them from the order board, despite not having 
originally intended to do so.  
Finally, a team needs to be able to know when to stick to its plan and when to deviate 
from it. This is called an ambivalence capacity towards balancing uniformity and 
deviance and deciding which one to follow based on the information available. This has 
been proposed by Weick (1993) as a facilitator of resilience. This is also about the 
ability to prevent unnecessary and harmful deviation, which is where most low-
performing teams experience problems. For instance, what many low performing 
teams do when they encounter unexpected conditions is to (often unwittingly) change 
their organization and role structure as members try to respond to the situation in ad-
hoc ways. It is extremely hard for members to adjust to roles for which they had not 
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been trained, which often results in more issues (production mistakes, 
miscommunication etc) creating even more problems. Low performance usually 
follows. Conversely, successful teams typically analyse their situation before acting and 
hence, understand when a deviation is beneficial or harmful. For instance, during the 
preparation period, Team-4 realised that their order taker was getting stressed about 
making improvised decisions with regards to which order to take. The team anticipated 
that this stress might prevent her from securing the appropriate orders. Hence, they 
prepared detailed order selection guidelines for her, which she conformed to until the 
end of the trading period.  
6.3.1.3 Effective specialization and organization 
A third precursor of resilience, which is rooted in the preparation phase, but effective 
throughout the trading day, is effective specialization and organization of team 
members. As mentioned in detail previously, there are several different tasks that need 
to be fulfilled (simultaneously, more often than not) throughout the trading period in 
order for a team to make profits. The order board has to be monitored; strategically 
important orders have to be secured; the order-takers must communicate with the 
production team and orders produced in accordance with a set of strict criteria to a 
strict deadline; and then submitted to the controllers. In the meantime, constant stock 
and quality control have to be carried out, along with monitoring of the overall ‘system’ 
to make sure all the tasks are accomplished efficiently and without member burn-out. It 
is near-impossible to maintain this cycle of tasks without proper specialization, 
particularly in the face of the fast-paced atmosphere where every second counts. 
Specialization is also proposed as an enabler of resilience and performance in the 
previous resilience literature by various researchers (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2012; e.g. 
Richtnér and Löfsten, 2014). Resilience researchers also proposed specialization as a 
solution to prevent “cognitive overload” (Levinthal and Rerup, 2006, p. 506). In the 
simulations, I observed that many high-performing teams prioritize specialization in 
the preparation period; and they mainly allocate roles in accordance with strengths and 
weaknesses rather than a random allocation. In their reflections, these team account 
for the practices they execute to make the most efficient specializations. For instance, 
Team-11 stated that while allocating roles, everyone tried to fulfil the roles and the 
roles were assigned to the best performers.  
On the other hand, extreme specialization, where certain members are the only ones 
equipped to carry out their specialized roles and do not know about or monitor the 
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work of other members is also problematic. Errors are less likely to be spotted in time, 
and worse, no-one can (skilfully) fill in for other members when adjustments are 
required. In this case, if a member is fatigued or ineffective for some other reason, the 
tasks s/he is supposed to perform cannot be accomplished and the cycle is broken. In 
previous studies of resilience, researchers stressed the problems that specialization 
may cause with regard to limiting flexibility (Bigley and Roberts, 2001, p. 1281) and 
reducing slack resources (Winn et al., 2011, p. 169). Therefore, in the challenging and 
dynamic operation conditions of the trading period, teams need to effectively specialize, 
which means that every member is trained to be expert of a particular task set, and at 
the same time, in some way, all members should be replaceable. This is also seen in the 
quantitative data. One of the dimensions of the transactive memory systems measure is 
specialization and it is found to be significantly related to team resilience.  
There are various ways a team can effectively specialize and organize to be resilient 
and successful in the trading period. For instance, in Team-9, all the members except 
one specialized in a particular set of tasks and one member, called the floater, trained to 
fill in for any task if needed. The team stated that knowing that extra help was available 
all the time boosted their confidence and safe-guarded them against the “stressors” of 
the trading period. With a similar purpose, Team-31 assigned a “jumper” (as they 
named the position) to avoid work overload. In another example, in Team-2, each 
member on the production line was trained in two roles (e.g. folder, stenciller, writer, 
etc.) so that if high workload became an issue during the trading period, a less loaded 
member could effectively provide help. Similarly, Team-11 started allocating members 
to specific roles, but conducted “cross-training”, to make sure members could take 
breaks if needed. All these extra capacities served as flexible resources to enable 
functions to be fulfilled despite uncertain conditions. 
In line with specialization, different organization styles emerged in different teams. For 
instance, teams that assigned “floaters” generally preferred single-line production 
where the floater could fill in for others on the line. Conversely, teams that conducted 
“cross-training” generally preferred two-line production units, where two orders were 
normally carried out at the same time, but when required cross-trained members could 
fill in for one another allowing everyone to work on a single order.  
How a team decided what roles to assign to which member was at least as important as 
the effective specialization described in the previous paragraph. Clear patterns were 
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observable among the high performing and low performing teams with regard to this. 
While high performing teams spent substantial amounts of time during the preparation 
phase in order to allocate roles appropriately and pay attention to strengths and 
weaknesses, low performing teams generally allocated roles according to initial 
preferences and never went back to question their appropriateness. In high performing 
teams, roles were typically clearly defined (demonstrable by the strategic review 
documents submitted) and assigned according to strengths and weaknesses, skills, 
talents and abilities. These teams generally tested various roles for different members 
and assigned roles to the most appropriate individuals. Conversely, low performing 
teams did not pay as much  attention to role clarity and roles assignment based on the 
assumption that if an individual wanted a role, then s/he would be successful at it. 
When faced with the reality of the trading period, roles could not be filled competently 
and this sometimes brought strategy collapse and quality problems along with it. 
Members would start to change roles or some would assume extra roles that they could 
not properly fulfill.  
For instance, a member from Team-63 stated that s/he started the trading period as an 
order taker and submitter, but during trading  s/he also needed to do stock control, 
purchasing and communication work and that this created overload resulting in stress 
and decreased productivity. Similar problems was obvious in Team-67 as well. Their 
problems started with the way that they assigned roles. Initially roles were not defined 
clearly to individuals and some were not clear about the specific tasks that their roles 
comprised. Second, tasks were defined independently of each other and the 
connections between them were omitted  - this impeded cohesion during execution. 
Moreover, when the team started to face adversities (such as rejections and the loss of 
a pen – a crucial produciton resource), members immediately started to switch roles, 
possibly because of an existing lack of fit between individuals and roles. However, this 
impulsive switching further reduced resilience, because  members could not adjust to 
their new roles and struggled to accomplish their new tasks. 
6.3.1.4 Rigorous training and practicing 
We have seen how, in order to perform satisfactorily in the simulation, teams needed to 
be aware of their skills and competences and to form their strategies accordingly. 
However, this is not quick and easy to do on the basis of a single trial. Once a team 
decides in what configuration (i.e. organization) of the team is most productive, it must 
practice if it wishes to be able to target the most difficult and profitable orders. A team’s 
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skill set is identified as one of the most crucial precursors of resilience in the previous 
literature in the form of “slack capabilities” (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003, p. 107), “learned 
resourcefulness” (Lengnick-Hall, Beck and Lengnick-Hall, 2011, p. 246), and 
“competence” (Horne and Orr, 1997, p. 32).  
It is also evident from the qualitative data that an enhanced skill set increases teams’ 
resilience, as it facilitates the maintenance of normal performance levels when 
simultaneously dealing with challenges. Teams that develop skills to produce 
accurately and quickly can continue their production while simultaneously addressing 
challenges. Consequentially, the teams with enhanced skill sets tend to be the best 
performing teams of the simulation. For instance, Team-2, which obtained the second-
highest profit among all 68 teams, stated that they met 11 times to practice production 
as a team, excluding strategy and planning meetings and individual work. They also 
stated that because of this rigorous practicing they were able to continue their 
production in the face of the “stressors” of the trading period: unfavourable work 
conditions such as crowded conditions, “rushing and shouting people”, “happy screams 
of competitors to the accepts they get”, “whistles blown by the controllers when a team 
got rejected”, etc. coupled with market uncertainty and time pressure. Team-9 also 
stated that the emphasis they placed on pre-trading practice allowed them respond to 
unpredictable events while at the same time continuing production. Team-1 also 
pointed out that it was rigorous practicing that allowed them to adapt to the 
unpredictable conditions of the market by being able to confidently take any profitable 
order from the order board in any card size (i.e. A5, A6 or A7) and successfully fulfil it.  
6.3.1.5 Testing limits and challenging the assumptions 
Finally, the resilient and high performing teams were observed to be willing to 
challenge assumptions and test their own and other limits. This decreased the 
possibility of facing adversities caused by overloading the team and the members with 
tasks beyond their ability to handle (such as taking an order too difficult for the 
production capacity of the team) and increased the performance by preventing the 
team from adopting an overly conservative approach (such as constantly taking orders 
far below the production capacity of the team).  
All the teams are briefed about the simulation in the same manner, however, some 
rules are interpreted by different teams in different ways. With regards to conforming 
to the rules and attempting to meet the quality criteria, some teams tend to be very 
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conservative whereas others are too relaxed. The former type of teams may be so strict 
in applying the quality criteria that they are very slow in production process; they 
interpret the rules very literally and never consider ways to ‘stretch’ them. Conversely, 
the latter type of teams may be so careless about the quality criteria that their orders 
are repeatedly rejected by the controllers. Examples of both types of teams are 
abundant among the participating teams, particularly among the low and mid-level 
performing teams. For example, Team-50 finished with a loss of -£2,014 and was 
ranked 10th rank out of 15 teams in its game, despite having zero rejections from the 
controllers. Afterwards, reflecting the exercise, they reported that they felt they were 
too conservative and paid too much attention to quality, internally rejecting cards on 
the basis of very minor issues (an example internal rejection reason was: “That “a” on 
the bottom looks weird”). They admitted that they never challenged the early 
assumptions they had made with regards to quality, and only after the trading period 
they realised that cards with minor issues were acceptable. They regretted never 
thinking to question the controllers about what was acceptable.  
In another example, Team-58, never thought to ask the controllers to borrow 
equipment for trial production and assumed that stencilling would be the easiest 
process of production. Since they had only created one stenciller role and ordered only 
one stencil, they could not then pursue high-end orders in the trading period because of 
their stencilling bottleneck. Similarly, they also did not question whether they could 
make and bring templates to the trading period and assumed that it was against the 
rules to do so. This was in fact allowed as long as permission was sought in advance 
(the guidelines actually state this possibility) and most teams used such templates – 
something which improved the speed and accuracy of production considerably. 
Without a template, Team-58 wasted tremendous time trying to centralize their verses 
and therefore was only able to pursue small orders. These problems coupled with the 
false interpretation of the quality criteria, again, something which they could have 
questioned prior to the trading period, and left them with a massive loss of -£2,841 at 
the end of the trading period. 
On the other hand, with the successful teams, a pattern of questioning their own 
assumptions and the controllers was observed in relation to the rules and criteria. In 
general, most of these teams came to the strategic meetings with examples of the cards 
they had produced and asked the controllers about the acceptability and accuracy of 
their folding, centring, stencilling, writing, etc. Moreover, they asked about rhymes and 
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the acceptability of their verses and also of minor issues such as smudging or writing 
variations. These were all clear examples of testing limits and questioning constraints. 
Most of these teams also asked to borrow equipment and materials in order to make 
production trials with them. They also sought permission for materials they wanted to 
bring in to the trading period. On some occasions, these requests were rejected, 
however, the process demonstrated that these teams were trying to understand 
precisely the situation they were facing. For instance, Team-9 drew attention to the 
complexity and uncertainty of the briefing material, something which was indeed 
intentional in the design of the exercise. To address this, Team-9 did two things: first, 
they have discussed all the uncertainties in detail to establish a shared group 
understanding of them; and second, they reached out to the controllers to try and 
achieve greater clarity. For example, in the case handwriting variation, they asked the 
controllers about the strictness level and whether two people could write verses for the 
same order provided that their handwriting was not too different. Similarly, Team-2 
emphasized how important “checking in with the controllers about the quality 
standards” was in determining their overall performance.  
The ability to test the limits, to challenge the assumptions and to push the boundaries 
has also been identified by previous studies of resilience. Linnenluecke and Griffiths 
(2013, p. 407) argued that while dealing with emergencies, the exercise of thinking 
beyond ‘current assumptions’ might help organizations to better understand the 
adversity faced and broaden the choice of options for dealing with it. They suggest 
(Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2013, p. 408) that organizations should ‘push boundaries’ 
to understand their ‘limits’ with regard to responding to disasters. Moreover, Seville et 
al. (2015, p. 10) proposed that organizations that “push boundaries, challenge 
conventional wisdom, and encourage innovative solutions” can establish learning 
cultures, which can, in turn, allow these organizations to adapt to the VUCA world more 
quickly. ‘Questioning assumptions’ is also one of the core principles of collective 
mindfulness (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2000, p. 38). Lastly, Flin and Fruhen (2015, 
p. 87) mentioned the importance of “questioning old assumptions” in accurately 
interpreting the ambiguous information to provide for safety.   
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6.3.2 Effective information processing 
6.3.2.1 Establishment of intra-team communication system 
An important concept discussed in the previous literature as one of the antecedents of 
resilience is the establishment of an effective communication system, which opens the 
way for the effective information processing. Crisis management researchers argue that 
communication channels and information sharing mechanisms are among the first 
casualties of adversity (Quarantelli, 1988); and Weick (1993) proposed that this is 
among the most important reasons behind the collapse of collective mental models (i.e. 
transactive memory systems and collective mindfulness) when faced with adversity. 
Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) support this proposition by pointing out as a response to an 
adversity, broadening the information processing enables the establishment of 
situational awareness and enhances understanding of the requirements of an effective 
response; thereby, increasing resilience. Communication, in the form of the flow of 
relevant information, is also suggested as one of the dimensions of resilience by Horne 
and Orr (1997) by enhancing the establishment and preservation of collective mental 
models. Similarly, Fioratou et al. (2010, p. 84) also proposed that preservation of 
situational awareness in a “distributed cognitive system” requires continuous 
interaction among its components. Moreover, communication has also been empirically 
tested and validated as an important source of resilience by Gomes et al. (2014), 
Furniss et al. (2011) and Jaaron and Backhouse (2014).  
Although it is not included in the quantitative analysis, effective communication and 
information processing were also observed in the qualitative data. For example, one of 
the distinct qualities of Team-1, the best performing team among all 68 teams, was the 
attention they paid to effective communication. They prioritised e collective 
contribution to the decision-making process as well as rapid response to operational 
issues; and with that purpose, they established an online platform they named the 
“executive board communication channel (EBCC)”. Through that platform, before and 
during the trading period, all information with regard to the operations of the team was 
gathered at a single point that was available to all the members. In addition, they also 
tried different communication structures while conducting trading period trials in the 
preparation phase and applied the most effective one in the actual trading period. They 
worked particularly hard to ensure that there were no misunderstandings between the 
order-taker and the production unit. Lastly, while reflecting on the simulation in the 
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aftermath, they identified their “active communication and openness” as a feature that 
made them a resilient and high-performing team.  
Similar to Team-1, Team-9 established an Office365 work group to communicate and 
share information. This not only allowed them to overcome misunderstandings on 
matters such as when and where to meet (assisting in their achievement of 100% 
attendance at all meetings and practice sessions), but also equipped all team members 
with up-to-date information with regard to decisions taken and work carried out.  
Conversely, problems with communication and information transfers prevented teams 
from effectively responding to challenges. For example, when order submitters were 
not able to effectively communicate controller feedback about rejections to the 
production units, the mistakes that were causing the rejections continued. This was an 
important issue for most of the low performing teams. There were even teams in which 
the production unit was not aware of the fact that most of their production was being 
rejected by the controllers. It was particularly a problem for Team-63 as they had seven 
orders rejected throughout the trading period on the grounds of inaccuracies with 
centralization, folding, rhymes and stencilling. However, the team’s order submitters 
did not relay the controllers’ feedback to their production unit effectively. A similar 
problem was revealed by Team-54 during their post-trading presentation. The source 
of their problem was the excessive work load of the operations manager of the team. 
According to the team, manager was overloaded with order taking, order submitting 
and overall monitoring and, in middle of all this work, s/he was ineffective in 
processing the rejection feedback to the production unit. Production unit members 
could not find a “point of contact” within the team to raise issues or to question the 
reasons behind the rejections. This was also an explicit indication of a communication 
problem.  
6.3.2.2 Effective information gathering  
Although it is extremely important to establish a communication system that enables 
effective movement of information within the team, it is also crucial to acquire the 
information from the surroundings in the first place. Previous literature identified  the 
importance of establishing situational awareness in addressing and overcoming 
challenges (LaPorte, 1996; Sheffi and Rice Jr., 2005; Burnard and Bhamra, 2011). To 
establish situational awareness, studies proposed being attentive to weak signals about 
possible adversities (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008, p. 43), confirming the 
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credibility of information from multiple information sources (Mallak, 1998a, p. 151), 
and integrating the information gathered from multiple sources to establish a 
comprehensive picture of the operational environment (Fruhen et al., 2014, p. 32; 
Alliger et al., 2015, p. 180). The analysis of my exploratory study demonstrated the 
importance of establishing effective information gathering channels in realizing and 
understanding problems and formulating responses to address them.  
The qualitative data also reveal the importance of utilizing information gathering 
channels to establish situational awareness and thereby realize challenges at an early 
stage, understanding them and formulating effective solutions. One of the most obvious 
indications of this in the trading period is the ability to monitor the order board and to 
quickly recognise when desired order(s) are displayed. Being able to quickly realize a 
desired order allows a team to obtain it and increase profits. Losing such an order to 
another team may cause motivational as well as performance-related deficiencies, as 
well as issues with inventory management if materials have already been purchased. A 
team unable to obtain a desired order may need to take another one that is 
incompatible with its initial strategy, production capacities or current inventory. Hence, 
high-performing teams typically track the order board continuously and rapidly secure 
the desired orders, which prevents possible difficulties.  
On the other hand, it is also crucial to prevent the flow of unnecessary and potentially 
harmful information (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008, p. 44). Excessive information 
overloads communication channels and obstructs the processing of high-priority 
information. It may also reduce enthusiasm and the will to confront challenges, 
especially if the information demoralizing and not solution-oriented. For instance, 
when Team-36 production unit was working on their second order, the news of the 
rejection of their first order arrived in the middle of the operation. This disrupted their 
cohesion and paved way for the rejection of the second order, too. If the rejection news 
had been concealed and only feedback on possible improvements given, the second 
submission might have been accepted.  
Having said that, teams should be very careful when deciding the necessity of a 
particular piece of information. For instance, production units unaware of the low-
quality of their work have little reason to improve quality, mistakenly thinking that 
they are at an acceptable level. As a consequence, restricting information flow and not 
providing the necessary feedback prevents teams from addressing the challenges 
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quickly and efficiently. Yet revealing all information to all parties might also have 
negative consequences in the form of overloaded channels or decreased motivation (in 
the case of bad news).  
 
6.4 Discovery of new relationships  
This section presents the qualitative findings that were independent from and 
additional to the original research model. Although my quantitative analysis 
systematically tested a part of the relationships proposed in the research model, while I 
was examining the qualitative data, I discovered other team attributes and processes 
that appeared important in addressing and overcoming the challenges of the 
operational environment. Hence, I decided to investigate these relationships further. 
The results of this investigation are provided in the section below. Because these 
attributes were not theorized during my literature analysis, I decided not to include 
them in the final version of my model of resilience.  
6.4.1 Managing Diversity 
First of all, an ability to blend cultural strengths and to balance diversity was observed 
as an important resilience precursor. Diversity is proposed to facilitate the enrichment 
of a team’s  action repertoire; and hence, it is regarded as an important resource to 
support resilience (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; Boin and McConnell, 2007; Gomes et al., 
2014); however, only so long as it is managed well.  
When the members of a team were able to accept the possibility of diverse (and 
sometimes even contradicting) understandings among the members; and were tolerant 
and patient towards one another in spite of their differences, increased diversity 
became a strength in responding to challenges. For instance, Team-12 had members 
from different cultures which had the potential to impede team performance. There 
were members whose culture (culture-A) favoured direct communication and 
involvement in the conversation whenever an opportunity arose. On the other hand, 
there were also people who were much more indirect and only involved in the 
conversation when it was explicitly expected of them (culture-B). This might have 
caused overreliance of the ideas of culture-A members and undermining of the ideas of 
culture-B members. Culture-B members found it difficult to get the chance to express 
themselves while culture-A members concluded that culture B members had nothing to 
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say. This could also cause culture-A members to think that culture-B members were not 
enthusiastic enough, whereas culture-B people perceived culture-A members as 
wanting to decide everything. However, as a team they first paid attention to 
understanding the different expression styles of each members and then found a 
middle ground so that all could join to the decision-making process. Once possible 
negative effects of diversity were overcome, they realised that their diversity was one 
of their competitive advantages. For example, because of the specificities of the 
different cultures, some members were happier with roles requiring creativity whereas 
others were better at repetitive tasks. Moreover, some members were talented and 
enthusiastic about monitoring the overall organization, whereas others excelled at 
specialized roles. Consequentially, the team negotiated a map of who should do what 
when specific challenges arose. Team-12 stated this as one of the reasons behind their 
satisfactory performance.  
Conversely, cultural differences and the misunderstandings originating from diversity 
sometimes paved the way to intra-team conflict, in which case diversity became a 
burden on the team. Most low performing teams identified cultural differences among 
the problems that impeded their performance. Team-58 stated how they experienced a 
“clash of cultures” with certain behaviours normal to a culture perceived as offensive 
by members from another culture. Moreover, the indirectness of certain members was 
perceived as a lack of enthusiasm. Similarly, in Team-59 passiveness of the certain 
members was perceived as “social loafing” behaviour, whereas it might be attributable 
to the specific behaviour styles of their culture. Lastly, Team-65 stated how the silence 
of certain members were misinterpreted as “acceptance” and this became a false group 
norm. This norm carried into the trading period as well: for instance, a member 
underestimated the time and effort required to complete open orders and suggested 
taking several open orders to keep them busy. This became the team’s decision when 
no objections raised, and they were left with the burden of several unfinished open 
orders at the end. This demonstrates the importance of managing diversity, which 
could be in the form of explicit feedback or “voting” on crucial decisions in this 
example. Depending on the types of differences among the members, teams need to 
find ways to utilize them in addressing challenges as well as to manage them in prevent 
diversity from deteriorating cohesion.  
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6.4.2 Trust in other team members 
As mentioned in the literature analysis chapter, trust is conceptualized as one of the 
precursors of resilience in a number of resilience studies. For instance, in the 
socioecological resilience field, Carpenter et al. (2012, p. 3253) referred trust as one of 
the conditions that enables resilience by decreasing levels of uncertainty and 
encouraging actors to focus on meeting challenges rather than other actors’ behaviour 
which may be seen as irresponsible or incompetent. In the organizational resilience 
field, Weick et al. (2008, p. 46) argued that resilient responses to the challenges can be 
provided by established trust within the organization. Exemplifying this, the negative 
effects of the 1997 fire in Aisin Seiki’s plant were quickly overcome with the help of the 
competitors; and this was only possible because the firm trusted its competitors’ 
respect for its property rights (Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 1998, p. 57). Trusting them, 
Aisin Seiki allowed competitors into its premises to help with the recovery efforts. In 
the team resilience field, too, Morgan et al. (2013) and Bowers et al. (2017) proposed 
trust as one of the enablers of team resilience and Stephens et al. (2013, p. 29) validated 
this with quantitative empirical analysis.  
In this study, I investigated trust quantitatively in the form of “trust in the expertise of 
other team members” as a part of the transactive memory systems construct, and found 
it to be positively and meaningfully correlated to team resilience (Pearson correlation 
coefficient=0.66, p<0.001 and n=68). This quantitative finding is further reinforced by 
the qualitative data. Almost all the successful teams explicitly mentioned the positive 
effect of trust on their resilience and performance, both in the form of “trust in 
expertise” and in the form of “trust in responsible behaviour”. For example, Team-1 
referred to trust as one of the key elements behind their successful performance and 
added that trust increased their willingness to share and accept information which, in 
turn, boosted their situational awareness and allowed them to quickly respond to 
adversity. In particular, the trust they placed on their decision-makers during the 
trading period allowed them to quickly agree responsive actions and unhesitatingly 
implement these.  
Conversely, the teams who reported a lack of trust among team members linked this 
lack to slow information processing, decreased situational awareness, role conflicts and 
ineffective challenge-response processes. For instance, Team-63 accounted how a lack 
of trust in the expertise and responsibility of other members weakened the 
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organization of the team. For example, when a particular individual lacked trust in the 
officially appointed leader, s/he started to assume the leadership role. This created 
confusion amongst the other members as to which individual to follow. Unfortunately, 
this lack of trust was not limited to the appointed leader’s expertise: some way into the 
trading period, the folder assumed order-taker tasks, the stenciller became the delivery 
person and the overall decision-maker was drawn into production. This extreme role 
ambiguity was a result of the inability of members to prove their expertise and 
responsibility to the other members. 
At this point, an important question is: “How were the successful teams able establish 
such a culture of trust?” The experience of Team-2 suggests that such a culture was 
established prior to the trading period, with meetings where group norms were 
discussed in detail with active participation of all members and through practice 
sessions where each member could observe the work process of other members. Team-
2 intensively invested in the preparation period with all members spending as much 
time as possible on both individual and group studies. On the one hand, in the meetings, 
each member revealed what they expected from the trading period and how they were 
approaching it. This made other members realise that everybody was willing to work 
hard to be successful, which was then demonstrated by full participation in every 
meeting. On the other hand, in the practise sessions, each member observed how the 
others successfully accomplished their tasks and they were credible in the information 
they provided. Hence, in the trading period, it was straightforward for Team-2 
members to trust the information obtained from other members. Nobody felt it 
necessary to obsessively monitor others to check whether they were able to fulfil their 
duties.  
In line with this, misplaced trust that is not based on a proven expertise and 
responsibility might lead to unfavourable outcomes. For instance, Team-68 trusted the 
financial knowledge of one of their members without establishing their degree of 
financial expertise, and did not question the financial model s/he developed. This 
model failed to accurately identify the most profitable orders or to provide a viable and 
cost-efficient plan.  
Thus, while not establishing trust among members may lead to redundancy in the form 
of monitoring, suspicion and double-checking, establishing misplaced trust may limit 
useful scepticism and conceptual slack (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008, p. 43).  
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6.4.3 Supportive team members / team atmosphere 
From the analysis of the qualitative data, another key element in achieving resilience 
and satisfactory performance was found to be supportive and positive team 
atmosphere. It is crucial as a source of motivation and enthusiasm and also for 
encourage members to openly report the mistakes and problems without the fear of 
being blamed; which is important in establishing “pre-occupation with failure”, one of 
the principles collective mindfulness (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008). Moreover, it 
is also crucial during the preparation phase to enable every member to constructively 
question and challenge suggestions without fear of disapproval. If members feel that 
constructive criticism is not tolerated, then they will not express their ideas and 
opinions in meetings. The negative outcomes of this are twofold: members might start 
to feel demotivated and problems related to decisions taken might not be revealed.  
Examples of this include “how such an environment motivated them and increased 
their productivity” (Team-3) or “how having a no-blame culture helped them beat the 
stress during the trading period” (Team-11). Team-7 and Team-4 particularly 
mentioned the importance of supportive atmosphere in encouraging the members to 
“give opinions”, “come up with creative solutions”, “contribute to the conversation” and 
“speak freely”.  Adding to these, Team-2 drew attention to the importance of 
motivational and positively informative quotes such as “You did a great job!”, “It wasn’t 
our rejection” (whenever the rejection whistle was blown) or “Keep going, you can do 
this” as a part of such supportive atmosphere in boosting productivity and in increasing 
the effectiveness of the challenge-response process.  
On the other hand, the damage caused by an unsupportive environment was strongly 
emphasized by several low resilience and low performance teams as a source of 
demotivation, anxiety and unhappiness. For example, in Team-34 certain members 
dominated the decision-making process and did not provide a favourable environment 
for others to express opinions. Unspoken opinions were assumed to be positive and 
planning and organization decisions were made by a few members. On the trading day, 
it was revealed that these decisions were not happily embraced by all the members. 
When such an unfavourable team atmosphere resulted in problems such as rejected 
orders, no member had the courage to take crucial decisions as a “no-blame culture” 
had not developed. This resulted in the inability to respond to the problems and 
ultimately resulted in an unsatisfactory performance.   
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Similarly, Team-58 also reported how decisions were taken by only a few members; 
and in order not to risk the team cohesion other members conformed to these 
decisions, despite having doubts about them. What is observed from most of the low 
performance teams was the reluctance of some members to question or challenge 
decisions taken out of a fear of being the person that broke the team cohesion, just as in 
Team-58. Team-64, Team-54 and Team-41 all pointed this out. Even Team-16, which 
was among the most successful teams, stated that some decisions were not challenged 
in order not to break unanimity. This possibly arises from the fear of being isolated and 
also being responsible for the consequences of the proposition made. An obvious 
consequence of this reluctance is a lack of discussion with regard to the possible 
drawbacks of the decisions taken.  Without knowing, discussing and anticipating these 
drawbacks, teams became vulnerable to the adversities caused by them and ineffective 
in addressing them.  
 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter introduces the qualitative findings of my research; and enrichens the 
understanding of the relationships among resilience, performance and their 
antecedents. According to my qualitative analysis of the anecdotes from the 
experiences of the participating teams, collected via direct observations as well as 
individual and collective reflections, knowledge accumulation in the form of 
strategizing, planning, specializing, training, practicing, testing and challenging 
broadens action repertoire and this, in turn, facilitates the effectiveness of challenge-
response process. Moreover, establishing effective information processing structures is 
also crucial in addressing and overcoming that challenges. An effective intra-team 
communication system contributes to the establishment and continuous updating of 
the collective mental models; and effective information gathering (from the 
surrounding) enables the establishment of situational awareness. With situational 
awareness, teams are able to detect the early and weak signals of the challenges; and 
hence, address them before they turn into bigger problems.  
In addition to the exploration of the relationships of the research model, with 
qualitative data, I also discovered other dynamics crucial in overcoming challenges. 
Firstly, I found diversity as an important source of resilience in formulating responses, 
particularly to novel challenges, however, diversity needs to be managed well in order 
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not to deteriorate team cohesion. Secondly, I found trust as an important factor in 
increasing the effectiveness of challenge-response, as it enables individuals to focus on 
accomplishing their tasks instead of double-checking others’ work. Lastly, I found a 
supporting team atmosphere important in open discussion of mistakes, which 
contributes to the accuracy of collective mental models. In addition to this, a supportive 
team atmosphere was also seen crucial for the motivation and enthusiasm needed for 
members to maintain their performance levels until the end of the trading. 
In the next chapter, I introduce the finalized version of my model of resilience, and 
then, I discuss what my investigations suggest in answering the research questions that 
guided my study. Further to this, I provide the academic and practical implications that 
may be derived from the results of my investigations. Finally, I lay out the limitations of 
my research and my recommendations for the researchers who desires to investigate 





This chapter is devoted to demonstrating how the findings of this study addressed my 
research questions and build on the previous literature. I also lay out the implications 
of my findings and the limitations of this research in this chapter. I first provide the 
final version of my model of team resilience, which was developed further in the light of 
the findings from my main study. Second, I restate my research questions and propose 
answers to them. Then, in two sections, I articulate the implications for the 
organizations and teams more generally. In the first of these two sections, I discuss 
academical implications, paying particular attention to how the results of this study 
may be used to develop theory in the fields of organizational resilience and team 
performance fields as well as other relevant topics such as collective mental models, 
effective teamwork and team dynamics. In the second section, I explore the practical 
implications of my findings for teams and organizations that operate in dynamic and 
turbulent environments and make some suggestions with regard to how they can 
ensure continuity, sustainability and endurance. Lastly, I discuss the conceptual and 
methodological limitations of my study and provide suggestions for how these may be 
overcome in the future. In this section, I also make recommendations for other 
researchers in the field of organizational and team resilience.  
 
7.2 Model of Team Resilience 
As a result of my analyses, I updated the conceptual model a further time. The final 
version is presented in Figure 16. Using the quantitative analysis described in chapter 
5, I conducted hypothesis tests to test some of the relationships I proposed in the 
operationalized version of my model. Moreover, utilizing qualitative data, I examined 
the relationships tested with the quantitative analysis to understand how they were 
formed and manifested, and where possible, the underlying mechanisms at work. In 
addition to this, I also investigated those relationships that I could not test through the 
quantitative analysis in the light of the qualitative data. In some cases, the qualitative 
data also revealed attributes and relationships that I had not included in my conceptual 
model. As a result of this process, I amended the model and brought it into its final 
form. It should be noted that some of these amendments are derived mainly from the 
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qualitative data. Given the limitations of this, those relationships that are solely based 
on the qualitative investigations require further testing before one can be confident 
that they are indeed robust.  
 
 
Figure 16. Model of Collective Resilience 
 
The final version of the model suggests that resilience to challenging conditions in an 
operational environment is related to certain pre-operational and operational 
collective dynamics. Pre-operational dynamics are about preparing the system for 
challenging conditions when time and resource-related restrictions are much less acute 
than during trading itself. According to my analyses, these dynamics involved the 
development of effective communication and information gathering systems as well as 
activities that help in the accumulation of knowledge which broadens action 
repertoires. These system development actions facilitate the functioning of operational 
dynamics during trading, which allows the teams to effectively address and overcome 
challenges.  
I identified the operational dynamics which appear to be effective in creating and 
maintaining resilience as collective mental models, team cohesion, ambivalence and 
accumulated knowledge. As demonstrated by both the quantitative and qualitative 
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analyses, establishing collective mental models helps team members informed of key 
operational dynamics and conditions. Through the information gathering and sharing 
activities of members, the collective picture of operational dynamics and conditions is 
constantly updated and the picture in each member’s mind is synchronized to the 
updated collective picture. This, in turn, helps teams to establish situational awareness 
of operations and thereby detect early and/or weak signals of forthcoming challenges. 
To effectively respond to these challenges, teams should collectively act on these 
signals, which requires members to work cohesively. Moreover, in order to achieve 
effective responses, which require planning, deciding, formulating solutions and 
implementing these, action repertoires need to be sufficiently broad – hence the 
importance of knowledge accumulation. Finally, ambivalent attitudes towards existing 
knowledge and plans enable deviation from pre-planned responses modelled during 
pre-operational periods when this is required. This essentially means a capacity to 
improvise. 
To effectively address and overcome challenges, it is therefore necessary to establish 
situational awareness of operations. Effective information gathering systems 
established prior to operations are part of this. If a team faces novel challenges for 
which its existing action repertoire is inadequate, then the ability to improvise becomes 
important in generating alternative solutions. These features ensure that challenges are 
detected in a timely, way understood thoroughly by team members, addressed 
accurately and responded to effectively, all which result in a resilient team. This 
resilience, in turn, contributes to satisfactory performance.  
The relationship between resilience and team potency was non-significant according to 
the quantitative analysis; however, with the help of qualitative data, this result was 
explained as such: team potency only appeared to be beneficial when it was not 
groundless, i.e. when feelings of potency were accompanied by real team capabilities. 
Moreover, according to some of the quantitative analyses, the relationships between 
team resilience and collective improvisation and between team resilience and team 
cohesion were non-significant. However, in the light of qualitative data, collective 
improvisation and ambivalence appeared to be important when teams were subject to 
novel challenges, such as those requiring deviation from a plan and the rapid 
generation of alternative options. Moreover, in the face of challenges, cohesive teams 
appeared better able to coordinate actions and implement counter measures.   
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Finally, two feedback loops are included in the model. Firstly, addressing and 
overcoming challenges, particularly novel challenges, was observed to improve 
accumulated knowledge through collective learning and acquisition of the necessary 
skills. This, in turn, broadened a team’s action repertoire, better equipping it for future 
challenges. Secondly, poor performance was likely to be serve as an additional source 
of adversity, lowering team potency and consequently increasing stress. Lowered 
potency, in turn, may cause the members to doubt the decisions and actions they are 
taking to overcome problems created by low performance, hence potentially 
decreasing the effectiveness of responses even further. Dealing with issues caused by 
low performance may also reduce situational awareness, detecting early signals of 
other potential challenges, formulating effective solutions and/or effectively 
implementing these solutions. Conversely, improved performance may positively affect 
the challenge-response process by enhancing potency, and hence, improving responses.   
 
7.3 Research questions re-visited 
The process by which I developed of my research questions was described in section 
2.5. As detailed there, I came up with two main questions as a result of my literature 
analysis in the first year of my study: “What are the precursors of team resilience?” and 
“How is team resilience related to team performance?”  In this section, I seek to provide 
answers to these questions in the light of the results of my studies.  
7.3.1 What are the precursors of team resilience? 
Earlier conceptual investigations of organizational resilience (e.g. Sutcliffe and Vogus, 
2003), as well as more  recent ones (e.g. Linnenluecke, 2017) pointed to “the 
identification of the collective capabilities and capacities that contribute to resilience” 
as one of the most important unresolved issues of the field. In this regard, resilience 
researchers have observed that there is a lack of generally accepted and widely applied  
framework to explain resilience along with its antecedents and outcomes (Annarelli 
and Nonino, 2016, p. 8; Kamalahmadi and Parast, 2016, p. 126; Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 
16). Hence my first research question sought to address this issue by identifying these 
collective capabilities.  
To answer this question, I first constructed a tentative framework based on the 
propositions and findings of previous studies, utilizing various research streams of the 
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resilience field. Then, I tested this framework with my exploratory and main studies. As 
a result of the quantitative and qualitative analyses conducted in these studies, I 
updated the framework to its final version as shown in Figure 16. As seen in this model, 
various collective dynamics are identified as the precursors of team resilience. Among 
them, collective mental models received the strongest empirical support from my 
analysis results. In the main study, using two previously developed scales, namely 
collective mindfulness (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) and transactive memory systems 
(Lewis, 2003), I quantitatively tested the relationships between team resilience and 
collective mental models. The results showed a strong and meaningful relationship. 
Moreover, both in the exploratory and main studies, qualitative anecdotes revealed the 
importance of collective mental models in addressing and overcoming challenges. 
Qualitative analysis also revealed that effective communication systems are necessary to 
establish and maintain collective mental models among the team members. Teams that 
had continuous and effective information sharing among its members were able to 
establish and update the common picture of operations and synchronize this with the 
picture in each member’s mind. 
Moreover, team cohesion was also tested both quantitatively, using the scale developed 
by Chang and Bordia (2001), and qualitatively throughout my study. Although this 
collective dynamic was not included in the initial model, it was revealed as an 
important capacity to effectively address problems in the exploratory study; hence, 
added in the model. Quantitative analysis partially supported its relationship with 
resilience, yielding a significant positive coefficient in the correlation analysis but a 
non-significant positive coefficient in the regression and path analyses. Nonetheless, 
qualitative anecdotes advised for the importance of coordinated and unified collective 
act towards achieving shared purposes and accomplishing collective goals rapidly and 
efficiently.  
Finally, two dynamics in the model, namely team potency and collective improvisation, 
were also tested quantitatively in the main study. Team potency was included in the 
model after the analyses of the exploratory study, which demonstrated the importance 
of a team’s belief in its abilities to overcome a problem. However, the quantitative 
analysis of its relationship with team resilience did not yield significant results. 
Examining the qualitative data, I concluded that there were both resilient and non-
resilient potent teams and the difference between them appeared to be the breadth of 
their respective action repertoires. In other words, when a team was equipped with a 
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rich action repertoire, being potent contributed to resilience; when such a repertoire 
was absent, it did not.  
Collective improvisation was included in the initial model. In the exploratory study, 
teams were not observed to improvise extensively, and I concluded that the strictly 
pre-determined design (pre-determined problems, solutions and clues) of the Escape 
Game exercise might not give scope for teams to generate several response 
alternatives. In the main study, quantitative analyses yielded mixed results: all 
indicated a positive relationship between improvisation and resilience, however some 
of these results were non-significant. However, the qualitative data strongly suggested 
that the ability to improvise, along with an ambivalent attitude towards previously 
modelled responses (which were included in the action repertoire), was particularly 
important when faced with novel challenges that could not be addressed using existing 
action repertoires.  
Although included in the initial model, because of the methodological difficulties and 
the compromises I made during the selection of quantitative measures, certain 
precursors could not be tested quantitatively in my analyses. One of these precursors is 
accumulated knowledge, which also could not be tested in the exploratory study. The 
reason it could not be tested in the exploratory study was that “escape games” require 
participants to have as little information and practice as possible to preserve the 
novelty of the problems faced during the exercise. Hence, participants did not have 
prior knowledge of the situation they faced. However, my conversations with people 
who ran and played Escape Games indicated that prior experience of the exercise 
affects performance. The qualitative data from the main study also strongly suggested 
that knowledge accumulated prior to the trading day (in the form of planning, 
modelling, strategizing, specializing, practising, etc.) was effective in quickly detecting 
challenges and formulating effective responses. The teams that tried to anticipate and 
model the conditions of the trading period became familiar with the possible challenges 
and they broadened their action repertoire by formulating response alternatives. This 
in turn allowed them to address and overcome the challenges rapidly and effectively.   
For similar reasons, effective communication and information gathering systems also 
could not be measured quantitatively; however, qualitative data particularly advised 
for the importance of these systems in establishing situational awareness, which allows 
teams to detect the early and weak signals of challenges (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 
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2008, pp. 43–44). Qualitative anecdotes demonstrated that teams that had effective 
communication among its members were able to establish and constantly update their 
collective mental models with regard to the operational dynamics and environment. 
Effective information gathering systems were also important in updating the overall 
shared picture of operations and this in turn provided teams with the capacity to detect 
early and weak signals of forthcoming challenges.  
7.3.2 Is team resilience related to team performance and if so, how? 
In addition to identifying the dynamics that contribute to resilience, understanding the 
outcomes of resilience was also an extremely important objective in my study. As I 
elaborated in the introduction and literature analysis chapters, most of the previous 
resilience research has focused on extreme organizational settings (for the detailed 
discussion refer to sections 1.1 and 2.3). In these settings, resilience is important to 
provide “safe and reliable performance” (Sutcliffe, Paine and Pronovost, 2016, p. 1) as 
well as survival of the team or organization in question (Linnenluecke, Griffiths and 
Winn, 2012, p. 17). However, the majority of organizations and teams operate in non-
extreme settings where safety and survival is not necessarily such an immediate 
concern. The much more immediate and pressing concern for many units is to achieve 
and maintain  satisfactory performance levels in the face of a constant stream of 
challenges, many of them relatively minor but still potentially disruptive (Sheffi and 
Rice Jr., 2005; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009; Burnard and Bhamra, 2011).  
I, therefore, sought to derive objective measures of team performance to analyse the 
relationship between resilience and performance. In my exploratory study, I 
operationalized performance using the time taken by teams to solve the puzzles and 
unlock themselves from the room. Although this operationalization provided an 
objective measurement of performance, it did not allow me to differentiate between the 
ability to overcome challenges and the ability to accomplish collective operational 
goals. Such differentiation could not be achieved in my exploratory study as 
participating teams did not have any collective operational goal; or any goal other than 
solving the puzzles and unlocking themselves from the room. In contrast, real life teams 
(and other collective entities) are formed to accomplish certain goals and they have 
operations to accomplish these goals. While operating to accomplish these goals, they 
need to address and overcome the challenges they face and this is how they achieve 
resilience.  Considering this, I decided that in the research setting I will use to collect 
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data, teams should have operational goals that are different from solving problems and 
overcoming challenges. Therefore, as a result of my exploratory study analysis, I re-
conceptualized the outcome of resilience in my model as operational performance to 
indicate the level of accomplishing collective operational goals.  
In my main study, the teams were required to profitably produce greetings cards in 
accordance with the prespecified criteria. Therefore, operational performance was 
measured using objective performance indicators such as profit/loss, value of sales, 
number of cards produced, and rejection rate. In the quantitative analyses, the 
relationships between team resilience (using Stephens et al.(2013)’s team resilience 
scale) and these objective performance data were tested using various analyses; and all 
analyses showed significant, positive relationship. To understand the mechanisms 
underlying this relationship, I utilized qualitative data. Qualitative data revealed that 
when teams were effective in addressing and overcoming the challenges of the 
operational environment (such as high volume of noise, low lightning conditions, 
inability to secure desired orders, inventory problems, intra-team conflicts, etc.), the 
quality and the volume of their production increased, which was reflected in 
operational performance indicators. On the contrary, when they are not able to absorb, 
respond to and therefore overcome challenges, their operational performance 
decreased. 
Qualitative data suggest a cyclical, feedback relationship between resilience and 
performance, where the accomplishment of operational performance affects resilience 
as well as vice versa. Particularly when teams’ products did not meet the strict quality 
criteria and orders were rejected by the controllers, teams’ stress levels increased and 
their collective belief in their abilities (i.e. team potency) diminished. In turn, this 
appeared to decreased team effectiveness in detecting, addressing and overcoming 
challenges. This mechanism resembles to what tightly coupled systems experience, 
where because of limited time and slack, small problems may quickly escalate into 
bigger challenges (Roberts, 1990, p. 163). Similarly, for the teams in simulation, the 
inability to detect and overcome challenges deteriorates processes that provide quality, 
increase the level of rejection and rejection becomes a further source of challenge.   
Conversely, when teams were able to produce by meeting the quality criteria and 
delivery deadlines, their performance levels increased, their potency levels increased, 
and when combined with rich action repertoire, this contributed to their resilience to 





In this section, I seek to articulate what the results of my study may mean for the 
academy as well as the practitioner world, and how these parties may apply these 
findings. The general implications of the findings are discussed in two parts. In the first 
part, theoretical as well as methodological implications are provided for academic 
communities interested in resilience. These implications may be relevant for 
sensemaking, high-reliability organizing and positive organizational scholarship 
communities. Moreover, resilience is investigated within the context of maintaining and 
boosting team performance; hence, this study may also be relevant for the academic 
communities working on team performance and teams that operate in challenging 
environments. In the second part, practical implications, aimed more at the practitioner 
audience, are discussed. 
7.4.1 Academic implications 
In this section, I discuss how the findings from my study may be utilized by the other 
scholars. I focus on three areas. First of all, I discuss the contribution of the model of 
team resilience developed in this study, which integrates insights from a number of 
different resilience research streams (namely, high-reliability organizing, sensemaking, 
positive organizational scholarship and crisis management). Second, I elaborate on the 
importance of treating resilience as a mediating construct and I suggest that resilience 
per se need not be the ultimate outcome that an entity aims to attain, but is rather a 
stepping stone on the way to other desirable states, such as satisfactory performance. 
Third, I indicate how, as opposed to the post-hoc investigations widely preferred in the 
field, this study adopted a different methodology and that allowed for real-time data 
collection and a closer investigation of the processes associated with appropriate 
responses to challenges that resulted in resilience. These characteristics are elaborated 
below with regards to how they may be useful for the further development of research. 
7.4.1.1 A comprehensive framework to explain resilience 
As argued by previous work (Annarelli and Nonino, 2016, p. 8; Kamalahmadi and 
Parast, 2016, p. 126; Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 16) and mentioned in this study, there is a 
lack of a generally accepted framework to explain resilience. As I described  in the 
literature review chapter, there are several propositions for frameworks to explain 
resilience, produced  by various researchers (Horne and Orr, 1997; e.g. Mallak, 1998a; 
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Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Stephenson, 2010b), however, none of them has been 
widely adopted so far. Addressing this gap, I developed and tested an integrative model 
of resilience. This model has the potential to be a generally accepted and widely applied 
framework for resilience for two important reasons. 
Firstly, I developed it by integrating findings from different research streams of 
resilience. In the initial creation of this framework, I utilized several theoretical as well 
as empirical pieces of work and I investigated resilience from various perspectives, in 
various contexts and at various levels. This work includes organization studies (from 
research streams such as high-reliability organizing, positive organizational 
scholarship, and sensemaking) as well as engineering, ecology, sociology, psychology, 
systems. There are studies that look into one to one relationships between resilience 
and its proposed precursors as well as those that investigate several precursors 
simultaneously; there are quantitative investigations as well as qualitative and mixed 
investigations; there are conceptual developments as well as empirical examinations; 
and there are team level analyses as well as organizational, community, system and 
individual level analyses. The framework I established as a result of my investigation of 
these studies included their commonalities, addressed their contradictions and 
considered their idiosyncrasies. The model that I propose at the end of my research 
speaks to various streams of the resilience field and to various organizational contexts 
where resilience is required. This framework may be used by resilience researchers in 
various streams as a guide to investigate how challenges in various challenging 
organizational contexts may be addressed and overcome.   
 My qualitative investigation added an exploratory element to the analysis and also 
suggests the importance of other collective dynamics that have not yet been rigorously 
investigated by previous research. For instance, the qualitative findings demonstrated 
the effects of soft skills such as potency, trust or supportive team atmosphere on 
reporting mistakes and hence addressing and overcoming them more rapidly and 
effectively. Although I did not incorporate these attributes into the final version of my 
model because I was not able to rigorously test them, these findings could be fruitful 
research avenues for further investigation.  
Secondly, the results of this research demonstrate that the capacities that were found 
to foster resilience in high-risk, safety critical settings where even the smallest 
mistakes are not tolerated may also be effective in supporting challenge-response 
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processes in less extreme conditions. A majority of the research conducted into 
resilience has drawn its results from the analysis of entities that are in either high-risk 
industries or that have been through extreme adversities such as terrorist attacks, 
nuclear explosions, natural disasters, etc (a detailed analysis of this work was 
presented in section 2.3). Therefore, the literature review, upon which the initial 
development of the research framework is based, is mainly comprised of such work on 
extreme cases. Although it is important to understand the dynamics of effectively 
responding to such extreme events, the direct applicability of this understanding is 
very limited as the probability of these extreme events is very low (Vogus and 
Welbourne, 2003). Therefore, it is important to test whether the capabilities found to 
foster resilience in extreme settings are also effective in less extreme settings.  
In that sense, I have tested my framework by replicating non-extreme challenging 
conditions, which are more frequent in organizational settings but which threaten 
operational performance rather than reliability, continuity and safety. Although 
maintaining reliability, continuity and safety is a more important issue, for wider 
populations of organizations and teams, operational performance levels are more likely 
to be threatened by challenging conditions. Hence, by proposing a model of resilience 
to maintain and boost performance levels, my framework could be applied in a wider 
population of organizations compared to earlier models of resilience. 
7.4.1.2 “Resilience” as an intermediary construct in the path  
In the previous conceptualizations and empirical investigations of resilience, resilience 
was generally considered as an outcome variable (notable exceptions to this are 
detailed in section 2.5.2). Nevertheless, in more recent definitions, resilience is 
regarded as an ability that helps an entity to obtain a desired outcome (e.g. preserving 
identity or maintaining operational capacity). Therefore, in this study, in line with the 
adopted conceptualization of it, resilience is considered as an intermediary construct 
affecting performance, and being preceded by a set of precursors. This model has two 
significant implications.  
On the one hand, the model stresses that resilience is a dynamic capacity, which can 
change, develop and improve; as opposed to the idea of resilience being a static 
capacity, which is either possessed or not (e.g. Meyer, 1982; Wildavsky, 1988). This 
study implies that by investing into certain capacities and capabilities, such as collective 
mental models, team cohesion, effective communication and information gathering 
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systems and improvisation ability, teams may improve their resilience to challenges and 
adversity. In addition, after enduring a challenge, capacities may be learned and 
developed, making the team more resilient in the face of the next challenge. The 
examination of the processes by which resilience develops (or not) over repeated 
challenge-response cycles may be a fruitful avenue to pursue.  
On the other hand, this study adds to the conceptualization of resilience as the ultimate 
purpose of an entity (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; e.g. McDaniels et al., 2008; 
Stephenson, 2010a), even when going through challenges. In line with the definition of 
resilience adopted in this study, being resilient to challenges and overcoming them is 
only meaningful if this allows an entity to achieve its greater purpose. In this study, I 
investigated resilience to the challenges of daily operational conditions; hence, that 
greater purpose has been maintaining and improving operational performance. 
Therefore, effectively dealing with challenges is essential so long as it leads to 
satisfactory performance levels. Adopting this logic, resilience researchers, or any 
researcher studying organizations in challenging environments, may treat resilience as 
a precursor construct of the ultimate goals pursued by the entity. This logic takes 
resilience research beyond studies that treat resilience as the ultimate outcome and 
tries to answer the question of “why providing for (or investing in providing for) 
resilience is necessary and beneficial”.  
7.4.1.3 Real-time methodologies  
As mentioned in the literature review chapter, the academic resilience community does 
not yet appear to agree on a unanimous definition, conceptualization and 
operationalization of resilience (Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 15), suggesting that further 
work needs to be done in order to fully understand how resilience is manifested (van 
der Vegt et al., 2015). This suggests that resilience researchers should conduct in-depth 
investigations to be able to grasp the root causes of being (or not being) able to 
demonstrate resilience. Of course, such thorough and profound investigation requires 
continuous observations, numerous interviews with various people involved and 
extensive secondary information. These requirements entail methodological problems. 
To begin with, it might be impractical, if not impossible, to wait to come across 
challenge-response processes while making observations. In addition, being observed 
while addressing challenges might disturb participants. Thus, it is extremely hard to do 
real-time data collections while investigating real-life resilience manifestations. 
Moreover, even for the post-hoc investigations, in certain instances, participants might 
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be reluctant to spend time on the data collection process or they might not want to 
reveal data they think might hurt their reputation. Even if the investigated party is 
collaborative and helpful, it might be a long process to understand where to look for 
useful information.  
Because of these issues, empirical studies of resilience are mostly in the form of post-
hoc investigations of entities that have been through different kinds of crises and data 
sources mostly rely on self-reports. This might be one of the reasons behind the lack of 
unanimity on definitions, conceptualizations and operationalisations of resilience. This 
implies that the field requires novel methodologies to progress. Addressing this, one of 
the novelties of my study is the use of a simulation methodology to generate data to test 
the proposed framework. This methodology lies somewhere in between experimental 
designs and field investigations. It does create an artificial setting in which to observe 
responses to challenges and adversities; however, no manipulations were used in order 
to try to ensure that challenges and responses were as authentic as and as naturally 
developed as possible. When observing the challenge-response processes of 
participating teams, it interesting to see processes very similar to those seen in 
investigations such as Weick’s (1993) study on Mann Gulch disaster and Nishiguchi and 
Beaudet’s (1998) study on Aisin Fire. However, the simulations were also effective in 
revealing, at least partially, how these processes came into being, how they manifested 
themselves and how they were developed and exercised. Hence, methodologies similar 
to the one used in my study could be developed and applied for other researching on 
resilience or other concepts that have the same multifaceted structure. Although the 
simulation method used in this study was based on a card manufacturing process, the 
same procedures could be applied to imitate different kinds of organizational 
environments and to replicate different operational processes. Examples could be top 
management decision-making processes, new product development processes or 
supply-chain product movement processes.  
 
7.4.2 Practical implications 
While designing this study, one of my main objectives was to test and validate the 
wider applicability of resilience principles, which were found to work for the teams and 




“…resilience can be important for almost any business team, even 
when physical safety is not an issue. Challenges can diminish the 
ability to accomplish goals and tax the cohesion of virtually any 
team; so almost any team can benefit from greater resilience.”  
The results suggest that even among the teams in this study, there were 
discriminations to be made in terms of which capacities to develop and how to develop 
these capacities. In this section I discuss the practical implications in three parts. In the 
first part, the advantages and disadvantages of permanent and temporary teams are 
discussed; and specific suggestions are made as to how to be resilient to challenges. In 
the second part, the focus turns to challenges, and the differences between responses to 
novel and non-novel challenges are elaborated. Finally, in the third part, work periods 
are examined; actions are proposed for operational as well as non-operational periods.  
7.4.2.1 Permanent vs. temporary teams 
Some teams work on continuous tasks and operate for long lasting periods, whereas 
some others are formed to accomplish specific projects that last for a short, limited 
period. Although at the formation stage of these teams all might have similar 
experiences, the former type strategizes and plans with a long-term perspective and, 
over time, and by facing the similar challenges, it accumulates much more knowledge. 
Therefore, for these former types of teams, response processes might have already 
become embedded in the routines, whereas temporary teams have to develop response 
processes as they encounter new challenges.  
The importance of accumulated knowledge was demonstrated in my study, even 
though the teams involved were temporary teams. The participating teams met and 
formed only four weeks prior to the trading period and they were formed only to 
participate in the simulation and then dissolved afterwards. Nonetheless, the choice of 
how to utilize the four weeks was solely decided by them, so there were differences in 
terms of how much high-quality time they spent together (i.e. how many times they 
met, how long the meetings were and how they choose to spend this time). Some teams 
met more than once a week and some only met a few times and practice occurred in 
subunits and even individually. Some teams mingled, talked, specialized, strategized, 
planned, modelled and rigorously practiced in these meetings and in doing this 
replicated some of the challenges they would face in the trading period. This allowed 
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them both to develop responses to these possible challenges and to embed these 
responses into their planned routines, at least to a level.  
Conversely, other teams did not consider alternative scenarios or did not encounter 
them prior to trading because of not practicing enough; in these cases, resilience can 
only come from improvised actions. However, as the qualitative data effectively 
illustrate, first, the turbulence and dynamism of challenging conditions inhibits the 
development of improvised actions; and second, even the improvised actions were best 
developed when previously established (or accumulated) action repertoire is rich. The 
implication of this is that, even for temporary teams, time spent to accumulate 
knowledge is extremely valuable. 
This implies that for teams with no defined dissolution date, continuous investment in 
developing and improving routines will be even more rewarding. Such teams may 
discuss the regular challenges they face in order to create and embed the responses to 
these into their routines and also to talk about the irregular challenges faced and 
develop alternative action scenarios to address these. This would help them to 
establish collective mental models during challenging operational conditions. In 
addition, the planning and the organization embedded in the accomplishment of the 
routinized tasks may also be evaluated and, if necessary, amended in these meetings. 
For instance, if a specific form of specialization does not work, alternatives could be 
developed and even tried for a limited time. Finally, the results show the value of 
paying attention to the building team cohesion as its effect on resilience can be seen 
both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
On the other hand, temporary teams may place greater attention on the generation of 
alternative scenarios and corresponding actions sets rather than trying to develop 
routines which they may never need. Working on the responses to different challenge 
scenarios will enrich their action repertoire, and they may be able to improvise more 
effectively in the face of irregular (or unexpected) challenges, which is possibly the type 
of challenge they will encounter the most. Moreover, as they might not have a second 
chance to reorganize themselves, temporary teams could focus on developing enhanced 
role flexibility and greater role knowledge to be able to fill in for another role if 
required. Hence, they might invest in developing collective mental models to have a 
shared and synchronized picture of the operations and roles. They could also benefit 
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from being more ambivalent towards plans and being ready to be flexibly deviate and 
improvise new actions when unexpected circumstances arise. 
7.4.2.2 Novel vs. non-novel challenges 
Particularly in the qualitative data, a distinction was observed between responses to 
novel (unexpected) and non-novel (expected) challenges. In the context of my study, 
non-novel challenges are the challenges either anticipated or considered during 
alternative scenario analyses or challenges encountered while practising the 
operational tasks and conducting trials of the trading period. In real-life, especially for 
permanent teams, non-novel challenges may also be challenges encountered regularly 
in the regular course of operations. These could be a stressful work atmosphere, tight 
deadlines, difficulties of tasks, risks of making mistakes, penalties for not accomplishing 
the tasks as the way they should be accomplished, and so on and so forth. Novel 
challenges are those that cannot easily be anticipated during scenario analyses and 
ones that have never been encountered before; they could be named as irregular 
challenges in the case of permanent teams. 
Obviously, non-novel challenges are easier and less stressful to respond to because 
they have already been either experienced or considered. Particularly in terms of 
anticipation and consideration, the development of collective mental models is 
prominent. For example, if the members openly report and discuss previous mistakes 
and errors, the team can work on generating an effective solution before facing the 
same situation again. If overcoming a challenge requires collective effort, then it 
becomes important that the members know how to best communicate among each 
other and where to obtain the necessary information. All these will improve resilience, 
and in turn, lead to better performance. Such a sequence illustrates, once again, the 
importance of working on alternative plans, generating Plan-Bs, Cs, and Ds, as well as 
the importance of modelling operations, practicing individual tasks and making 
realistic trials of operations.  
The feedback loop from resilience to accumulated knowledge is also important in the 
context of addressing non-novel challenges. When an entity overcomes a challenge, 
there is potential (derived from the experience) to develop the necessary skills and 
capacities to overcome that challenge. This potential may be utilized by collective 
learning activities (such as talking about the experience or recording the steps of 
overcoming the challenge) and thereby causing the response process of to become part 
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of its accumulated knowledge. This, in turn, can broaden entity’s existing action 
repertoire and allow it to overcome similar challenges more quickly and efficiently.  
Unfortunately, certain teams are operating in turbulent, dynamic, fast-paced 
environments such as technology-driven industries, where processes and routines may 
be altered on a daily basis. For these teams, alternative scenarios and extensive trials 
might not be effective in designing resilient responses to all challenges, as some 
challenges will be unexpected and some will have novel elements. For these challenges, 
the only preparation that can be (and possibly should be) done is to develop an 
understanding of “the possibility of unanticipated challenges” and to enrichen the action 
repertoire of members as much as possible in order to encourage the generation of 
improvised solutions right in the moment. Although improvisation is an emergent 
capacity that facilitates resilience, its achievability is strongly dependent on collective 
support for improvisation and also on the breadth of the previously developed action 
capacity.  
Another important point is how information processing is exercised during operations, 
before and during an encounter with a novel challenge. Above all, the team has to 
detect the early signals of a novel challenge to have enough time to improvise a 
solution. This requires an effective communication system among the team members in 
order for every member to have a cognitive map of the operations and the 
surroundings, so that the right member can bring signals together at the right moment 
to recognize the arrival of a challenge. While processing relevant information, team 
should also be wary of overloading communication channels with unnecessary 
information. Thus, an effective information processing system should be capable of 
filtering noise as well as digesting the necessary data. Even after a novel challenge has 
been detected, the information processing system should still be intact for the 
collective generation and implementation of solutions. In the simulation, the best 
performing and most resilient teams were the ones that established communication 
structures that were not disrupted throughout the trading period. Therefore, 
particularly for resilience in the face of novel challenges, an effective information 
processing system is crucial, since detecting problems in the earliest instance and 
improvising and implementing novel responses requires an all-round and collective 
understanding of the circumstances.    
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7.4.2.3 Challenging (operational) vs. non-challenging (non-operational) periods 
Finally, teams that have non-operational periods may take different sets of actions in 
operational and non-operational periods. The teams in the simulation had four weeks 
of non-operational time before trading took place; hence, they had this time to prepare 
to perform well in the turbulent and fast-faced market replication. The data clearly 
show that performance differences originated from different actions taken during the 
trading period as well as during the preparation period. First of all, it was evident that 
the capacity to respond resiliently had been developed prior to entering the trading 
period. For example, as elaborated in section 6.3.1.3, teams utilized effective 
specialization in the form of clearly defined roles allocated according to tested 
strengths and also in the form of a broad role knowledge coupled with appropriate 
flexibility to be able to fill in for other roles when necessary. This capacity was utilized 
(by certain teams) during operations, however, this capacity had been developed in the 
preparation period by defining roles, testing strengths, allocating roles, planning 
flexibilities, training on the main roles and then cross-training in other roles, and finally 
by practising extensively. In addition to building such capacities, modelling alternative 
scenarios, testing capabilities and limits, and challenging assumptions is easier to 
accomplish during these non-operational periods; and these are the most effective 
preparation actions to anticipate challenges, to respond to challenges and where 
possible to avoid these challenges in the first place.  
However, even more crucial than these, fundamental strategies are often formulated in 
these non-operational periods. The non-operational periods are opportunities for a 
team to understand its functional and social dynamics. Hence, teams that operate in 
challenging operational conditions may need such non-operational periods for 
reflection and processing in order to be resilient during the operational (challenging) 
periods, where time and task pressure does not allow for such reflection and 
processing. 
Non-operational periods are much less prone to disruption with fewer time constraints, 
no external disturbances and no penalties for errors. Therefore, if the members are left 
to behave more independently, supported to participate in the discussions, and 
encouraged to provide their ideas, opinions, comments and feedback; then more 
information will be available to the team to make the best strategic decisions. 
Organizational atmospheres where all-channel communication is encouraged might be 
the most appropriate choice for this, with decision alternatives proposed by everybody 
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and decisions taken by mutual agreement. Such an atmosphere would allow the 
assumptions behind proposals to be challenged by several minds, which should make 
the decisions more robust. Moreover, members can more easily disclose if they are not 
happy with a decision, and this would reduce the possibility of low member satisfaction 
and subsequent error proneness and performance reduction.  
Contrarily, when a team is in challenging conditions, decisions have to be made quickly, 
and the team has to avoid ambiguity, conflict and hesitation. All these lengthen the 
response process which is likely to reduce resilience. Thus, in challenging periods, a 
centralized approach could be preferred to speed up the decision-making process. Even 
if an all-channel communication structure is preferred during the non-operational 
periods and a leader has not emerged naturally, a manager (or a decision-making 
committee) may be appointed to assume the decision-making power and responsibility 
when dealing with challenges.  
 
7.5 Limitations and recommendations 
7.5.1 Limitations  
As with any research, there are certain limitations of what I have described here, which 
I shall explore in the section that follows. 
Firstly, the data analysed in this study were collected using a simulation methodology, 
which means the results are based on an artificial setting rather than a real setting. As 
pointed out by Muijs (2013) the problem of conducting a research in an artificial setting 
is that these settings may not represent the complexity of real settings. Particularly in 
the case of experimental designs, controlling other possible effects to observe cause 
and effect relationships is unrealistic as in real life there might be multiple factors at 
work which might intermingle together in various ways. The simulation method I 
utilized in my study is not a pure experimental design as there was no systematic 
controlling or manipulation. The market replication was designed to be as realistic and 
natural as possible for the applicability of the results to real-life teams. During the 
implementation, the researchers did not intervene with the conditions the teams were 
going through. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to precisely reproduce the complexity of real life 
conditions in a simulation. It is highly likely that there are certain other factors 
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affecting the resilience of the teams that could not be observed because of the way the 
simulation was designed. Moreover, the negative outcomes of the challenges and 
adversities faced by teams may be more severe in real life, which in turn affect 
responses. Furthermore, the design of the simulation ensures that rational, strategic 
and operational behaviour tends to result in high performance and desired outcomes, 
which might not be the case in political, contested environments, for example. In the 
simulation, there is little in the way of politics and subterfuge. Controller decisions are 
as standardized as possible to provide for equality and ‘a level playing field’; except for 
maybe a little room at the margins for exceptional inter-personal skills. On the 
contrary, in real-life consortiums are formed, bilateral agreements are signed, bribes 
are sometimes given, and power is exploited; so, there are various legal as well as 
illegal ways to secure outcomes other than just been good at what you do. Hence, in real 
life, overall performance may be an outcome of various other precursors in addition to 
the operational outcomes, which is not the case in simulation utilized in my study.  
Lastly, the simulations replicate a market with challenging conditions in a non-extreme 
organizational setting. Different fast-paced and dynamic markets in different sectors 
and industries might have different types of challenges and adversities; and hence, 
there is the possibility of different precursors to be effective in permitting resilient 
responses to these challenges. For example, Holweg and Oliver (2015) investigated 
high-impact failures and near-misses in auto industry, and their analysis concluded that 
stakeholder relations, operations and management systems, market reach and scale are 
the sources of resilience in the auto industry (2015, p. 114). Particularly for high 
impact, one-off adversities (generally in the form of a large-scale crisis) and for larger 
organizations with more complex systems and dynamics, other dynamics (such as 
scale, financial reserves or relations with stakeholders, etc.) might play more crucial 
roles. Having said that, I established my framework by utilizing the resilience studies 
conducted in various sectors; therefore, the results are expected to be applicable in 
various different settings.  
Secondly, as mentioned, resilience is a very complex phenomenon that is not be fully 
understood yet; and hence, investigating it and generalizing the results of this 
investigation requires a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, where not only 
the manifestation of relationships can be closely examined, but also the relative 
importance of these relationships can be determined. Although I designed my study in 
such a way to permit me to observe, record and analyse team processes that lead to 
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resilience and, in turn, satisfactory performance; this study also demonstrated how 
hard it is to perfectly capture the manifestation of resilience, its antecedents and its 
outcomes. I concluded that manifestation of resilience in challenge-response processes 
is too subtle to be easily observed and recorded; and this study could only go so far to 
record and analyse its most imminent outcomes in the form of problems solved, 
challenges overcome, performance maintained and so on. All these indications of 
resilience, together with self-reported team resilience, are treated as the proxies of 
team resilience to understand its dynamics. However, the recordability of actual 
manifestation of resilience still remains as an important issue of the field.  
One may claim that how data is captured is also relevant in the context of this 
limitation. Although the problem associated with self-report data is addressed with 
objective performance measures and observational data collection tools (non-
systematic participant observations and audio and video recordings), data related to 
certain team dynamics and soft-skills were measured using self-report scales. As 
mentioned by various scholars, the operationalization of certain cognitive and 
behavioural processes that provide for resilience in challenging conditions, along with 
the concept of resilience itself, is a major challenge (Lewis et al., 2011; Linnenluecke 
and Griffiths, 2011; Rose, 2004). Thus, self-report measures are utilized as the most 
convenient method of systematic data collection; and these measures are supported by 
a non-systematic observational data collection to (at least partially) overcome the 
limitations associated with self-report data, but they do have weaknesses. 
Thirdly, considering the quantitative analysis methodologies utilized in this study, the 
sample size could be considered as a limitation. Certain scholars suggest using no less 
than 200 cases to obtain robust results with path analysis (Barrett, 2007; Foster, 
Barkus and Yavorsky, 2011b); and, of course, considering the number of predictors in 
the quantitative analyses, one may suggest a bigger sample would increase the power 
of generalizability (Maxwell, 2000). However, it should be noted that the relationships 
analysed in this study are based on the previous theorizations; hence, the results test 
and validate rather than provide novel assertions. Moreover, the relationships 
validated (or not) through quantitative analysis were not merely interpreted based on 
these results; the manifestations of these relationships were explained and illustrated 
utilizing qualitative data. In addition, this study is part of an ongoing project, so, the 
sample size will increase over time.  
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Fourthly, the way qualitative data was collected and utilized in this research is also a 
limitation. It was not feasible to directly observe teams during their four weeks of 
preparation. Moreover, because of the administrative work that needs to be done by 
the researcher-controllers during the trading period, no systematic real-time 
observations of trading period could be conducted. The information with regard to 
these periods was therefore mainly based on the collective and individual reflections of 
every team and its members, and supported by non-systematic observational and video 
data. Moreover, at the outset I did not intend to carry out a systematic analysis using 
qualitative data and only benefited from it as an extra source to support and 
complement the quantitative analysis in testing and validating the conceptual model. 
Therefore, particularly the parts of the finalized model (Figure 16) that were mainly 
investigated through qualitative data require further rigorous investigation for 
validation.   
A final limitation particularly relates to applying the results of this study to permanent 
teams with an abundance of accumulated knowledge embedded into team routines and 
collective mental models. As described in the methodology chapter, the participating 
teams of the simulation were formed only four weeks prior to the trading period, which 
may be considered as a short period of time to develop routines to deal with challenges. 
Moreover, the duration of the trading period is limited (135 minutes) to allow 
participating teams to develop skills to be more resilient over time; and they only 
undertook the simulation once, which means that the effect of prior experience may 
only be observed through practicing and trials they report. Thus, the learning effect 
might not have been captured as well as desired. If teams were entered into the 
simulation a second time, they might better respond to the challenges and improve 
their performance (which is what almost all of them claim in the post-trading 
presentations). Therefore, one may conclude that the results of the simulation is not 
entirely applicable to permanent teams. This issue is acknowledged in the suggestions 
for permanent teams (section 7.4.2.1) along with the possible differences between 
temporary and permanent teams. To address this issue, in the parent project, we hope 
to include permanent teams and the results will be contrasted to detect any difference.  
7.5.2 Recommendations for future studies into resilience 
The investigation of the resilience concept is an ongoing and continuously improving 
process carried out by the ever-growing community of resilience scholars; and as 
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stated before, the work done for this study will also continue after the finish of the 
study. Consequently, there are several paths that could be followed to continue this 
work and also to progress resilience research in the organizational context. This section 
outlines some of these various paths and details the research that could be conducted.  
7.5.2.1 Further exploration and validation of the framework  
The most straightforward continuation of this research would be the testing and 
validation of the framework developed in this study by replicating it in various 
different research settings. I plan its first replication to be conducted on real-life teams 
as a field investigation, which would serve as an ecological validation to this study. This 
could be done in different studies choosing samples from different sectors or other 
sample specifications may be done with regards to the characteristics of the teams, the 
nature of the challenges and even the location (country, culture, environmental 
conditions, etc.) the teams operate in.  
Moreover, validation may be made using different methodologies and different data 
collection tools. It may be a solely quantitative study by updating the questionnaires 
with the insight gained from qualitative finding of this study; or it may be a further 
qualitative analysis to try to discover ways to see the manifestation of resilience in 
action, along with observing its interaction with other concepts. For analyses involving 
quantitative methods, I may try to collect data from bigger samples to test the 
robustness of the results. The tools to collect qualitative or quantitative data may be 
updated to gain knowledge in varying angles. For example, observations could be made 
more rigorously and systematically by assigning an observer for each team or putting 
audio and video recording equipment on each table or interviews could be conducted 
after the simulation to obtain elaborated data on significant incidents. 
7.5.2.2 The importance of paradoxes for the resilience research 
While juxtaposing the qualitative findings with the previous literature, I identified a 
promising avenue as the relationship between resilience and experienced paradoxes. 
According to the findings of this study, it is revealed that teams that were successful at 
managing certain paradoxes were better able to demonstrate resilience. For example, 
some teams had both specialized members with clearly identified roles and the 
capacity to fill in a role that could not be carried out by the originally responsible 
members. When such teams faced with challenges, all members were knowledgeable 
on their own area of expertise, so the appropriate members stepped in to solve the 
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problem. However, when such a challenge prevented a member from fulfilling his/her 
roles, somebody else was ready to fill in for him/her thanks to the appropriate 
mechanisms established. In another example, many mid to high performing teams were 
able to formulate plausible plans and even contingency plans prior to the trading 
period. However, most of the time, the performance differences between these teams 
were determined by their ability to detect when it was necessary to deviate from the 
original plan and their courage to accomplish that deviation. As a final example, some 
teams practiced rigorously to overcome the errors and to maintain performance levels 
during other kinds of challenges. Some others went one step further; modelled the 
trading period with trials in order to anticipate external challenges and formed 
contingency plans and strategies accordingly. However, at certain times, what 
determined team resilience was an ability to address the challenges, which allowed 
combining this accumulated knowledge with improvised solutions that were generated 
in the heat of the moment. This ability to bring these paradoxical elements together 
was observed among the most resilient and best performing teams.  
When examining the resilience literature, one can see that similar contradictions in the 
demonstration of resilience were also observed by certain previous studies. In the 
examination of Mann Gulch disaster, Weick (1993) suggested utilizing existing 
knowledge but equally leaning towards novel solutions would have saved the lives of 
the firefighters. Subsequently in the conceptualization of mindfulness he and his 
colleagues indicated that HROs’ ability to simultaneously ‘believe and doubt’ their past 
experiences not only allow them to benefit from those experiences, but also encouraged 
them to improvise novel solutions quickly when past experiences were useless (Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008, p. 97). They also touched upon other contradictory 
dynamics and skills that these organizations exhibit when faced with adversities. For 
instance, they stated how successful HROs necessitate centralization for the effective 
coordination of response but at the same time require decentralization for ‘local 
containment and resolution of problems’ (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008, p. 117). 
Moreover, Kendra and Watchendorf (2003b) also identified the vitality of inherently 
contradictory elements of resilience during their fieldwork in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks. They highlighted centralization as well as decentralization, and improvisation 
as well as preparedness, as all paradoxically essential to provide for resilient responses 
(Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003, p. 50). In another study, Tierney (2003, p. 6) 
mentioned the ability ‘to deviate both from plans and past experiences when necessary’ 
213 
 
as an important facilitator of resilience, which is another unresolved paradox for 
resilient responses; and related with that, Rijpma (1997, p. 18) pointed out the ‘switch 
from one mode of decision-making to another’ as a characteristic of HROs while dealing 
with unexpected situations. Among these, Hamel and Välikangas (2003) specifically 
used the word paradox and stress the need to ‘embrace paradox’ in order to provide for 
sustained resilience.  
Therefore, moving from both the propositions of previous studies and the findings of 
the qualitative analysis, a recommendation for the future studies of resilience may be to 
examine the relationship between resilience and paradoxes experienced by teams and 
organizations. Ambivalence (as described in section 6.3.1.2) is considered a form of 
paradox and is included among the constructs used in the questionnaires in the 
continuation of parent project. Similar to this, other concepts measuring the 
management paradoxical elements could be used in quantitative analyses of resilience. 
As an alternative, qualitative studies may be designed to reveal the paradoxical process 
of teams and organizations and the effects of these processes on resilience.  
7.5.2.3 Ultimate outcomes other than “performance” 
In this study, the outcome of being resilient in non-extreme challenging settings was 
identified as satisfactory performance, in line with the justification made in section 
2.5.2. Subsequently, in the research model, a positive relationship between resilience 
and performance was proposed; and in the methodological design, tools were included 
to measure team performance objectively. This relationship was validated in this study. 
However, for future studies, researchers are encouraged to investigate other possible 
outcomes of resilience. For instance, in the context of extreme conditions (for e.g. high-
reliability organizing), since the negative outcomes of challenges are related with the 
survival of an entity, the outcome of resilience is identified as reliability (Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008). In circumstances where human life is in danger, the 
outcome of resilience may be safety and security (Richardson, 1995; Seville, Van Opstal 
and Vargo, 2015). In the context of well-being and positive organizational scholarship 
the effect of resilience on happiness, commitment and satisfaction can be examined 
(Youssef and Luthans, 2007; West, Patera and Carsten, 2009). Therefore, depending on 
the research field, analysis level, sector or industry, and the ultimate needs, desires and 
purposes of the investigated entity, the outcomes of resilience may change. This is also 
effectively saying that resilience support various other outcomes. 
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Researchers who aim to investigate resilience, particularly with a holistic view, may 
first examine the circumstances of the entities they are analysing in order to determine 
their ultimate needs and desires they may obtain by increasing resilience. Once the 
ultimate outcome (or outcomes) are identified, the researcher can then determine 
methods to measure them. These can help a resilience study in two ways: first, these 
measurements may serve as proxies to represent the level of resilience, if the cause and 
effect theorization is well grounded; second, if the methods are well-established to 
directly measure resilience, then, using two measurements, the nature of the 





In their introduction to how the resilience concept explains “positive adjustment in 
challenging conditions” and incorporates insight from the previous studies to 
thoroughly conceptualize it, Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003, p. 95) stated that: 
“Dynamics that create or retain resources (cognitive, emotional, 
relational, or structural) in a form sufficiently flexible, storable, 
convertible, and malleable, give rise to resilience and allow 
organizations, their units, and their members to avert 
maladaptive tendencies and positively cope with the unexpected.” 
These words guided my study, as well as many other studies carried out after this 
work. My main purpose has been not only to discover and validate such dynamics that 
leads to resilience on their own, but also to establish a comprehensive framework of 
how these dynamics manifest and intermingle in constituting the antecedents of 
resilience. Adding on to this, I also investigated the outcome (or outcomes) of resilience 
in the form of satisfactory performance. The systematic literature review conducted by 
Linnenluecke (2017) spanning 1977 to 2014 demonstrates that such a comprehensive 
and widely accepted framework is still not established. She points out that the 
questions of “what makes some organizations more successful in dealing with, and 
responding to, the unfamiliar” (2017, p. 4) and “whether and how organizations can 
avoid threat-rigidity and ‘activate’ resilience in response to threat, and how resilience 
can successfully be built across individual, group and organizational levels of analysis” 
(2017, p. 9) still cannot not be answered in a way that satisfies the resilience 
community and its stakeholders.  
In my study, I identified these as my research questions, and over three and a half 
years, I tried to conduct thorough research in order to answer them. With this aim, I 
conducted a detailed literature analysis to establish a working framework, then, I 
improved this framework and brought it into an operationalizable format with an 
exploratory study, and, tested with a simulation study (as part of a parent project on 
resilient teams) utilising both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Agreeing 
with Cumming et al.’s (2005, p. 976) statement: “If we define a priori the variables that 
lead to system resilience, then our conclusions will be largely driven by our initial 
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selection of variables”, in the main analysis, I not only tested the relationships I 
identified by the literature review, but also observed additional relationships.  
As mentioned previously, one of my objectives was to understand and validate the 
transferability of the principles applied in extreme organizational settings to 
demonstrate resilience into non-extreme organizational settings. Linnenluecke (2017, 
p. 11) indicates this as one of the several other unanswered questions of the resilience 
field. To achieve this objective, first of all, the main study simulations were designed to 
replicate a non-extreme but still challenging organizational setting. Moreover, the 
outcome of resilience was identified as performance rather than reliability, safety or 
survival, as this is identified as one of the elements that differentiate the organizations 
in extreme settings from the organizations in non-extreme challenging settings. The 
results suggest that resilience is very important in obtaining satisfactory performance 
levels, just as it is in providing for reliability and safety.  
The final version of the model of collective resilience (as shown in section 7.2) aimed to 
serve the purposes of various stakeholders. Theoretically, I expected it to fill the gap of 
a comprehensive and widely accepted framework that explains resilience, of course, 
after further rigorous replications and validations. Since this study is conducted at the 
team level, it could first be tested at organizational level and since this study did not 
specify any sector or industry for its application, it could also be tested in specific 
sectors (and industries) to validate its applicability in a wide range of organizational 
settings. Furthermore, practically, I intend this framework to guide organizations and 
their collective units to apply the necessary principles to demonstrate resilience 
against the challenges and adversities they face. I provided recommendations for them 
(in section 7.4.2) with regards to which actions may be taken in permanent and 
temporary contexts, for operational and managerial tasks, when faced novel and non-
novel challenges, and during operational and non-operational periods.  
As a final word, investigating, understanding and achieving resilience is proved, in this 
study as well as in all other studies in this field, to be a difficult, long-lasting, complex, 
and constantly developing challenge. Over the three and a half years of this study, I 
carried out my work with the hope of contributing to this progress, but also with the 
acceptance of not pursuing a moving target. Hence, even before the beginning of this 
study, I expected to design further studies to continue this work, in progressing the 
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10.1 Various definitions of ‘resilience’ 
Source Level Definition Dimensions and Facilitators of Resilience 
(Holling, 1973) Ecological “Resilience is a measure of the persistence of 
systems and of their ability to absorb change 
and disturbance and still maintain the same 
relationships between populations or state 
variables.” (as opposed to stability) 
Keeping options open 
Viewing events in a regional rather than a local 
context 
Emphasizing heterogeneity 
(Meyer, 1982) Organizational “Resiliency occurs when responses create 
negative-feedback loops that absorb jolts' 
impacts and loosen couplings between 
organizations and their environments.” 
Strategic (Innovativeness, Attention to 
environment, Boundary spanning, Scope of general 
services, Outpatient and long-term scope, Medicare 
scope) Ideological variables (Importance of 
environment, Strategic reorientations, Benefits 





System “Resilience is the capacity to cope with 
unanticipated dangers after they have become 
manifest, learning to bounce back.” (as 
opposed to anticipation) 
Resourcefulness 
Flexibility 
(Weick, 1993) Group No definition given Improvisation,  
Virtual role systems,  
The attitude of wisdom,  
Norms of respectful interaction 
(Pulley, 1997) Organizational “Resilience is associated with elasticity, 
buoyancy, and adaptation. It is also associated 
with a strong life energy... A lack of resilience 
manifests as paralysis, depression, 
Organizational learning 
Corporate mission (a larger purpose) 
Corporate culture (a binding identity) 
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defensiveness and cynicism, Communication 
across functions or departments declines 
because job insecurity often causes increasing 
fortification around turf. Even in rapidly 
growing organizations, many people seem 
paralyzed around making decisions or taking 
action in the face of enormous ambiguity. Or if 
they do take action, they react habitually rather 
than creatively simply because there is not 
time to think. Consequently, organizations lose 
adaptability, and the result is lower 
productivity and declining performance. 
Organizations that lack resilience are out of 
synch with their environment.” 
Partnering and strategic alliances 
Staff elasticity (inclusion of temporary workers and 
outsourcing) 







“Resilience is a fundamental quality of 
individuals, groups, organizations, and systems 
as a whole to respond productively to 
significant change that disrupts the expected 
pattern of events without engaging in an 
extended period of regressive behaviour.” 




 Work environment 
Competence (effective blended skills and 
knowledge) 
Connections (relationships within) 
Commitment 
Communications (flow of relevant information) 
Coordination (accurate linking of effort for effective 
results) 
Consideration (self-checking/correction for 
accountability and harmony) 
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“Organizational resilience is the ability of a 
system to withstand the stresses of 
environmental/composition of the system 
pieces, their structural interlinkages, and the 
way environmental change is transmitted and 
spread throughout the entire system. To 
varying degrees, resilience is a fundamental 
quality found in individuals, groups, 
organizations, and systems as a whole. It 
allows positive response to significant change 
that disrupts the expected pattern of events 












& individual  
“…design(ing) and implement(ing) positive 
adaptive behaviours quickly that are matched 
to the immediate situation – while enduring 
minimal stress all the while.” 
Perceiving experiences constructively  
Performing positive adaptive behaviours 
Ensuring adequate external resources 
Expanding decision-making boundaries 
Practicing bricolage 
Developing tolerance for uncertainty 





“…the ability of an individual or organization to 
expeditiously design and implement positive 
adaptive behaviours matched to the immediate 
situation, while enduring minimal stress.” 
Goal-directed solution-seeking;  
Avoidance;  
Critical understanding;  
Role dependence;  
Source reliance;  
Resource access 
(Mallak, 1999) Individual & 
organizational 











Organizational “Resilience is not only about bouncing back 
from errors, it is also about coping with 
surprises in the moment. It is important to 
retain both connotations of resilience to avoid 
the idea that resilience is simply the capability 
to absorb change and still persist. To be 





Ability to cope with surprises 
Ability to form epistemic networks 
Formal support for improvisation 
Ability to recombine actions from repertoire  
Ambivalence (having both hope and doubt) 
(Reason, 2000) Organizational  “A resilient system… has intrinsic ‘safety 
health’; it is able to withstand its operational 
dangers and yet still achieve its objectives.” 
No characterization given 
(Carpenter et 
al., 2001) 
Socioecological “Resilience is the magnitude of disturbance 
that can be tolerated before a socioecological 
system (SES) moves to a different region of 
state space controlled by a different set of 
processes.” 
No characterization given 




“Resilience… (for people who are concerned 
with more complex, dynamic systems) is the 
ability of a system to recover from or adjust 
easily to misfortune or change… the ability to 







(Coutu, 2002) Individual “…the skill and the capacity to be robust under 
conditions of enormous stress and change.” 
(1) Acceptance of reality, (2) A belief mechanism 
with strongly held values (the link between the 
value systems and the resilient organizations) and 
(3) Ability to improvise 
Sense of humour 
Ability to form attachment with other 
Possession of an inner psychological space that 
protects from abusive people 
Ability to attract people and make them help you 
Having an optimistic nature that do not distort your 




Organizational  “(T)he ability to dynamically reinvent business 
models and strategies as circumstances 
change... a capacity for continuous 
reconstruction.” 
Aiming for “zero trauma” 
Conquering denial 
Valuing variety 
Liberating resources (as opposed to being 
conservative) 







“… refers to the maintenance of positive 
adjustment under challenging 
conditions…Dynamics that create or retain 
resources (cognitive, emotional, relational, or 
structural) in a form sufficiently flexible, 
storable, convertible, and malleable, give rise 
to resilience and allow organizations, their 
units and their members to avert maladaptive 
tendencies and positively cope with the 
unexpected…resilience is the capacity to 
Balancing the growth and competence (i.e. 
efficiency) 
 Enhance variation 
 Innovation 
 Efficiency 
 Honing existing competencies 
Enhancing competencies that provide mindfulness 




rebound from adversity strengthened and 
more resourceful.” 
 Recombining behavioural repertoires  
Restoring efficacy (structures that allow flexibility) 
 Norms, structures, practices 
 Conceptual slack 
 Ad hoc problem-solving networks 






“…socially constituted adaptability to 
unpredictable ambient forces.” 
Adaptive behaviour 
Improvisation 
Goal-directed solution seeking 




Organizational “Resilience means the ability to spring back to 
original form from stress, illness or adversity.” 
Relationships 
Management of emotions 
Moral Purpose 
(Fiksel, 2003) System Adopted from different studies Diversity: existence of multiple forms and 
behavio(u)rs;  
Efficiency: performance with modest resource 
consumption;  
Adaptability: flexibility to change in response to 
new pressures;  
Cohesion: existence of unifying forces or linkages. 
(Bruneau et al., 
2005) 
Systems “…the ability of social units, e.g., organizations 
and communities, to mitigate hazards, contain 
the effects of hazard-related disasters when 
they occur, and carry out recovery activities in 
ways that minimize social disruption and 









Systems  “the ability of the system to maintain its 
identity in the face of internal change and 









Organizational “Resilience capacity is defined as a unique 
blend of cognitive, behavioural, and contextual 
properties that increase a firm’s ability to 
understand its current situation and to develop 
customized responses that reflect that 
understanding.” 
Cognitive resilience,  
 Constructive Sensemaking 
 A strong ideological identity 
Behavioural resilience,  
 Complex and varied action inventory 
 Functional habits 
Contextual resilience 
 Deep social capital 
 Broad resource network 
(Sheffi, 2005) Organizational “For companies, it [resilience] measures their 
ability to, and speed at which they can, return 
to their normal performance level – 
production, services and fill rate – after a high 
impact/low probability disruption.” 
Redundancy: safety stock of material and finished 
goods 




Organizational “Resilience is a function of an organization’s 
overall situation awareness, management of 
keystone vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacity 
in a complex, dynamic, and interconnected 
environment.” 
Situation Awareness 
 Roles and Responsibilities 
 Understanding of Hazards and 
Consequences 
 Connectivity Awareness 
 Insurance Awareness 
 Recovery Priorities 
Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities 
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 Planning Strategies 
 Participation in Exercises  
 Capability and Capacity of Internal 
Resources 
 Capability and Capacity of External 
Resources 
 Organisational Connectivity 
Adaptive Capacity  
 Silo Mentality 
 Communications and Relationships 
 Strategic Vision and Outcome Expectancy 
 Information and Knowledge 




Systems Adopted from various resources Robustness: the extent of system function that 
 is maintained 
Rapidity: the time required to return to full system 
 operations and productivity 
(Ponomarov 
and Holcomb, 
2009, p. 131) 
Organizational  “The adaptive capability of the supply chain to 
prepare for unexpected events, respond to 
disruptions, and recover from them by 
maintaining continuity of operations at the 
desired level of connectedness and control 
over structure and function” 
Event readiness 




Organizational Adopted from various resources Resilience Ethos 
 Commitment to resilience 




 Roles and Responsibilities 
 Understanding of Hazards and 
Consequences 
 Connectivity Awareness 
 Insurance Awareness 
 Recovery Priorities 
 Internal and external situation monitoring 
and  reporting 
 Informed decision making 
Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities 
 Planning Strategies 
 Participation in Exercises  
 Capability and Capacity of Internal 
Resources 
 Capability and Capacity of External 
Resources 
 Organisational Connectivity 
 Robust processes for identifying and 
analysing  vulnerabilities 
 Staff engagement and involvement 
Adaptive Capacity  
 Silo Mentality 
 Communications and Relationships 
 Strategic Vision and Outcome Expectancy 
 Information and Knowledge 
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 Leadership, Management and Governance 
 Structures 
 Innovation and creativity 





Organizational “Organizational resilience is defined here as a 
firm's ability to effectively absorb, develop 
situation-specific responses to, and ultimately 
engage in transformative activities to capitalize 
on disruptive surprises that potentially 
threaten organization survival” 
Cognitive resilience,  
 Constructive Sensemaking 
 Strong core values coupled with a sense of 
 purpose and identity 
Behavioural resilience,  
 Learned resourcefulness, ingenuity, and 
 bricolage 
 A combination of useful habits and 
behavioural  preparedness 
Contextual resilience 
 Psychological Safety 
 Deep social capital 
 Diffuse power and accountability 





“General resilience is the capacity of social-
ecological systems to adapt or transform in 













(Lee, Vargo and 
Seville, 2013) 
Organizational  Adopted from: (McManus et al., 2008) Adaptive Capacity 
 Minimization of silos 
 Internal resources 
 Staff engagement and involvement 
 Information and knowledge 
 Leadership 
 Innovation and creativity 
 Decision making 
 Situation monitoring and reporting 
Planning 
 Planning strategies 
 Participation in exercises 
 Proactive posture 
 External resources 




Organizational  “…we define resilience as organizational 
capacity to absorb the impact and recover from 
the actual occurrence of an extreme weather 
event.” 
Impact resistance: the capacity of an organization to 
 withstand a damaging  impact as it occurs 
Rapidity: the capacity of an organization to quickly 
 recover and to restore to a pre‐disturbance 
or  even an improved state after experiencing a 
 damaging impact 





10.2 Exploratory study data collection guidelines 
PRE-EXERCISE DISCUSSION 
Individual Level Team Level 
- Feelings right before the game 
- Confidence / Hope? Doubt / Hesitation? 
Ambivalence?  
- Expectations regarding the forthcoming 
experience: Positive or Negative 
perceptions? Or both? (What do you 
expect / think is going to happen?) 
- Would you like to develop a strategy? 
(may show rigidity vs. flexibility and 
coordinated action vs. deviation from 
plan) 
- Does anyone have any suggestion 
regarding how you should approach to 
game? 
THINGS TO WATCH FOR DURING SESSION 
Individual Level Team Level 
- Hope vs. doubt 
- confidence vs. hesitation 
- braveness vs. fear  
- positive vs. negative attitude 
- rigidity vs. flexibility 
- self-orientation vs. other orientation 
- competitive vs. collaborative 
- big picture vs. attention for detail  
 
- diversity vs. unity 
- sophistication vs. simplicity 
- positive vs. negative attitude 
- existing capabilities vs. improvisation 
- specific role vs. filling in for other 
- rigidity vs. flexibility 
- interactive vs. detached  
- central vs. de-central 
- coordinated action vs. deviation from 
plan 
- Were there any constructive challenge 
& debate? 
POST-EXECISE DISCUSSION 
Individual Level Team Level 
- Can you self-evaluate yourselves 
regarding your success / approach /…? 
- How would you evaluate your 
experience? Did you enjoy? Did you feel 
exited during the game? If not, what did 
not fulfil your expectations? 
- How were your feelings during and 
after the game? 
- What were your strengths and 
weaknesses as a team? 
- How did you deal with obstacles and 
difficulties as a group? 
- What were the factors that impeded or 
facilitated problem-solving? 
- Were there any constructive challenge 
& debate? 
- How was the construction of a common 
frame of reference/ shared 
understanding? Do you think did you 
have it at all? Do you think you could 
keep it throughout the game? 
- Why did you fail? / What made you 
successful? 
- Why did your initial strategy fail? Why 
didn’t you go with it in the first place? 
- What could you do better? What would 
you change in your attitudes / 
behaviours / choices / decisions if you 
were playing the game again? (if you 
again had some pre-time to develop a 
strategy) 
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10.3 Examples of documents provided with the Starter/Pre-Order Pack 
































10.5 The latest version of pre- and post-trading questionnaires  






















10.6 Contents of the self-completion measures 
Team 
Resilience 
• My team knew how to cope with challenges 
• My team was able to cope with difficult periods of time 
• We (team members) knew how to handle difficult situations 
when we faced them 
Collective 
mindfulness 
• We had a good “map” of each person’s talents and skills 
• We talked about mistakes and ways to learn from them 
• We discussed our unique skills with each other so that we 
knew who has relevant specialized skills and knowledge 
• We discussed alternatives as to how to go about our normal 
work activities 
• When discussing emerging problems with co-workers, we 
usually discussed what to look out for 
• When attempting to resolve a problem, we took advantage 
of the unique skills of our colleagues 
• We spent time identifying activities we did not want to go 
wrong. 
• When errors happened, we discussed how we could have 
prevented them 
• When a crisis occurred, we rapidly pooled our collective 




• Each team member had specialized knowledge of aspects of 
our project 
• I had knowledge about an aspect of the project that no other 
team member had 
• Different team members were responsible for expertise in 
different areas 
• The specialized knowledge of several different team 
members was needed to complete the project deliverables 
• I knew which team members had expertise in specific areas 
• I was comfortable accepting procedural suggestions from 
other team members 
• I trusted that other members’ knowledge about the project 
was credible 
• I was confident relying on the information that other team 
members brought to the discussion 
• When other members gave information, I wanted to double-
check it for myself                                                                         
• I did not have much faith in other members’ “expertise” 
• Our team worked together in a well-coordinated fashion 
• Our team had very few misunderstandings about what to do 
• Our team needed to backtrack and start over a lot                      
• We accomplished the task smoothly and efficiently 
• There was much confusion about how we would accomplish 
the task 
Team cohesion • Team members were united in trying to reach our goals for 
performance  
• All team members shared task responsibility for any mistake  
• Everyone tried to help if members had problems 
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• Team members communicated freely about each other’s 
responsibilities 
• Members rather went out on their own than as a team 
• Team members rarely socialized together 
• We liked to spend time outside of work hours 
• We stick together outside of the team project 
Collective 
improvisation 
• The team dealt with unanticipated events on the spot  
• Team members thought on their feet when carrying out 
actions 
• The team responded in the moment to unexpected problems  
• The team tried new approaches to problems  
• The team identified opportunities for new work processes 
• The team took risks in terms of producing new ideas in 
doing its job  
• The team demonstrated originality in its work 
Team Potency  • This team has confidence in itself 
• This team believes it can become unusually good at 
producing high-quality work 
• This team expects to be known as a high-performing team 
• This team feels it can solve any problem it encounters 
• This team believes it can be very productive 
• This team can get a lot done when it works hard 
• No task is too tough for this team 
• This team expects to have a lot of influence around here 
Individual 
Resilience 
• I tend to bounce back quickly after hard times 
• I have a hard time making it through stressful events  
• It does not take me long to recover from a stressful event 
• It is hard for me to snap back when something bad happens  
• I usually come through difficult times with little trouble 
• I tend to take a long time to get over set-backs in my life 
Affective well-
being 
Please indicate how often you experienced each of the following 

















10.7 Performance data used in the calculation of performance indicators 
Measure Explanation Contribution 
Number of 
members 
Throughout all seven runs of the simulation 
team sizes changed between 6 and 10. This 
number is recorded under this measure for 
each team.  
It is used to 
calculate certain 
performance 
variables on the 
“per head” level 
as team sizes 
differed. It is also 
used as a control 




This is the number of the orders delivered 
by the team and accepted by the controllers 
as a result of which team got paid. 





Cash at end This is the value of the cash left at a team’s 
account at the end of the trading period. 
It is used to 
calculate the 
profit (loss).  
Assets at end This is the cash value of the materials 
(sheets and envelopes) and equipment (pen, 
stencils, rulers, etc.) returned by a team to 
the controllers in good and reusable 
condition (for e.g. unfolded and unwritten 
sheets). 70% of its initial value is considered 
depreciated and the remaining 30% is 
added to team’s profit.   
This value is used 
to calculate the 
profit (loss). 
Total incomings This is the total value of a team’s cash and 
assets at the end of the trading period 
This value is used 
to calculate the 
profit (loss). 
Started pack This is a pre-defined pack of materials and 
equipment provided to teams in the first 
four runs of the simulation (the amount is 
credited from their accounts), in addition to 
any pre-orders they make. In the last three 
runs of the simulation, this pack is not 
provided and teams decided the whole 
amount of their pre-ordered materials and 
equipment freely.  
This value is used 
to calculate the 
profit (loss) for 
the first four runs 
of the simulation. 
Loans and 
interests 
This is the value of the materials, equipment 
and cash pre-ordered before the trading 
period plus any emergency loans taken 
during the trading period plus the interest 
incurred (10% for the pre-orders and 25% 
for the loans taken during the trading 
period).  
This value is used 
to calculate the 
profit (loss). 
Cost of table Starting with the 3rd simulation, teams are 
offered to choose the position of their 
production table by paying for it. Auctions 
This value is used 




were organised, and positions were sold one 
by one to the teams which paid to highest 
amount. The amount is considered a pre-
order loan and incurred 10% interest.  
Fines Teams are fined if they do not oblige the 
rules of the simulation, for instance in the 
form of bringing equipment and materials 
apart from the ones provided by the 
controllers. 
This value is used 




If a team cannot deliver an order within the 
order deadline, then this order is considered 
unfulfilled and incurred a penalty of the 
20% of the order. This order is not 
considered for assessment and so, the team 
did not get paid even if the order would 
meet the specifications. 
This value is used 
to calculate the 
profit (loss). 
Total outgoings This is the total value of starter pack (for the 
first four runs of the simulation), loans and 
interests, cost of table (for the last five runs 
of the simulation), fines and delivery 
penalties.   
This value is used 
to calculate the 
profit (loss). 





10.8 An example template for Strategic Plans  
2015-16 MBA Production Game: Review of Strategic Plans 
 
In the week beginning 12 October 2015 each team should present a short strategic 
plan that spells out your aspirations and intentions for the Game. Please submit these 
to Nick by email (nick.oliver@ed.ac.uk) no later than 0900 on Wednesday 14 
October. Review meetings should take place on the afternoons of Wednesday, 
Thursday or Friday 14-16 October. A representative from each team should contact 
Nick to arrange a time for their review meeting. 
The strategic plan should be no more than three pages, and should address the 
following issues: 
Company Mission 
In no more than one sentence, summarize the purpose of your Company - what it 
stands for, who it serves and any sources of distinctiveness. 
Objectives 
List up to four main objectives for your Company. 
Strategy 
How will you ensure that your Company is competitive relative to the other 
companies in the marketplace? What do you see as your strengths? What are your 
weaknesses? 
Organisation 
Briefly describe how your organisation reflects your strategy.  
Preparation & Planning 
a) How many times has your team met to plan and prepare for the trading period? 
b) What has been the typical duration of these meetings? 
c) What has been the typical % attendance at these meetings? 
Risks 
What are the greatest sources of risk and uncertainty that your Company faces? 
What steps have you taken to mitigate these? 
Finances 
a) How much loan capital do you wish to apply for? (You should provide a brief 
rationale for the amount requested). 
b) Approximately how much value do you think your Company will create during the 
Game? Please provide a ball park figure, in £, and a brief explanation of this. 
Additional Information  





10.9 Strategic review meeting guidelines for the researchers 
• Explain the purpose of your company and how you plan to ensure you will 
fulfil it.  
• How did you design your organisation that will support your strategy?  
• How will you approach the task?  
• Have you decided on any particular strategy concerning how 
you will select your orders (e.g., are you planning to go for a 
particular type of orders?)  
• How have you divided the work/ how did you decide who will take 
on specific roles?  
• What roles are your team members expected to take on?  
• Have you designated a leader of your company? If yes, has that 
facilitated or perhaps impaired your planning and preparations for 
the game? 
• How will you coordinate your activities? 
• What are the greatest risks that your Company faces? Describe any steps you 
have taken to mitigate these risks. 
• How much loan do you request and why? What is your rationale behind this 
amount?  
 
Preparation & Planning 
 
 
a) How many times has your team met to plan and prepare your strategic plan?  
b) How many times has your team met to plan and prepare for the trading 
period? 
c) What has been the typical duration of these meetings (in minutes)?   
d) What has been the typical % attendance at these meetings?     
e) On a scale from 1 (no effort at all) to 5 (a lot of effort), how much effort have 
you put into preparation for the trading period?     
f) On a scale from 1 (very poor) to 5 (excellent), how would you rate the 
cooperation between team members during the preparation period?   
g) On a scale from 1 (not at all frequent) to 5 (very frequent), how frequently 
have you experienced conflicts during the preparation period? 
h) On a scale from 1 (not at all disruptive) to 5 (very disruptive), how disruptive 
have the conflicts you experienced been during the preparation period?  
If you purchased the table in the auction, what were the reasons for going to that 
particular table?  
 
 
